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The contribution which John Oman has made to theology is evaluated in
this thesis by an examination of his life and intellectual background, a survey of
the general pattern of his major theological writings, an introduction to his method¬
ology, and an exposition and critical evaluation of the major themes of his theology.
The writer attempts to show that the traditional elements in Oman's think¬
ing came from his Calvinistic background, but that the creative stimulus for the
distinctive elements in his theology were provided by Schleiermacher and Ritschl.
From them Oman learned the significance of freedom in theology, and the major
thesis of his thought may be characterized as a consistent presentation of the view
that freedom in its fulness is possible only when it is firmly based upon a reality
which faith apprehends and which sustains man's free action within the world.
The primary task of his theology, therefore, is the attempt to relate freedom,
interpreted in its profoundest personalistic sense, to the whole of theology in
an adequate methodology and in the major themes of his thought—i.e. , in the con¬
cepts of authority, religion, reconciliation and the Church.
Oman's methodology is that man is to survey his environment, both
Natural and Supernatural, from the highest standpoint he can reach, with all his
experience, insight, and knowledge, and that this must be attempted in an atti¬
tude of reverence and sincerity. He applied this method consistently and com¬
prehensively to his theology and this is largely responsible for the integrity and
wholeness of his thought which makes it a practical concern of life.
(over)
Use other side if necessary.
Oman has made a significant contribution to theology in certain areas
such as the existential interpretation of religious authority, the reorientation of
the doctrine of reconciliation according to its essential personalistic nature, and
the insistence on the spiritual nature of the Church in its organization, method and
task. However, there are some very serious limitations in his theology, such as
the lack of an adequate treatment of the doctrines of sin and revelation; further¬
more, his contribution to theology would have been much greater if the Christo-
logical and kerygmatic framework of the Christian faith had been given fuller
expression and control in his thought. It is therefore concluded that Oman's
greatest contribution to theology lies in his methodology where freedom, per¬
sonality, sincerity, and comprehensiveness are essential concepts and attitudes
for the study of theology.
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THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN OMAN
C H A P T E R I
THE LIFE OF JOHN OMAN
CHAPTER I
THE LIFE OF JOHN OMAN
In Stenness, Orkney, on July 23, 1860, there was born to Simon
and Isabella Oman a son, John Wood, who would in future years be pointed
out as among the most original minds that have contributed to theological
studies in recent times. * John Oman was the second son in a family of
four sons and two daughters born on the farm of Biggins, which had been
owned by the Oman ancestry for hundreds of years.^ Simon Oman, John's
father, was a sailor and farmer, humble and uneducated; yet in the dedica¬
tion of The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries John
Oman described him as "a scholar only of life and action, but my best
3
teacher." Coming from one whose education reached great breadth, "these
words are significant: probably they express appreciation of encouragement
to do his own thinking, however much information he might imbibe from
4
teachers."
*H. H. Farmer, "Memoir of the Author," in John Oman, Honest
Religion (Cambridge: University Press, 1941), p. xxx.
2George Alexander, "Memoir of the Author," in John Oman, Honest
Religion (Cambridge: University Press, 1941), p. xvi.
■j
John Oman, The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two
Centuries (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1906), p. v.
^F. R. Tennant, "John Wood Oman, 1860-1939," Proceedings of
the British Academy (1939), p. 333.
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John Oman grew up a Northerner in character, and it was said of
the mature man:
In Dr. Oman's veins flows the blood of the Vikings and his
home is in the sea-girt Orkneys, where nature yields a hard-
won sustenance to a hardy toiling race. And it is the spirit of
his sea-king ancestors that he has brought to the great adven¬
ture of life-dreams of great conquests, but also a resolute
facing of ail the dangers and difficulties of wind and wave, of
current and shoal. *
Oman's mind was deeply shaped by the "freedom and simplicity of his boy¬
hood— its close contacts with the soil and the sea and with the hardy and
2
vigorous folk who gained their living from them." They were, according
to Oman, folk who, "whether for thought or action, divided humanity into
men who went to sea and muffs who stayed at home, and for whom the Sover¬
eignty of God meant the assurance of being able to face all storms, and seek
no harbour of refuge." Professor H.H. Farmer recognized the influence of
Oman's Orcadian home, saying: "When I think of the great man, heather,
and salt winds, and mountain mists come to mind rather than a gown and
lecturer's desk; and his thought is the profounder for this."^
Dr. Oman once described how as a small boy, standing alone at the
edge of the open sea, he had reflected upon the world around him:
*"The New Principal, An Appreciation," The Monthly Messenger
of the Presbyterian Church of England (No. 928, July, 1922), p. 154.
^H. H. Farmer, "Oman, John Wood," Dictionary of National
Biography (1931-1940), p. 657.
■3
John Oman, Honest Religion (Cambridge: University Press, 1941),
p. 165.
4
Farmer, "Memoir," p. xxxi.
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To the very long sight of one who constantly looked from
horizon to horizon, the depth of the sky was overwhelmingly
impressive, and was the first object I think ever to hold my
attention immovably. It compelled me to think of travelling
on and on for ever and ever without being any nearer the end.
Thus though space was, as it were, the illustration, the real
impressiveness was in time: and perhaps time is always what
gives the impressive quality. Through this first came the idea
that I was alone. I had been to church. I think the preacher
had been expressing the absolute difference between good and
evil under the material forms of heaven and hell. I went down
to the edge of the water alone, and stood, a very small child,
with the full tide at my feet. Along the smooth waters of the
sound a path of sunshine carried the eye out to the open sea.
It flashed on me that, if I dropped in and floated out, with
endless sea around, I should be alone for ever and ever.
The result was a consciousness of myself which set me
thinking, yet not about myself. Instead, it caused doubt about
whether the world I saw was in the least like the world other
people saw. I tried hard to find out.
The passage indicates how Oman's environment early stirred his reflective
mind and foreshadowed his career as philosopher and theologian.
Oman said that at the age of fourteen, his ambition was no higher
than "to ride a horse bare-backed and steer a boat in a gale." But in due
course he sought other skills and arrived at them with distinction. When he
was seventeen he entered Edinburgh University, "a raw lad from the ends of
the earth with little equipment, except a vast responsiveness to the intellectual
1 John Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural (Cambridge: Univer-
s ty ress, 1931), pp. 136-37.
2
Honest Religion, p. 36.
environment."* His mind was well-stored and, more important, his native
gift of original thought was unimpaired.
Oman recorded the following event which occurred during his student
days and made a lasting impression upon his thought. "When I was a student,"
he related, "a great crowd of us were addressed by some very distinguished
people—Browning and Lowell and Helmholz and Virchow and Pasteur and
Lesseps and Saffi." But the statement he most vividly remembered came
from Lavaleye, a Belgian economist.
He began, he said, by being of the school of Mill, with every¬
thing determined by supply and demand, with freedom mainly in
political safeguards for freedom of exchange. But one day he was
struck by the singular fact that all Christian countries, with the
possible exception of Russia, were in some real sense free, and
that no other country was so in any real sense. Then he saw that
freedom depended, not on political safeguards, but on the people
for whom freedom was dearer than life, and that this went back*
2
to the great demand, "Let a man deny himself."
This incident served to impress the significance of freedom upon one who
would give it much emphasis in later years.
When Oman enrolled in the University of Edinburgh, the Robertson
Smith controversy was at its height and left a deep impression upon him.
Oman felt that Robertson Smith was a man loyal to the spirit of investigation,
being condemned for vanity by people who did not know and did not want to know
*John Oman, "Method in Theology," The Expositor (Ninth Series,
Vol. IV, 1925), p. 437.
John Oman, Concerning the Ministry (London; Student Christian
Movement Press, 1936), p. 13.
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the truth. Oman acknowledged that his own understanding of the issues
was at the time perhaps immature and uninformed; even so, the event
troubled him deeply. * He explained:
What influenced me at the time was not criticism, but the
ecclesiastical attitude towards it. This was expressed by a
lawyer of my acquaintance, in a way which shocked me all the
more that he was a really good man as well as a most devout
elder of the Free Church. "Granting," he said, ' that Robertson
Smith is right, if it is truth, it is dangerous truth, and h- has no
right, as a professor of the Church, to upset the Church by de¬
claring it." I hope I have not since weakened in my loyalty to
truth, but in those days I thought intellectual truth the one
worthy pursuit in life: and this suggested that the Church was
not interested in it. Had I been then intending the ministry,
probably I should have been put off it, but this affected me
somewhat as a call to my life's work. ... I was left no option
between facing the search for a truth, which would shine in its
own light in face of all inquiry, and complete scepticism."'
Brought up in the United Presbyterian Church, Oman decided to
enter its ministry. "I did not want to be a minister," he said, "but some-
3
how could not escape." The ministerial training involved an Arts Course
of four years, which Oman at that time had almost completed, followed by
three years in the Church's Theological College. Having taken a distinguished
place in the classes required for the ordinary degree, Oman attended the
advanced classes and graduated in 1882 with first class honors in Philosophy.^
^"Method in Theology," p. 452.
2
John Oman, Vision and Authority (London: Uoddcr and Stoughton,
2nd ed. 1928), pp. 9-10. See Appendix A at the end of this thesis.
3
Concerning the Ministry, p. 33.
^"First Class Certificate of Merit," of the University of Edinburgh,
dated 1881-82 and signed by A.C. Fraser, Professor, (continued on page 8)
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With his distinguished record at Edinburgh University, Oman was
awarded the Gray and Rhind Scholarships which were open to graduates of
the University, and proceeded to the theological college of the United Presby¬
terian Church, also in Edinburgh. As the classes were recognized by the
University for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity, he added that to his Arts
degree.1
Oman's personal characteristics at this time apparently did not
foretell the magnitude he would achieve in his profession, for one fellow-
student wrote:
Among many unexpected turns in Oman's career, the most
unlikely was that the dreamy, shy youth who addressed fellow-
students of his own Church with such diffidence, and at whom
we were apt to smile, until we found he was always worth listen¬
ing to, should have come to speak with confidence and authority
to men of all Churches. . . .
In the critical years. . . great thinking strove with limita¬
tions of oral expression, in circumstances where the value of
the latter could not be despised and, so far as his chosen profes¬
sion was concerned, narrowly escaped defeat.^
Oman himself was keenly conscious of his limitations of speech. In later
(continuing footnote 4 from page 7) shows that Oman "acquitted him¬
self with high distinction," and "obtained the second prize." The Certificate
is now in the library of Westminster College, Cambridge.
*Alphabetical List of Graduates of the University of Edinburgh
from 1859 to 1888 (Edinburgh: Published by order of the Senatus Academicus
by James Thin, no date), p. 67.
2
Alexander, op. cit. , pp. xv-xvi.
-9-
years, addressing himse f to young ministers, he declared:
You cannot have less natural gift for free speech than I had,
nor possibly receive less encouragement to try. One friend
said, "It is no use. Your written word seldom lacks character,
your spoken word has none." Another said, "What on earth
took you to-day? I heard your voice certainly, but not one
word that was yours." . . . Wherefore, though it tried the
long-suffering of the audience and distressed myself, I per¬
sisted. As these talks may show, the result still is nothing
to boast of. *
During Oman's student days many students of the United Presby¬
terian College went for summer terms in German universities, particu¬
larly to Erlangen. In the summer of 1883, accordingly, Oman went there
and attended the lectures of Frank, Zahn, Class and Hauck. The theologi¬
cal society welcomed him to guest membership and this contributed to the
educational value of the term. Two summers later, Oman went to the Uni¬
versity of Heidelberg where the chief attractions were Hausrath in New
Testament Introduction, Merz on the Psalms, Bartsch on German Litera¬
ture and Kuno Fischer on Faust. ^ After the summer in Heidelberg, Oman
A
proceeded to Neuchatel where he remained nearly three months and gained
fluency in French. He already had a thorough knowledge of German and was
able in later years to be very much at home in speaking on the Continent.
^Concerning the Ministry, p. 190.
^John Oman, "Germany, Fifty Years Apart," British Weekly(Vol.
XCVII, January 24, 1935), p. 347. Cf. Alexander, op. cit. , p. xviii.
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The value of his study in Germany was recognized by F.R. Tennant, who
said: "It was German theology . . . that stimulated and directed his re¬
searches by supplying him with products of thought congenial to his own
habit of mind*"* During this period of his life, Oman was already in agree¬
ment with the cardinal principles of Ritschlianism and had become deeply
2
interested in Schleiermacher's thought. This interest later resulted in
Oman's first published work, the translation of Schleiermacher's Speeches
3
on Religion.
After Oman returned from Neuchatel he was licensed to the Presby¬
terian ministry and became a Probationer of the United Presbyterian Church,
seeking to obtain a charge. The method by which Probationers obtained pas¬
torates at that time was this: A small committee within the Presbytery sent
to the vacant congregations several probationers, each of whom would
preach two Sundays. After hearing several prospects, the Congregation
would select their preference.^ The system obviously depended heavily
upon the pulpit gifts of the prospective young ministers. Although Oman
preached in a number of vacant churches, he lacked what was termed a
^Tennant, op. cit. , pp. 333-34.
2 Ibid.
Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, On Religion, Speeches to Its
Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (London: Kegan Pauls French, Trub-
ner and Co. , Ltd. , 1893), with introduction by the translator.
^James Brown, The Life of a Scottish Probationer (Glasgow:
James Maclehose, 1877), pp. 85-87.
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good delivery, and the quality of his sermons was often overlooked as a
consequence. Eventually he took charge of a preaching station at Makers-
toun, near Kelso, where for a few months he walked several miles from
Kelso for the Sunday services. .After a time he became assistant at St.
James Church, Paisley, of which Dr. James Brown was the minister.*
Dr. Brown was a man of great charm who had a large and devoted congrega¬
tion, and in Oman he found one whom he learned to love and trust completely
as an assistant. 2
Something of Oman's personality and character at this stage of
his development may be seen in the following description by a friend:
Anyone who wanted proof of Oman's inner quality, and who there¬
from would have forecast his career, had only to see him as I
first saw him, sailing an open boat on a wide sea! It was in
Orkney, in Stromness, where his home was. . . .
. . .The first man I sought in Stromness was John Oman, at
that time a probationer, though already assistant to Dr. James
Brown of Paisley. He invited me to a set of tennis. . . . It was a
calm afternoon; and, being neither of us a master of the game,
Oman suggested a sail. Soon we were slipping out of the bay, I
forward, Oman at the rudder. We had a long afternoon and even¬
ing (It was early June and in a northern latitude) and the skipper
thought we might make for the "Old Man of Hoy," or at least
might get a nearer view of that solemn and upstanding rock.
It was there and then that I saw Oman as God had made him
and as he throughout "obeyed his own commandment."
It did not occur to me to chatter. Neither did he speak. An
open boat on the Pentland Firth is enough occupation for a man.
We had sailed for a matter of an hour or so, into the afternoon
sun, when I heard him say, "I think we'll put about." Put about we
did, and at the same moment he gave his boat all the breeze she
*Tennant, op. cit. , p. 658.
2
Alexander, op. cit. , p. xix.
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could gather. Soon there was a wind in pursuit of us and by the
time we got inside the harbour it was blowing hard. He seemed,
even there and then, and on thai issue, to be given to discerning
the signs of the times.
During his months at Paisley, Oman continued to preach in various
churches in the area and toward the end of 1889 he accepted a call to be min¬
ister of Clayport Street Church, Alnwick, Northumberland. Thus he passed
into the Presbyterian Church of England, and was to remain in its service to
the end of his life.^ Although the Alnwick Church had for some time been
closed down, it responded to Oman's leadership and he remained there for
seventeen years, during which time the Church grew both in size and
depth. ^
To the Alnwick days Oman owed his first acquaintance with Miss
Mary Hannah Blair, daughter of Mr. Hunter Blair of Gosforth. This acquaint¬
ance led to their marriage in 1897.
Already John Oman was known to the discriminating all over the
land, and to the natural grace and charm of a young wife there
was added from the beginning a natural and proper pride in his
distinction as a scholar and as a student. The natural and proper
pride continued all through the intervening years, corroborated as
it was increasingly by John Oman's increasing recognition by the
world.
*"John Oman: In Memoriam," British Weekly (CVI, May 25, 1939),
pseudo. Watchman, p. 126.
Tennant, op. cit. , p. 658.
3"News of the Churches," British Weekly (Vol. XVIII, May 16,
1895), p. 59.
"Mrs. John Oman," British V eekly (Vol. CI, December 24,
1936), p. 314.
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Oman used to enjoy relating that on the first service after returning from
his honeymoon, he took as his text Psalm 67: "Lord bless and pity us."
Pity, however, was not a term applicable to their union. Mrs. Oman was
able in succeeding years to prove her capacity in the home and in the church
work, and was also the "mentor which the rather absent minded ways of her
husband at times needed."*
While in Alnwick, Oman accomplished what, "regarded as the first
2
fruits of his studies, must be deemed a notable achievement." He trans¬
lated Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion, a work which, though epoch-
making for theological thought, had not previously appeared in the English
language. Oman recorded an experience which he had soon after his trans¬
lation was published.
A venerable German professor of a simple and benevolent frame
of mind, when ... I was introduced to him as one who had re¬
cently translated Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion into
English for the first time, regarded me as a person of dubious
veracity. He was quite convinced that the book must have been-
already in English for the best part of a century; and, consider¬
ing the multitude of German theological works which, in that
interval, had not only been translated but had found their way to
lighting material and not intellectual fires, his scepticism was
justified. ^
It was while he was at Alnwick that Oman's quality as an unusually
learned, powerful, and original thinker in the field of theology began to be
*
Alexander, op. cit. , p. xxi.
2
G. K. MacBean, "An Appreciation of Dr. Oman," The Modern
Churchman (XXI, No. 11, February, 1932), p. 596.
3
John Oman, Review of The Christian Faith, British Weekly,
(Vol. LXXXV, February 28, 19297Tp. 493.
-14-
more widely known, primarily through the publication in 1902 of Vision
and Authority. The book "revealed a mind singularly able to keep pro¬
found and informed theological reflection in close relation with the reli¬
gious life and its problems."* With its publication he seemed suddenly to
be brought into prominence. As one reviewer put it: "It is seldom indeed
that a reviewer has the good fortune to come upon a book like this, by
which a comparatively unknown author passes at a bound into the front
2
ranks of serious religious thinkers." With Oman's new prominence came
additional invitations for lectureships and new positions. In the next four
years he declined a Professorship at Ormand College, University of Mel-
bourne, Australia, and a Chair of Systematic Theology in Chicago.
In 1904 Oman received his degree of Doctor of Philosophy from
the University of Edinburgh. That year also found him temporarily occu¬
pied in a place where he later was to serve permanently , Westminster Col¬
lege, Cambridge, for it was that year that he delivered the Westminster
*Tennant, op. ci-t. , p. 658.
^"The Seat of Authority, " Glasgow Herald (No. 119, May 19,
1902), p. 286.
3"News of the Churches," British Weekly (Vols. XXXII and
XXXIX, July 9, 1902 and March 22, 1906), pp. 286 and 673.
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1 2
Association Lectures on "Some Inherited Problems of Theology."
In January, 1906, Oman delivered the Kerr Lectures at the Glas¬
gow College of the United Free Church of Scotland. This was a special honor
since he was the first non-member of the United Free Church to be invited by
the Kerr Trustees. Oman acknowledged this honor and added humorously:
"Though I am a child of one of the churches now so truly united in her fold,
I have all my ministry been what I fear she regards as a 'stranger of the
Dispersion' in England." The lectures which Oman gave at Glasgow were
a revision and expansion of what he had given at Westminster College in
1904, and were published in November, 1906, as The Problem of Faith and
Freedom in the Last Two Centuries. The book "evinces that the writer's
4
independence of thought was proportionate to his capacity for absorption."
In 1907 Oman sailed for the United States where he delivered a
series of lectures to the students of Auburn Theological Seminary in New
York.5
1,1Ministerial Training: College," Digest of the Proceedings of
the Synods of the Presbyterian Church of England, 1876-1905, compiled by
Samuel William C&rrulhers (London: Publishing Office of the Presbyterian
Church of England, 1907), p. 275.
2
According to Professor H.H. Farmer, these lectures were not
published and are not available among Dr. Oman's private papers. The title
was given in the above referenced article in the Digest of Proceedings.
Faith and Freedom, pp. vi-viii.
4
Tennant, op. cit. , p. 336.
5
"News of the Churches," British Weekly (Vol. XLI, February 7,
1907), p. 501.
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The publication of Vision and Authority and The Problem of Faith
and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries had brought Oman a reputation as
"one of the Church's great philosophers, and at once marked him out for a
professorial chair. In 1907 he was nominated for the Chair of Systematic
Theology at Westminster College, Cambridge, which had been vacated by
Principal Dykes' retirement. Two other men, D.S. Cairns and P. Car¬
negie Simpson were seriously considered by the presbyteries for the posi¬
tion. At his own request, Cairn's name was withdrawn, and at the annual
2
assembly, Oman was elected over Simpson for the chair.
When he accepted his new position in May, 1907, Oman told his
Alnwick congregation that, while he had been called to a wider sphere of
labor and would have more to do with the Church in general, he would not
lose touch with the congregation at Alnwick which had meant so much to
3
him during his ministry. The congregation "left Mrs. Oman and himself
in no doubt that the ties forged between members and minister would, as
4
he hoped, be enduring." Years later a visitor to the community reported
^"The Rev. Dr. J.W. Oman, Westminster College, Cambridge,"
The Times (No. 48,308, May 18, 1939), p. 21.
^Digest of the Proceedings of the Synods of the Presbyterian Church
of England, 1906-1920, compiled by Samuel William Carruthers (London:
Publishing Office of the Presbyterian Church of England, 1907), p. 147. Dr.
Oman received 402 of 503 votes cast.
•^"News of the Churches," British Weekly (XLII, May 16, 1907), p. 141.
4
Alexander, op. cit. , p. xxii.
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that "the farm labourers still look back with happy memories to the time
when 'the Doctor' was among them."*
Oman was inducted at Westminster College on October 10, 1907,
2
along with Anderson Scott, newly-elected Professor of New Testament.
The Rev. Dr. Monro Gibson, acting Principal of the College, conducted
3
the service and gave the charge.
The first part of it referred to the interesting time in which the
new professors were entering upon their duties—a time of transi¬
tion, which was trying men's souls; a time following a period of
destructive criticism that had shaken everything in Christianity
which could be'shaken; a time when the inspiring work of recon¬
struction had begun. They would, therefore take their places
amongst the "repairers of breaches" and the builders of a
twentieth century "Temple of Faith," which would be greater
and grander than any that had preceded it.^
During his early years at Westminster College, Oman was one of
a remarkably distinguished teaching staff. Dr. John Skinner in Old Testa¬
ment, Professor Charles Anderson Scott in New Testament, Professor P.
Carnegie Simpson in Church History, and Dr. Oman in Dogmatics and Philo¬
sophy of Religion formed "that quattuorvirate which for many years adorned
its lecture rooms.
*"The New Principal, An Appreciation," op. cit. , p. 289.
2
"Ministerial Training: College," op. cit. , p. 289.
^"Westminster College, Cambridge," British Weekly (Vol.XLIII,
October 17, 1907), p. 29.
4Ibid. , p. 41.
^John Kenneth Mozley, Some Tendencies in British Theology from
the Publication of Lux Mundi to the Present Day (London: S.P.C.K. , 195l),
p. 161.
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Oman quickly won the hearts of his students by his bold and fear¬
less expression of truth as he had himself experienced it, and by the up-to-
date methods he took to correlate his views with the problems of modern life. *
His teaching was
always stimulating because always exacting, never ornate but
pointed by memorable sayings, profound because it was always
concerned with reality. He was a great teacher of religion be¬
cause he was a religious teacher, and religion for him was con¬
cerned with the whole of life.2
Of all the values of his new position, Oman valued most the close
relation between professor and student which was possible in a residential
college like Westminster. "To be with him on a Sunday and find his students
dropping in . . . was to realize a relationship a classroom by itself could
never give."
Oman's magnitude as a profound scholar and original thinker was
fully recognized in the University of Cambridge. The University admitted
him to its privileges as it had other Westminster Professors not already
Cambridge graduates, by conferring the honorary degree of M.A. and mak-
4
ing him a member of Queens' College. For many years he served on the
lnThe Rev. Dr. J.W. Oman, Westminster College, Cambridge,"
op. cit. , p. 21.
2
R. D. Whitehorn, "Obituary, The Rev. John Oman," The Cam¬
bridge Review (LX, May 26, 1939, No. 1480), p. 423.
3
Alexander, op. cit. , p. xxiii.
^Cambridge University Calendar (Cambridge: University Press,
1930), p. 588.
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University's Faculty of Divinity and on its Degree Committee. 1 Through
these activities, and through his lectures and books, he came to be one of
the strongest influences in the study of the philosophy of religion in Cam¬
bridge. The following evaluation of Oman's contribution to the University
has been given by one of the professors:
On the Faculty Board, though not himself directly concerned
with the details of University routine and administration, Oman's
learning and wide range of scholarship, and his deep interest in
education as something much greater than mere instruction, gave
great weight to his opinion on all questions that concerned the
policy of the Faculty. His service to the Degree Committee was
especially notable, and it was far from being confined to opinions
on works in the Philosophy of Religion. His shrewdness and
humour, and his dislike of sham or pretentious work could make
him a severe critic where severity was deserved; but his judgment
was always generous in its recognition of good work and of promise,
especially in the young student. His knowledge of men and things,
his great powers of observation, and that direct and profound ac¬
quaintance with simple and unsophisticated things, which was one
of his outstanding characteristics, gave sureness and originality
to all his judgments, and enabled him always to penetrate to the
heart of the matter. Members of the Faculty who learned from
his wisdom and enjoyed his friendship cherish their memory of
him."
When Oman had been at Westminster College three years, he was
chosen by his alma mater, the University of Edinburgh, to receive the
honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity. The Dean of the Faculty of Divinity
presented him to the Senatus by saying:
^Tennant, op. cit. , p. 336.
2
Mr. Boys Smith, now Bursar of St. John's College, Cambridge,
quoted by Farmer, "Memoir," p. xxx.
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On three separate occasions Mr. Oman has already appeared
at your hands and those of your predecessors to receive degrees
in Arts, Divinity and Philosophy-—an almost unique record. . . .
He appears by invitation of the Senatus to receive an honorary
degree in harmony with the position which he has gained as a
theologian and the office which he holds. *
Oman published The Church and the Divine Order in 1911. In
1913 his name was mentioned in connection with the vacancy in the Glasgow
United Free College occasioned by the death of Professor James Orr.^
Upon hearing of the matter, Oman's Presbytery, the London North Pres¬
bytery, adopted a resolution expressing deep concern at the possibility of
his being called to Glasgow, and their earnest hope that he would remain in
the Presbyterian Church, "to whose welfare and progress he seems at the
■7
present time to be indispensable.""^ The resolution pointed out that a new
and higher ideal of personal devotion and ministerial efficiency was at work
in the Church and that this could be traced largely to Oman's influence over
4
the younger ministers. A month after that resolution, Oman appeared
before the Presbytery and stated that he "had been led to see that it was
his duty ... to live and labour in England, where the great religious
1
,
"British Table Talk," British Weekly (Vol. XLVIII, July 18,
1910), p. 378.
2
"News of the Churches," British Weekly (Vol. LV, December 18,
1913), p. 392.
3




problems of the day are centered."*
Between 1913 and 1916 Oman was appointed by Cambridge Uni¬
versity as its Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion, the first Non-
2
conformist to hold that important office. He was to serve two other terms
as Stanton Lecturer: 1919-1922, and 1929-1932."
World War I brought a radical reduction in the enrollment of West¬
minster College during 1914-1916, and in 1917 the College Committee decided
not to reopen the College. The few students exempt from military service on
medical grounds were removed to Birmingham where Professors Oman and
4
Scott supervised their work. The Birmingham Presbytery gave seats to
Professors Oman and Scott, and Dr. Oman's time was abundantly occupied
with maintaining the services of churches without ministers, visiting mili¬
tary hospitals, and giving numerous addresses in an effort to keep up the
e
spirit of the people during the trying days.
The problems of war led Oman in 1915 to publish The War and Its
*"News of the Churches," British Weekly (Vol. LVI, April 16,
1914), p. 704. ""
2Ibid. , (May 15, 1913), p. 178.
■'Farmer, Dictionary of National Biography, p. 658.
^"Ministerial Training: College, " loc. cit. Dr. Oman's daughter,
Miss Maisie Oman, does not remember that Dr. Scott was with them in
Birmingham; therefore, there may be a discrepancy in the record here.
5"Home Mission: General," Digest of Proceedings, 1906-1920,
loc. cit.
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Issues, an "attempt at a Christian judgment of war."* During the war
years, under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A., he visited the troops in France.
ills experiences there left deep and lacting impressions on Oman's sensitive
spirit. Years later he told of being at a memorial ceremony in Cambridge
when his imagination took him back to those experiences:
I was in a street in Boulogne. A young lad stood before me,
from whom I had parted a few weeks before. Then his face was
full of the joy of life. Now, a few days before, he had left three
hundred of his comrades behind him at Neuve Chapelle, and his
face had the haggard, dazed look of a child that had lost all its
bearings in the dark. Then I was with another lad from Hill 60,
dying slowly, not in pain but in terrible tension, of a bullet
through his spine, in a little hospital at the Forward Base, be¬
seeching me to write his mother assuring her that he was all
right. . . . And I was in the cemetery in Rouen after the Somme,
amid the rows of graves to which the young and strong were being
gathered to the dust. The rest was all painting on the surface:
this was the true vision to be seen in the mirror of the war.^
Late in 1917 Oman's Grace and Personality appeared. Although
the book had its groundwork in a series of articles which appeared in The
Expositor, ^ It had been entirely rewritten in the light of the war and Oman's
experiences in the camps and hospitals. He explained the appearance of
*John Oman, The War and Its Issues (Cambridge: University
Press, 1915), preface, unnumbered page.
2
John Oman, "Turfing the Grave," Dialogue With God (London:
James Clarke & Co. , Ltd. , 1950), pp. 45-46.
'"John Oman, "Personality and Grace," The Expositor (Eighth
Series, Vol. II, October and December, 1911), pp. 358-67, 456-63; Vol.
Ill, February, March, May , June, 1912), pp. 171-78, 236-42, 468-75,
528-34; (Vol. IV, July, August, September, October, November and Decem¬
ber, 1912), pp. 57-60, 138-42, 252-62 , 354-62, 414-23, 526-38.
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the book in this way:
What has waited so long, it may be thought, might have
waited till the end of the War afforded more leisure and calm
of mind for studies which, to most people, will seem remote
from all issues of the conflict. Yet the work, as it now stands,
is the effect of the war. It scattered my students, interrupted
more directly historical and philosophical studies into which an
appointment to the University lectureship on the Philosophy of
Religion at Cambridge had led me, sent me into camps and hos¬
pitals, where fundamental religious questions were constantly
being discussed, and forced upon me the reco sideration of my
whole religious position. Moreover, the fact that such sorrow
and wickedness could happen in the world, became the crucible
in which my whole view of the world had to be tested.
. . .As, during the years in which the book was being writ¬
ten, I was living, at home or in France, continually among the
men in the army, and saw the large company of my student friends
sorrowfully dwindling, and was called with bitter frequency to
mourn with the companions of my youth and others near and dear,
my success may not have been equal to my intention. But that, I
trust, will not obscure the conviction, which these years have only
strengthened, that the greatest need, even of our needy time, is a
religion shining in its own light, and that greater than all politi¬
cal securities for peace, would be a Christian valuation of men and
means, souls and things. *
After the war Westminster College resumed its work in Cambridge
and Dr. Oman returned to his teaching activities. In 1921 he published a
volume of his sermons, The Paradox of the World.
At the English Presbyterian Church's General Assembly in May,
1921, Principal John Skinner announced that he intended to resign the Prin-
cipalship of Westminster College at the next meeting of the Assembly.^
1
John Oman, Grace and Personality (Cambridge: University Press,
1917), pp. v-vi.
2
'"An Assembly Diary," The Monthly Messenger of the Presbyterian
Church of England (No. 927, June, 1922), p. 128.
The three other Westminster Professors—-Anderson Scott, Carnegie Simp¬
son and Oman—were all qualified and would have been reasonable choices
for the Princ'tpalship. Consequently, all three were nominated by various
presbyteries.1 When the Assembly met in early May, 1922, it was
"charged with a certain electricity of excitement," because of the "embar¬
rassing range of choice" presented by the nominations.2 "All the speeches
in support of the nominees were in excellent taste. . . but the outstanding
speech was certainly that of the Rev. Roderick Macleod on behalf of Pro-
3fessor Oman." The assembly was visibly impressed and the result of
the ballot showed that Professor Oman had been elected.^ He signified his
acceptance^ while the speeches of both Scott and Simpson revealed an atti¬
tude of loyal support and cooperation.^
Oman was inaugurated as Principal of Westminster College in
October, 1922. His inaugural address, "Method In Theology," was mas¬
sive in form, packed with thought, and it covered a very wide area, no less
inNews of the Churches," British Weekly (Vol. LXXI, October 6,
November 10, December 8 and 15, 1921), pp. 18, 138, 250, 274; (February 2,
1922), p. 408; (October 13, 1921), p. 42.
2
"An Assembly Diary,' loc. cit.
3"News of the Churches," British Weekly (LXXII, May 11, 1922),
p. 118.
4 "Dr. Oman Elected Principal," Minutes of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church of England (Vol. XVI, 1922-24), p. 61.
^"Dr. Oman Accepts Appointment," Ibid. , p. 62.
k"An Assembly Diary," op. cit., p. 131.
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than 'the study of theology'. He urged again and again the necessity for
seeking absolute truth. Ke made it plain, however, that his primary in¬
terest was still his teaching. "The office I would magnify is still my old
calling of a teacher of theology, and did this office make that secondary it
would be a very Irish promotion.
The variety of Oman's interest as a scholar was illustrated in 1923
when he branched out from his usual area of thought to publish The Book of
Revelation, in which he propounded an ingenious and attractive theory of the
composition of that much disputed book. lie apparently spent extensive time
on the subject of the Apocalypse, for his next book, five years later, was
entitled The Text of Revelation.
In 1928, twenty-six years after its original publication, Vision and
Authority was reissued. Principal Oman related an interesting anecdote to
explain the reissue:
One day, happening to be in Edinburgh, I ran across an old
friend whom I had not seen for some years. "Having now," he
said, "like the old lady, become an 'octogeranium,' I no longer
read theology, but get my theology from the poets. There is,
however, one book I read a great deal, which may or may not be
an exception, because I don't know whether it is theology or not.
It is called Vision and Authority. Do you, I wonder, ever read
it?" I said I had not opened it for any years. "I thought as
much," he said. "But take my advice and read it. I know it
"^"Westminster College, Cambridge," British Weekly (Vol. LXXIII,
October 12, 1922), p. 29.
^Gman, "Method in Theology," p. 438.
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will do you good." As soon as I could find time I followed his
advice: and this re-issue is the result. *
When Professor Oman reached his late sixties he looked back over
several decades of theological development and gave a valuable characteriza¬
tion of his age:
Not fifteen years ago. . . but nearer fifty, my generation. . .
found themselves theologically homeless.
The earlier generation, even Robertson Smith himself,
thought that criticism was only a matter of dates; on mine
came the stress of the conviction that the old foundation had
vanished. Not a soul helped us to rebuild. We dug clay cut
of German tomes, and our style suffered from evil communi¬
cations; we had still to make bricks, and there was no straw.
In the Anglican Church patrons sometimes came to the rescue,
but where there was popular election we wandered in the wil¬
derness for years; and no wonder, for we were not sure of
what to say, and we had mastered no popular form in which to
say it. But we did begin to see that there were foundations,
and that, though the religion that had been built on an external
authority had fallen, there were dim outlines to be seen of a
different kind of Christianity, which had, as it were, been the
steel frame all the time, and which stood in its own strength.
About our individual contributions we have reason to be modest.
Perhaps there is nothing like a great book in the whole produc¬
tion. Yet a great change of view has taken place. ^
In 1928 Dr. Oman was honored by Oxford University with the degree
Doctor of Divinity. When he was introduced it was said of him,"Dr. Oman
has made it his purpose in his books to resolve some of the apparent
Vision and Authority, preface to second edition, pp. 9-11. After
the second edition, the work continued unaltered through six more editions,
the eighth being published in 1948 with an introduction by T.W. Manson, and
the fifth being published in the United States as well as In England.
2
John Oman, Review of H.R.L. Sheppard's The Impatience of a
Parson, British Weekly (LXXXIII, October 27, 1927), p. 84.
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contradictions in the relation of God and man."1 The following year, 1929,
Oman was invited to address a gathering of Scottish ministers belonging to
the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland. His lectures were published in a
small pamphlet entitled The Office of the Ministry.
Dr. Oman's retirement had been scheduled, along with that of
Professor Scott, to take place in 1931. The Assembly of 1930, however,
asked both men to continue for another year.^ Both decided to remain, and
Oman made their decision known to the Assembly.
He had a great reception as he came forward to acknowledge
the invitation. "Dr. Scott and I," he said, "are in your hands.
We have come to the time when perhaps we no longer run and
are not weary, but so long as we can go on and not faint, it is
enough.
Oman's own Church honored him in 1931 by electing him to its
highest office, that of Moderator of the General Assembly. Prolonged
applause greeted him to show how unanimous was the Assembly's choice.
In a few dignified and feeling words, Dr. Robertson conveyed the decision
to Oman, who thereupon proceeded to the pulpit to deliver the Moderator's
^"Obituary, The Rev. Dr. J.W. Oman, Westminster College,
Cambridge," The Times (May 18, 1939), p. 21.
^"Appointments," Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presby-
terian Church of England (Vol. XVIII, 1928-30), p. 811.
^"The English Presbyterian Assembly," British Weekly (Vol.
LXXXVIII, May 15, 1930), p. 132.
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address. * The address dealt with the subject of the Reformed Creeds,
with particular reference to the V estminster Confession." In the course
of the message he made a bold claim for a changed outlook in the attitude
of the Westminster Confession in the light of facts of modern life, but
claimed that at the center, the Confession's trust in God's truth afforded
3
the strength and peace needed for this day.
The attitude of the entire Church toward Dr. Oman's election as
Moderator was expressed in the British Weekly:
The Presbyterian Church of England, in honouring Principal
Oman by nominating him as its forthcoming Moderator, has
indeed honoured itself. Dr. Oman occupies in the religious
life of England a place altogether his own. Amongst the younger
men in his own Church his influence has been decisive. Kis
books . . . for those who were fortunate enough to encounter
them while their minds were still susceptible to theological
truth, were final, putting an end to hesitations on what might
be called the final controversy. Those who have been fortun¬
ate enough to be his p***sonai friends are his hopeless debtors.^
When Oman's tenure as Moderator came to a close in May, 1932, a
vote of appreciation was given him by the Assembly and he replied:
*"The English Presbyterian Assembly," British Weekly (Vol. XC,
May 7, 1931), p. 107,
2
"The Moderator's Address," The Monthly Messenger of the
Presbyterian Church of England (No. 1035, June, 1931), pp. 48-50.
^"Dr. Oman on a Changed Outlook," The Times (No. 45,814,
May 5, 1931), p. 11.
^"British Table Talk," British Weekly (Vol. LXXXIX, November 6,
1930), p. 113.
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Th is would be a drab world if our friends did not sometimes
think of us better than our merits. When 1 was called to the
task I found myself with a big book on my hands which, if not a
sprightly piece of work, yet was laborious. Also I had attained
a span of years which the Psalmist thought the limit of human
activity. Consequently,I might be excused if I did not regard
the honour with radiant enthusiasm. Yet, if my year of office
has not done much for others, it has done a great deal for me.
I know, as I should not otherwise have known, how thoughtful
people in all the churches are being brought back, by the very
difficulties of the temporal, to the unseen and the spiritual. *
The book to which Oman referred in the above speech was The Natural and
The Supernatural which he issued in 1931. It was an "extensive philosophico-
reiigious inquiry, exploring why and how the concern of religion must both
flow out of and into right relations with the world."
As previously noted, Oman had been due to retire in 1932, but
the Assembly had persuaded him to remain for another year. At the 1932
Assembly, Oman was persuaded again to delay his retirement. "Those of
us," said Dr. George Alexander, "who have been toiling after Dr. Oman
through The Natural and The Supernatural, have got a vivid sense that so
far from his retiring, it is the rest of us who ought to be retiring and leave
3
him standing." Consequently, Dr. Oman agreed to remain, and his retire¬
ment was delayed, at the request of succeeding assemblies, until 1935.
*
Margaret A. Sutherland, "The English Presbyterian Assembly,"
British Weekly (Vol. XCII, May 5, 1932), p.88.
2
John Macleod, "John Oman, As Theologian," The Hibbert Journal
(XLVIII, October, 1949 - July, 1950), pp. 348-49. *
3
Sutherland, op. cit. , p. 88.
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At the Westminster College Commemoration Day in 1934, the
Rev. R.D. Whitehorn (who later became Principal of Westminster College)
presented a portrait of Principal Oman which had been painted by Mr. Hugh
G. Riviere. The artist told how some visitors to his studio had seen in the
portrait "a saint, others a sailor." He himself thought he had combined in
it three main characteristics: the divine, the philosopher, and the Norse¬
man. 1 As Mr. Whitehorn officially presented the portrait he said that it
depicted Oman as his students had often seen him, in the act of answering
a question in the classroom. "It recalled in a striking way the titles of
two of Dr. Oman's works: for it combined Grace . . . with Personality,
2
and Vision with Authority."
In 1935 Commemoration Day at Westminster College marked
Oman's last official appearance, for at the end of that session he retired as
Principal and Professor. "His own mood was genial and cheerful as usual. . .
yet it was natural that the general satisfaction at the present prosperity and
happy prospects of the College should be tempered by the sorrow that belongs
3
to life's changes and farewells." At the luncheon following the
^"Westminster College, Cambridge, Commemoration Day,"
British Weekly (Vol. XCIV, June 15, 1933), p. 209.
2
"Westminster College, Cambridge, Commemoration Day,"
British Weekly (Vol. XCVI, June 14, 1934), p. 218.
3
F. W. Armstrong, "Westminster College, Cambridge, Commemo¬
ration Day, " British Weekly (Vol. XCVII, June 20, 1935), p. 233.
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commemoration service, Dr. Alexander told of Oman's new honor: an
Honorary Fellowship of Jesus College, Cambridge. Speeches of apprecia¬
tion were made by representatives of different areas of Church and Univer¬
sity life. Oman was presented with a replica of his portrait and a ticket for
a cruise to the Norwegian fjords for him and Mrs. Oman. * In acknowledg¬
ing the gifts and speeches, he spoke with characteristic modesty, not of
what he had done, but of the great opportunity he had had and the generous
help he had received from his colleagues, his students, and his friends in
7
the University.
Upon Oman's retirement, his former student and colleague, Pro¬
fessor T. W. Manson, ably expressed what Oman's work at Westminster
College had meant to the College and the Church:
It has meant that Westminster College has gained a recognized
place as a great theological college in a University where theolo¬
gical learning is associated with names like Westcott, Hort,
Lightfoot and Burkitt. The recognition of the College has been
no mere matter of courtesy; it has been a real acceptance based
on the knowledge that such men as Dr. Oman were maintaining
there the highest standards of study and teaching in the highest
and most exacting of subjects.
It has meant that the library of theology has been enriched by
a series of works of outstanding value, all marked by the same
qualities of deep religious insight, sure faith, and determined
*J. L. Cottle and A.S. Cooper, "Westminster College Bulletin,"
The Monthly Messenger of the Presbyterian Church of England (No. 1085)
(August, 1935), p. 230.
2
Armstrong, op. cit. , p. 233.
honesty in facing theological problems.
Above all, the work of Dr. Oman in the College has meant
that for twenty-eight years those qualities of heart and mind
have been placed unstintedly at the service of successive genera¬
tions of students for the ministry. Year by year men have been
sent out to our congregations equipped with all that Dr. Oman's
insight and learning could give them, and—what is more valuable
still—fired by his own example of single-minded devotion to the
truth. There are many men in the ranks of the ministry today
who are able to face the difficulties and perplexities of our time
with some sort of inner serenity and courage because they once
sat at the feet of a real hero of faith, one who never shirks a
difficulty, is never content merely to defeat the opposition in
argument, one who all through has striven for a unified vision
of God, man, and the world, and wrought for nothing less than
that the whole truth that makes us free. *
The Presbyterian Church recognized Oman as Principal Emeritus and gave
him a seat in the London North Presbytery. Rev. H. H. Farmer, who had
been teaching at Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Connecticut, U.S.A.
and was a former student of Oman's at Cambridge, succeeded him in the Chair
of Dogmatics and occupied the chair until his retirement in I960. The new
Principal was Dr. W.A.L. Elmslie, who had served as both student and pro-
3
fessor under Oman.
*T. W. Manson.'Dr. John Oman," The Presbyterian Messenger (No.
1084, July, 1935), pp. 199-200. - _
^"Retirement of Principal Oman," The Minutes of the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of England (Vol. XX, 1935-36),
^"The New Principal of Westminster College, Cambridge," The
Presbyterian Messenger (No. 1085, August, 1935), pp. 229-30.
-33-
WithLn a year of his retirement, Oman issued Concerning the
Ministry, a book consisting of informal but meaningful talks which, he had
made to his students on the practical side of their vocation.
When he retired, Dr. and Mrs. Oman first thought of making a new
home away from Cambridge, but after looking around for several months,
they returned to occupy a house on Hills Road. There was no sign of im¬
pending tragedy and every prospect of a pleasant retirement among old
friends. Only a few weeks had passed, however, when Mrs. Oman was
stricken with a fatal illness. She passed away just before Christmas,
1936. * Though he continued to work, Oman never fully recovered from his
wife's death. "A weariness crept into his life, though he was always ready
to speak of his good fortune In the loyalty and devotion of his daughters, and
his younger sister who now made her home with him."^
In July, 1938, Oman was elected to the Fellowship of the British
Academy. Though he appreciated the honour, he felt he was no longer able
to do anything to support it. His term was very brief. About the same time
as his election, a malady overtook him which prevented his travelling and
3
attending the meetings. For some time it was known that Oman was
*
Alexander, op. cit. , and "Mrs. John Oman," British Weekly,
loc. cit.
Alexander, op. cit. , p. xxiv.
^Tennant, op. cit. , p. 333.
-34
suffering from a weakness of the heart, and a serious attack confined him
to bed in May, 1939. Although he was not thought to be in immediate danger,
he "died with a sudden peacefulness on Wednesday morning, May 17, 1939."*
Death touched him as he was writing ... to his oldest friend
and life-long intimate. . . whom. . . he regarded as of his own
rank in things of the mind, who could understand his thoughts
afar off.2 More than that, and something which might later be
regarded as mystical—the very last words John Oman put on
paper were—"and so he died." In that same instant, that
questing spirit entered upon the scene where the faithful see
Him Whom, having not seen, they loved.2
When a few days later Oman was laid to rest, the assemblage in
the Presbyterian Church in Cambridge was a remarkable tribute to the
position the distinguished Principal had gained and to his wide range of
scholarly and notable associates. The officiating clergy were Revs. T.R.
3
Morton, James Fraser, Carnegie Simpson, and Rev. Dr. W.A.L. Elmslie.
He was buried at St. Giles Cemetery, Huntingdon Road, Cambridge. Pro¬
fessor H.H. Farmer described the loss of Dr. Oman in this way: "To look
out across the world of religion and theology, with him no longer there, is as
though one were to look one morning upon a familiar landscape and find that a
*
Watchman, op. cit. , p. 126.
2Miss Maisie Oman recalled that this friend was Mr. George
Alexander.
^"Obituary," The Times, loc. cit. Others listed in attendance at
the funeral were various Principals and Masters of Cambridge Colleges;
Rev. and Mrs. R.H. Strachan; Mr. and Mrs T.R. Glover; Dr. and Mrs.
Anderson Scott; Rev. Prof. H.H. Farmer; Professor C.H. Dodd, repre¬
senting Mansfield College, Oxford; Dr. F.R. Tennant; Dr. Maitland, Rev.
Professors J.M. Creed and F.S. Marsh; and Dr. and Mrs. John S. Whale.
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great headland or peak has vanished overnight."*
After Oman's death, the manuscript of Honest Religion was found
ready for the publishers. Although he had requested that nothing be pub¬
lished posthumously from his pen, his family felt that since this work was
ready to have been submitted by himself, it should be made available for
publication. Consequently, Honest Religion was published in 1941 with a
Memoir of the Author by George Alexander and H.H. Farmer. The family,
after much consideration, felt justified in publishing a volume of Dr. Oman's
sermons delivered during his days as pastor. Thus, Dialogue With God
appeared in 1950 as Oman's last published work.
*H. H. Farmer, "Death of Dr. John Oman, An Appreciation,"
The Christian World (May 25, 1939), no page number.
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John Oman was an English Presbyterian and was therefore within
the historical framework of a Church which maintained the essential ele¬
ments of a traditional and orthodox interpretation of the Christian faith.
His Church was deeply conscious of its historical roots, acknowledged the
critical approach to the Bible and the relativity of creeds and confessions
and was characterized by a social and ethical concern in theology and prac¬
tice. However, Oman should also be interpreted within the Liberal position
of English theology in the cense that he reacted against the traditional "rigi¬
dities" of sacramental grace, Incarnational Christology, and traditional
soteriology, and sought to orientate theology toward a theology of value and
experience. His theology has therefore been characterized as an "adoptive
traditionalism," which may be considered within the central trend of contem¬
porary English theology alongside James Ward, Hastings Rashdall, A.E.
Taylor, C.C.J. Webb, W.R. Sorley, and William Temple. *
*W . Marshall Horton, Contemporary English Theology(New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1936), pp. 134ff. Cf. A.H. Thompson, "The Reforma¬
tion, in Edward Gordon Selwyn, Essays Catholic and Critical (London:
S.P.C.K., 1929), pp. 364ff.
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It is difficult to trace the influences behind Oman's theology be¬
cause of his reluctance to use references in his writings and because of
the original stamp of his own mind. The traditional element in his thinking
would quite naturally come from his Calvinistic background and the Presby¬
terian Churches in which he was trained and later served, and this influence
should never be minimized. Nevertheless, the really creative stimulus for
the distinctive elements of Oman's contribution to theology were provided by
continental theology, especially Schleiermacher and Ritschl.
The theological affinity between Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Oman
will be noticed throughout the exposition and evaluation of Oman's thought,
but it will be helpful here to note the broad kinship between them. Oman
appreciated the way Schleiermacher made religion a unique and original
element in man's nature; both interpreted theology from an anthropocen-
tric and experiential method; and both emphasized the will of the person
and his dependence upon God. Oman believed that Schleiermacher's empha¬
sis on religion as "the feeling of dependence" should not be interpreted pri¬
marily as an emotional feeling but as an intuitional awareness of ultimate
reality1, and Oman attempted to preserve this insight of Schleiermacher's
throughout his own theology, especially in his interpretation of epistemo-
logy, authority, and religion. It was Schleiermacher, according to Oman,
1
Faith and Freedom, pp. 216-17.
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who first realized the necessity of renovating theology and the Church by
the ethical idea of personal freedom in God, and this insight set the task
for English theology and was the controlling thesis behind Oman's theologi¬
cal work. *
Ritschlianism was interpreted to English theology primarily through
Herrman and Kaftan, Pfleiderer and Weiss, but it is more likely that Oman
received the Ritschlian influence during his study on the continent* Oman
shared the Ritschlian emphasis on many themes, such as the anti-meta¬
physical and anti-mystical approach to theology, the secondary importance
of institutions, reconciliation as forgiveness and the importance of a theology
of value judgment and experience. Ritschlianism appealed to Oman because
it offered a way of combining the insights of rationalism and the independ¬
ence of the personality with the contribution of Schieiermacher, who saw
the individual as a necessary but partial expression of the wonderful variety
of the universe. According to Ritschl, man was a free being, aware of his
absolute spiritual significance which he must maintain before a world antagon¬
istic to him, and Oman believed that to learn this purpose hidden behind and
within the world's antagonism, and glipnpsed in mans awareness of his own
worth, might be the substance of freedom and the essence of man's task. In
order to conserve this emphasis, Oman sought to bring a reconciliation
between the Ritschlian theology of value judgment and the traditional
* Faith and Freedom, p. 328.
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.Augusttnian-Caivinistic concept of the transcendence of God. 1
The major thesis of Oman's theology may be characterized as a
consistent presentation of the view that freedom in its fulness is possible
only when it is firmly based upon a reality which faith apprehends and
which sustains man's free action within the world, for man's great task is
the discovery of a "rock in the stream on which to set the individual with
•phis unchanging identity and his abiding responsibility." The primary task
of Oman's theology might be summarized, therefore, as the attempt to
relate freedom, interpreted in its profoundest, personalistic sense, to
the whole of theology in an adequate methodology, and in the concepts of
authority, religion, grace and the Church.
*.All the British theologians who were sympathetically influenced by
Ritschl welcomed the Dialectical Theology of Barth and Brunner except Oman
and .A.E. Garvie. (See John Dickie, Fifty Years of British Theology, Edin¬
burgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937, p. 101). Oman opposed the "distinction of a
qualitative nature between man and God,and the concept that God is totaliter
aliter was unacceptable to him. Oman declared that Barth's books were the
kind of materials which one gets together "before writing a book." On one
occasion the students of Westminster College gave an amusing program in
which they produced a book with the title, What I Owe to Karl Barth, by
John Oman. The pages inside were blank. (See P. Carnegie Simpson,
Recollections Mainly Ecclesiastical But Sometimes Human, London: Nisbet
& Co. , Ltd. , 1943, p. 65). Since many of the themes of the earlier Barthian
theology have in recent years undergone change or modification, it would be
interesting to know Oman's personal interpretation of Barthianism today.
There is no question, however, that the two approaches to theology are in
basic contrast to one another.
^Faith and Freedom, p. 237.
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Before coming to an exposition of the major themes of Oman's
theology, it will be helpful to see the larger pattern of his theological writ¬
ings. Oman realized that in a sense he had worked backward in his writ ings
for his earlier works give the fuller expression of his whole interpretation
of the Christian religion, while his later books deal more with methodology
and theological approach.
Only the major theological works have received attention in this
chapter. The Book of Revelation and The Text of Revelation mainly con¬
sist of Oman's investigations into the field of textual criticism and have no
really significant bearing on his contribution to theological thought. 1 F.R.
Tennant's evaluation of Oman's work in this field best summarizes its im¬
portance for this study: "Apparently his adventure into the field of textual
criticism is not deemed by expert students to have been as successful as
"?
his researches in other departments of theology. Oman's volumes of
sermons, The Paradox of the World and A Dialogue With God contribute
nothing unique or distinctive to his theology, nor do they show any noticeable
development in his thought. However, relevant passages from the sermons
will be used in later chapters to illustrate his major theological themes.
*The two books are, however, dealt with in Appendix B at the end
of this thesis. Professor Donald McLeod, who was personally acquainted
with Oman and is presently at Westminster College, Cambridge, once re¬
marked to this writer that he thought Oman did his work on Revelation as
some theologians read mystery stories—that is, primarily as a diversion
from his field of work.
2
Tennant, op. cit. , p. 228.
-42-
John Oman's first major literary project was his translation into
English of Friedrich Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion. The volume,
published in 1893, contained an introduction by Oman which dealt with Schleier¬
macher's life and times and which was, at that time, perhaps the most ade¬
quate estimate of Schle'termacher in English. * Oman explained that he re¬
fused to give the translation an English accent, but translated it as he
believed the author would have done, "had he learned the language of the
2
translation. . . had it been his native tongue." Oman considered his
translation exceedingly belated in view of the fact that the Speeches was
first published in 1799. He declared:
It may be questioned whether, after Kant's Critique and
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, any book of the period has had such
a great and lasting effect, and it is certainly no question that it
foreshadows the problems chiefly discussed among us today as
is done by no other book of that time. We have still with us the
unity of the Church, the . elation of church and state, inspiration,
the non-christian religions, the place of religion in life.
Oman said that he felt of all the criticisms which had been made of the
Speeches, the most profound was Friedrich Schlegel's verdict that it was
a "work of infinite subjectivity." That, according to Oman, was "the ground
both of its excellence and its defects."^ His own conclusion concerning the
^Dickie, op. cit. , p. 105.
^Oman's introduction to Schleiermacher's Speeches, p. vii.
^Ibid. , p. x.
^Ibid. , p. xii.
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Speeches was that "it stirs emotions which it does not always satisfy}"1
nevertheless, he was profoundly influenced by the work. F.R. Tennant
commented on this influence, saying:
Dr. Oman was attracted to this work, and valued it highly, on
account of the vigour with which it asserts that religion is an
"original" element in human nature, or "implicit in those first
intuitions which are the beginning both of our knowledge and of
our activity." This line of thought is pursued with originality
and adventurousness in his later and largest work, The Natural
and the Supernatural. ^
The first book entirely from Oman's own pen was Vision and
Authority, published in 1902, which originated in thoughts and feelings
stirred by the Robertson Smith controversy. The author said he "had no
thougnt beyond the more practical issues of the present ecclesiastical
situation;" however, the book does not reflect the Robertson Smith case
either in form or substance. In the book Oman applied his interpretation
of man's freedom to the question facing all theologians at that time—the
nature and scope of the Church's authority. The thesis of the work is that
the real authority of religion is not to be found in the potentate who sits on
the throne of the Caesars, nor in the prelate enthroned at Canterbury, nor
in the stern presbyter who rules his Highland glen, but in him who, be he
potentate or prelate or presbyter owes his apostolic succession to his
^Oman's introduction to Schleiermacher's Speeches, p.xii.
2
Tennant, op. cit. , p. 334.
Vision and Authority, p. 13.
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vision of the kingdom of love. "And the authority of this vision is what
alone it will be of profit to restore."* James Orr summarized the central
message of the book:
The ultimate authority is the "I have felt"of spiritual intuition
and impression. Neither an infallible Church nor an infallible
book, but the appeal of truth to a spiritual nature fitted for it
as the eye is for light, is the foundation on which religious faith
must be built. Mr. Oman neither disparages reason, derides
doctrine, undervalues Scripture, nor supposes that Church
organisation or institutions can be dispensed with. But his eye
is on something more central.^
The fact that Vision and Authority was successfully republished with little
revision twenty-six years after its first appearance gives evidence of its
original quality and value. H. H. Farmar said concerning the second edi¬
tion that "it is as fresh, inspiring, searching, and relevant as though it had
3
been written yesterday," while another reviewer wrote that it seemed to
be Oman's best book, "not merely because it has the dew of youth, but
4
because it contains the germ of all which he has written."
In The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries,
which appeared in 1906, Oman maintained that the ultimate problem of at
least the last two centuries is "the relation of Faith and Freedom, the
^Vision and Authority, p. 33.
?
James Orr, "Mr. Oman on Vision and Authority," British
Weekly (Vol. XXXII, May 29, 1902), p. 164.
%T. H. Farmer, Review of Vision and Authority, British Weekly
(Vol. LXXXV, November 29, 1928), p. 194.
^A. C. Welch, Review of Vision and Authority, British Weekly
(Vol. LXXXV, November 22, 1928), p. 1697"
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problem of how Faith is to be absolute and Freedom absolute, yet both
one."* The problem had its rise when the Reformation built in a new way
upon the freedom of the Christian man and laid new emphasis upon the impor¬
tance of this freedom in man's relation to God. As a result of the Reforma¬
tion, the Church was shorn of her outward glory, but Oman concluded, "as
the increase of her outward glory in the Middle Ages heralded her inward
corruption, the diminishing of it in our day may set her to the true task of
the Kingdom of God."^ He traced the development of the problem of faith
and freedom through its various historical stages, including Jesuitism and
Pascal, English Deism and Butler, Rationalism and Kant, Romanticism and
Schleiermacher, the French Revolution and Newman, the Theory of Develop¬
ment and Baur, the Theology of Experience and Ritschl. The major thesis
of the book, it may be concluded, is that faith and freedom are indispensable
to each other, that no man can have a spiritual faith in God who is not abso¬
lutely free—free from compulsion, from the legal authority of human insti¬
tutions and traditions, and that no one can live the life of true freedom ex¬
cept through faith in God who transcends the world, and who allows us to be
co-workers with Him in a work which is eternal.
The Church and the Divine Order, published in 1911, was written
by Oman because of "the return of a large section of the Church of England
*Faith and Freedom, p. 4.
2Ibid. , p. 25.
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to the idea of the Church as one continuous external organisation."* He
considered the various historical manifestations of the Church, beginning
with the Jewish preparation and concluding with his present day, and
applied the major emphases of his thought on freedom and the spiritual
nature of authority to the nature of the Church, its true unity and its task.
The book had considerable influence throughout Nonconformity and was
hailed as "the first outstanding contribution within the revived Presbyterian
2
Church of England to the doctrine of the Church."
In 1915 The War and Its Issues was released, embodying a discus¬
sion of the problem of property and war, the evils of militarism, and prin¬
ciples of a Christian judgment on war. Dr. Oman was convinced that the
crux of the question of war was the problem of property, for unless man
regards his power and possessions as means of service and not as means
for compelling service, he cannot advocate such an attitude nationally.
"In order to have power to resist immoral force among the nations, we
must not as a people live by the same immoral principle of competition;
and if we are to have power to resist t in our society, we must worship
3
another God than material success ourselves." The War and Its Issues,
1
* John Oman, The Church and the Divine Order (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1911), p. 290.
^John W Grant, Free Churchmanship In England, 1870-1940
(London: Independent Press , Ltd. , 1955), p. 221.
3
War and Its Issues, pp. 67-68.
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however, is not merely a scholastic dissertation but it portrays a deep
spiritual sensitivity in the author to those unfathomable personal dimen¬
sions of a war, such as are revealed here:
Those of us at least who have known the Germans as generous and
warm-hearted friends, and have learned much that deserves our
best gratitude from their labours, ought to be able to realise that
every death among them, as among ourselves, leaves a blank in
some fam'ly circle which for some heart will never be filled
again while life shall last. Yet in these days we hear with ever
diminishing pain that two thousand of them have gone to the
bottom or that their casualties are to be numbered in millions.
Can a strife which breeds in us such a temper be rightly regarded
with anything except detestation and horror?*
A series of articles by Oman in The Expositor entitled "Personality
and Grace,"** formed the groundwork for his Grace and Personality which
appeared in 1917. The book deals with God's relation to man, or more
specifically, the doctrine of reconciliation; yet, in keeping with the charac¬
teristic of wholeness in Oman's theology, the book "sets forth a complete
■J
theology which touches on every basic Christian doctrine." From his Cal-
vinlstic forebears Oman had inherited the conviction that religious destiny
depends absolutely upon the sovereign will of God, while from his study of
German philosophy arid theology he drew the conviction that Kant correctly
postulated the absolute freedom of the human will as a presupposition of all
*The War and Its Issues, p. 19.
^The Expositor, loc. cit.
3
W. E. Hough. "The Message of John Oman," The Baptist
Quarterly (Vol. XI, 1942-45), pp. 26-7.
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ethical conduct. * Therefore, the basic problem of the doctrine of recon¬
ciliation, according to Oman, is to relate the dependence upon God, which
is an essential quality of a religious person, and the independence of man,
which is the essential quality of a moral person. Oman sought to accom¬
plish this union, not by a compromise between religion and morality, nor
by the isolation of one from the other, but by an interpretation of reconcilia¬
tion which recognised that man's absolute religions dependence and his abso¬
lute moral dependence are united in the gracious personal relationship In
Christian experience.
Some critics accused Grace and Personality of dealing with a
"recondite question of philosophical divinity";2 however, F.R. Tennant
3
called Lt "one of the greater treasures of theological literature" and
George S. Hendry has given Oman the credit for being the first to call for
a reinterpretatlon of grace in Protestant theology. Hendry declared that in
Grace and Personality, which appeared first in 1917, "the distinction between
the I-thou and the I-il relationship, which was to receive its classical exposi¬
tion at the hands of Martin Buber six years later, was already drawn and
*Horton, op. cit. , pp. 130-31.
^J. K. Mozley, Review of Grace and Personality, Journal of
Theological Studies (Vol. XXI, April, 1920), p. 349. Cf. Times Literary
Supplement (No. 839, February 14, 1918), p. 83.
"^Tennant, op. cit. , p. 333.
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applied to theological thinking."1
In 1925 Dr. Oman contributed a chapter on "The Sphere of Reli¬
gion" to a collection of essays entitled Science, Religion and Reality. The
essay is significant if for no other reason than to show Oman in collabora¬
tion with men of such stature as Arthur S. Eddington, Joseph Needham,
Clement C.J. Webb, and William R. Inge. The chapter is also significant
in that it anticipated The Natural and the Supernatural which was to appear
six years later, for its major emphases are those which Oman treated more
thoroughly in the later larger work. He asserted the autonomy of religion
and the existence of the supernatural on at least an equal footing with the
sciences and concluded that
it was religion, and not science, which first inspired men to try
to unify all their experiences and ... it is religion still which
alone seems to unify all experience—the corporeal and the mental,
the inward and the outward, the ideas of value and the facts o,f exis¬
tence, the events of time and their significance for eternity.
The Natural and the Supernatural was published in 1931 and is per¬
haps John Oman's greatest work. H. R. Mackintosh asked "whether there
is any other man in Great Britain who could have written a work on religion
so profound, so learned, so philosophical in the best sense." Another
j
George S. Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology (Phila¬
delphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 127.
2
John Oman, "The Sphere of Religion," Science, Religion, and
Reality, ed. , Joseph Needham (London: Sheldon Press, 1926), p. 299.
3
H. R. Mackintosh, "Principal Oman's Great Work," British
Weekly (Vol. 91, October 29, 1931), p. 88.
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reviewer termed it "the most distinctive contribution to a philosophy of
religion the century has produced."* Oman 3aid his work was not a theology,
even in the very general sense, but that it was "an attempt to lay a foundation
for theology, by considering its method and its problems."2 The thesis of
the book is that man gains his freedom and his power to direct events accord ¬
ing to his own purposes by means of religion. The book is, therefore, an
attempt to work out a philosophy of religion and to lay the foundations of
theological study from the central concept of freedom. Oman's conclusion
is that religion, which in essence is right reverence and pursuit of the truly
sacred, culminates in the prophetic monotheism, which is reconciliation to
all life's appointments. Professor Farmer summarized the central theme
of the book by noting that man's
capacity to apprehend the sacred and to respond (or not to
respond) to it in reverent obedience is made the clue to the
nature and history of religion, and through this to the under¬
standing of human personality, of evolution, of history, of
man's place in and apprehension of the natural order, the
whole constituting a mighty argument to justify the contention
that to know the reality of the supernatural environment, the
prime requisite, as in other spheres, is to be willing to
respond to it and to live in its midst with sincerity of mind.2
Concerning the Ministry, published in 1936, has been called an
*Review of The Natural and the Supernatural, The Expository
Times (Vol. XLIII, February, 1932) ,~p7 203 .
2
Natural and Supernatural, p. 98.
3
Farmer, "Memoir," p. xxix.
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introduction to Oman's philosophical and theological work. * It contains
lectures on preaching which Oman gave to his students at Cambridge and
abounds in practical instruction which gives evidence of its impromptu ori¬
gin in the classroom. They were "just talks, with freedom to wander into
by-paths, and were the last effort of the week, when teacher and taught had
had more than enough of serious lecturing."^ The lectures dealt with the
preparation, style and delivery of sermons, while at the same time, Oman
kept before his students the fact that their preaching must be vitally con¬
nected with their general culture and spiritual life. For instance, he dis¬
cussed the minister's devotional reading and gave an indication of the read¬
ing which had benefited him:
While 1 have read with profit such classics as Augustine's Con¬
fessions , the Imitation, and Grace Abounding, and even some
much more emotional and mystical literature, they constantly
seem to miss the human, gracious, calm, objective enterprising
religion of Jesus Christ. ... I find a more natural and spontan¬
eous venture of faith in Luther's Freedom of a Christian Man,
John Woolman's Journal, and the Life of Mary Slessor.
Yet Oman concluded that "the parchec spirit may more readily go to the
4
poets than to any of them for the water of life."
*
John A. Hutton, Review of Concerning the Ministry, British
Weekly (Vol. C, April 9, 1936), p. 28"!
2
A series of articles containing chapter summaries and excerpts
from Concerning the Ministry appeared immediately prior to the book's
publication, in The British Weekly (Vol. XCIX, February 13, 1936), p. 407;
(February 20 and 27, March 5, 1936), pp. 427, 447, 467.
JConcerning the Ministry, introduction, unnumbered page.
4lbid. , p. 28.
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Horest Religion was published posthumously in 1941. The book
makes no new contribution to Oman's theology but attempts to draw out and
present in a simplified form the practical application of his thought. The
nature of the book is such that the theological content of the Christian reli¬
gion is left rather vague; however, "Oman himself becomes very visible
in these pages— in the balance of his mind, in his reverent spirit of inquiry,
in his caustic humour, in his respect for unscholastic wisdom , in his theo-
t
logical aversions, and in the large tenderness of his nature."* Oman ex¬
plained that the title, Honest Religion,
sets forth an aspiration after what has no limit or finality,
of which the essence is humility towards God and charity
towards man, an ideal for all but not an attainment by any,
and certainly not by the author. Rather it speaks of what,
had I been patient enough I might have found, wise enough
1 might have valued, humble enough I might have possessed,
kind enough I might have used to higher service.^
Therefore he sought to discover "what a true response would mean . . .
what bearing and attitude would be entire honesty in making life a continual
reasoning with God in the sense of laying our minds alongside of His and
3
open to His persuasion." Dr. Leonard Hodgson commends the appro¬
priateness of Oman's emphasis in Honest Religion when he says that
* John Macleod, Review of Honest Religion, Expository Times
(Vol. LII, April, 1941), p. 249.
2Honest Religion, p. xxxii.
^Ibid. , p. 1.
-53-
the events of the twentieth century have given a salutary check to the
optimism of the nineteenth but the reaction to the opposite extreme has
gone too far in its denial of progress, and to this situation "Dr. Oman
brings a breath of fresh air, a good tonic for war-weary faith.
Throughout the survey of Oman's writings the recurrmg themes
of methodology, religion, freedom, authority, grace and the Church give
the main pattern or structure of his theology; consequently, Oman's con¬
tribution to theology must be ascertained by an exposition and evaluation
of these major themes.
* Leonard Hodgson, Review of Honest Religion, Journal of
Theological Studies (Vol. 44, 1943), p. 116.
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CHAPTER III
INTRODUCTION: METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Throughout Oman's work there is evidence of his concern for an
adequate theological method. When he became Principal of Westminster
College, Cambridge, his inaugural address was entitled "Method in Theo¬
logy," and his great work, The Natural and the Supernatural, was "an
attempt to lay a foundation for theology by considering its method and its
problems."* Some of his other books—Vision and Authority, Grace and
Personality, and Honest Religion—often impress one more with the theo¬
logical method which they reflect and the spirit in which they approach the
theological issues than with their actual theological content or conclusions.
Oman's theology has been described by Professor Farmer as a theology of
"reverence, freedom and sincerity,"^ and it is significant that these major
characteristics are methodological in nature.
Although Oman's thought is quite clearly within the context of
"traditional Christianity," he believed that theology works necessarily on
the frontiers of intuition and anticipation; consequently, his methodology
* John Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural (Cambridge: Uni¬
versity Press, 1931), pp. 98.
^Farmer's "Memoir" in Honest Religion, p. xxviii.
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is that of philosophical theology rather than "kerygmatic" theology. 1 His
methodology in essence is that "no other method than surveying our envir¬
onment from the highest standpoint we can reach, with all our experience
and all our insight as well as knowledge" can be applied profitably to the
study of theology. He believed that in religion one must be as "bold, as
free, as honest, as prepared to face all realities as in science or philosophy.
Slavery to tradition, fear of inquiry, submission to institution, are not reli¬
gion but the want of it, not faith but unbelief."-*
*This distinction is made by Tillich in Systematic Theology, Vol¬
ume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 4.
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 99.
The wideness or breadth of outlook in A.N. Whitehead appealed to
Oman in his later years as he became acquainted with Whitehead's thought,
and the following passage illustrates their affinity at least in this area of
methodology:
"There is no other thinker at present who interests me as
much as Mr. Whitehead, and yet I do not find it easy to aay why.
. . . There is no one among us who is doing quite as much to
create a truer, freer, more reverent, more gracious view of
the universe: and the only explanation I can give is that this
belongs more to the man with his wide, sincere, and independent
interests, than to anything he has yet achieved in theory. We
might sum it up as the humility of the really wise man before
the depth and wonder of the universe, which makes him a power
for an entire change of outlook."
John Oman, Review of Alfred North Whitehead's Religion in the
Making, Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXVIII, 1927), pp. 296-97.
3
Honest Religion, p. 51. This quality was recognized in Oman by
his contemporaries. One wrote: "He has 'sat down before facts as a little
child,' been prepared to give up every preconceived notion, and follow
humbly wherever truth may lead. And it has led him to Christ."
"The New Principal, An Appreciation," loc. cit.
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Oman set forth his own method by showing its relation to the
method of rationalism, for he believed that the movement variously called
rationalism, the age of reason, the illumination or Aufklarung, illustrated
both what is right and what is wrong in theological method. He felt the task
of relating his own method to that of rationalism was particularly necessary
because the latter was grounded on a right principle which had to be main¬
tained even when the particular application of it was rejected. The contri¬
bution which rationalism made to methodology was, according to Oman, its
affirmation that truth is not truth for us except as we ourselves see it, and
that right is not righteous for us except as we determine it. Hence man's
highest and most personal concern is to determine his own beliefs by his
own reason, and his own duty by his own conscience. This affirmation of
rationalism established the authority of the witness of reality to itself and
made it man's duty to defer to it alone and not to any external authorities. *
Oman believed that rationalism had stated this principle far too negatively
and he attempted to emphasize the positive principle involved by declaring
that "the witness of reality will not deceive us if we approach it with the
right questions and if, in sincerity, we spare no pains to understand its
„2answers."
Oman, therefore, suggested the following principles as necessary
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 100.
2Ibid.
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for an adequate theological method. These principles belong to all inquiries
into the nature of any kind of experience, and they must be accepted by theo¬
logy if it is to be a convincing pursuit:
(1) Religion, like all else that claims to deal with a real world,
must submit to open investigation. It is of the nature of all reality
to challenge investigation: and fear of investigation can only arise
from doubt about the reality.
(2) A right investigation seeks to know only what exists, so as to
have a full awareness of it, and, as far as possible, an understand¬
ing of it, and we may not set any limit to the inquiry.
(3) We have at least as much right to assume that man's mind is
made in the image of the Supernatural as in the image of the Natural,
and that, rightly used, it is in this sphere, at least as much as in
the sphere of the Natural, the measure of the universe.
(4) True humility is not submission to human authority, but total
disregard of it when l-he reality speaks to us. .And this must be
at least as true of the Supernatural as of the Natural. Here too
the only objective authority is the authority of the object. 1
Oman maintained that religion, as nothing else, sets a man alone,
and recognition of this as a final and decisive fact, is the "watershed" of ail
thinking, especially of religious thinking. To illustrate this he compared the
method of science to that of religion, saying that although science is concerned
with truth, no one has a scientific mind until he is free from scientific fashion
and can treat the great scientists simply as his teachers. Only when a
scientist can acknowledge no ultimate authority except the witness of reality
to his own mind has he achieved a really scientific mind. Religion, Oman
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 101.
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explained, is equally concerned with universal truth, and in this sphere
"no one is strictly a religious person till he has realized the utter loneli¬
ness of his spirit and desires to hear nothing but what speaks in this alone-
ness, and no deliverance from it except harmony with the reality of this
sacred world which sets him in this isolation."1
While Oman deemed rationalism right in insisting on the necessity
of receiving truth on the basis of insight rather than authority, he believed
that rationalism had failed in being so concerned with the form of freedom
that it was indifferent to its content. The rationalists merely insisted on
being independent, believing only what was forced on them by logical argu¬
ment, and doing only what was imposed on them by rationalized imperatives.
It seemed to Oman that if these requirements were observed, the rationalists
did not care how much man missed of truth and righteousness. In other words,
rationalism had made man a much poorer measure of the universe than he
actually is. While recognizing that man's knowledge is the only measure
he has, the rationalists had failed to remember that man uses his knowing
profitably only when he realizes how completely the universe is beyond his
measuring. Oman strongly maintained, therefore, that the rationalists'
insistence on the form of freedom could never replace a positive faith in a
witness of reality and man's duty to lay himself open to it. From this parti¬
cular lack came rationalism's failure to provide a right method for any study,
1Natural and Supernatural, p. 102.
and especially for theology.
The basic weaknesses of rationalism's method were summarized
by Oman in the following way:
(1) Rationalism did not ask what the Natural or the Supernatural
were, but "imposed on the former the conclusions of its science and on the
latter the conclusions of its theology." It thereby reduced religion to mere
intellectual doctrines about God, providence and immortality.
(2) Rationalism reduced all truth to what could be proved by
abstract reasoning, and did not seek understanding by full awareness. In¬
stead of realizing that each kind of reality had its own witness which must
determine the method of inquiry, rationalism determined first the method
and then limited its inquiry to what could thereby be included.
(3) Rationalism did not assume that man's mind is made in the
image of the Supernatural, but rather regarded nothing in man's mind
except the understanding. The rationalists assumed something like a
Cartesian idea of a perfect being. But when they "tried to get truth out of
the mere notion of abstract universality, and goodness out of abstract laws,
and beauty out of abstract utility, mind was conceived neither in the image
of the Natural nor of the Supernatural."*
(4) Rationalism failed, also, to develop the realization of man's
smallness in contrast to the greatness of the universe . On the contrary,
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 103.
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it assumed man's greatness and thus made the universe small. It was
this lack of humility which was possibly at the root of all these limitations
of rationalism. *
The sharp contrast between the method of rationalism and Oman's
own approach is revealed in the basic principle of his methodology, which
insists that each kind of reality has its own kind of witness and the reality
must determine its own kind of method. The chief requirement, therefore,
is that one have an open mind to learn as he goes on his way. It is evident,
however, that the witness of a sphere which is mainly concerned with what
ought to be cannot be the same as that of a sphere which is wholly concerned
with what is. Therefore, one has not only to consider its facts in the light
of all the aspects of reality which he cannot escape, but one also has
to be aware, to the utmost limit of intuition and anticipation,
of the whole reality. If this is a higher reality, w ich is seek¬
ing to reveal itself through our whole experience in this present
world, it requires us to reach out after our farthest vision and
follow even the dimly discerned beckoning of its requirements,
as they speak to us of what is beyond demonstration and only
discerned in moments of deeper insight and higher consecration.
It thus deals with life's supreme business of progress: and this
is its justification.'*
Since Oman's methodology insisted on man's respo> ding to his environ¬
ment in its widest possible context, this naturally involves the question of how
one knows his environment. It is therefore necessary to deal briefly with
^Natural and Supernatural, pp. 103-04.
2Ibid., p. 109.
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Oman's theory of knowledge as a background for his theology.
Broadly speaking, in episternology, Oman is a realist, accepting
environment as it presents itself in its own terms; however, he is in the
idealistic tradition with regard to his emphasis on meaning and purpose.
He stands in the English tradition of personalistic theism which can be
generally traced to Kantian sources; however, his epistemology is dis¬
tinct from the absolute idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet. *
The essential elements of Oman's epistemology are found in the
following emphases: (1) awareness and apprehension as ways of knowing;
(2) an ordered universe which is interpreted symbolically as meaning;
(3) the reality of natural and ideal values and their relation to religion;
(4) the absolute necessity of the feeling of sincerity for true knowledge of
the environment. Each of these elements will be considered briefly.
Oman distinguished four types of knowing, which he termed
awareness, apprehension, comprehension and explanation. It is necessary
to quote somewhat at length to show his distinction among these types of
knowing. He explained:
While walking in a dreamy mood along a country road, we
may have a vivid sense of all that is bout us, without attending
to anything in particular. Our knowing is then a general field of
awareness, including scent and sound as well as sight. The more
we are entirely in this state of pure awareness, the more all our
senses are active, so that we may even have vague realisation of
Apparently there is no direct link with American Personalism.
-64-
the taste of the apples in the orchards and the coolness of the
waters in the streams.
Something in this field arouses particular attention, say an
object moving toward us on the road. If it specially interests us,
as, for example, by being unfamiliar, we concentrate attention
on it to see exactly what it is, seeking to apprehend it as one
object by what appears to be its more relevant and important de¬
tails. Let us say that we apprehend it to be a man riding a bicycle.
Then, supposing we have none of the information we afterward
learn to include under the name bicycle, but have everything to
learn about it, we try, as it approaches, to comprehend it.
This we do by considering the machine in relation to the man
as a means of locomotion: and we think we comprehend it when
we understand how it is the means for gaining this end.
Finally, as it passes, we are faced by the problem that it
seems to have no support from its breadth, yet keeps upright
while travelling along a line. This singularity we must try to
explain: and we do it with such general principles as the scienti¬
fic knowledge we happen to possess provides.*
This theory might then be summarized by saying that awareness is
knowing the environment in its wholeness and unity. Apprehension picks out
individual objects by interest and attention, yet never removes them from
their place in the whole world of awareness. But comprehension and explana¬
tion are concerned with understanding the environment already perceived.
Comprehension is concerned with how a thing fulfills its particular purpose,
and explanation with reducing this comprehension to an abstract principle
applicable to all objects of the same sort. Oman's emphasis fell clearly
on the value of awareness and apprehension as ways of knowing, for he
believed that apart from these means there was "no other source of
*Natural and Supernatural, pp. 120-21.
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concrete knowing."*
The question of knowledge, however, involves the world which
makes itself known and not just the way of knowing, because both the
knower and the way cf knowing can develop only in relation to what there
is to be known. Oman therefore maintained that if one is to understand
the nature of his environment he must look not only to the scientist and
philosopher, who are primarily looking for an explanation and understand¬
ing, but also to the experience of the poet and the child whose gifts are for
perceiving rather than explaining. While Oman did not relinquish the
insights of rationalism which he had appropriated in his methodology, his
sympathies in epistemology were more clearly with romanticism's interest
in the varied world of individuality. For he said that one will be nearer to
understanding the nature of his environment "by dealing with the world of
concrete realities of infinitely varied interest and value of the poet, than
with even the best and truest abstract cosmological principle of the philo¬
sopher ."
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 121.
Canon Charles Raven declared:
All knowledge has, indeed, followed this path from awareness
to explanation; and at each stage of the journey the scope of our
experience is narrowed, attention is restricted and concentrated,
and what begins as an activity of the whole self in relation to its
whole environment becomes, when analysis is complete, a minute
and abstract interpretation of one aspect of one particular unit
selected from the whole.
Charles Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology (Cambridge:
University Press, 1953), (Second Series entitled: Experience and Interpreta¬
tion), p. 49.
2
Natural and Supernatural, p. 125.
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The foundation upon which Oman based his epistemoiogy was his
belief in an ordered universe which could be interpreted symbolically as
meaning. .Although this aspect of Oman's epistemoiogy is sometimes
vague because he failed to define clearly his use of the term "meaning,"
his emphasis is usually clear and helpful in understanding how one knows
his environment. He illustrated this concept by referring to the develop¬
ment of language. Language was originally very close to apprehension and
was possible because there was a common and fixed order of experience
which was apprehended by those who would communicate with one another.
Man has, by language, extended his knowledge beyond the range of his own
senses and has gained knowledge of times remote from his own experience.
Man, "by making his experience a universe of discourse with his fellows,
has come to a conscious knowledge that it deals with an actual universe
which is rational and ordered."* Along this same line of thought Oman
observed that a person listening to the playing of a violin perhaps knows
that there is an ordered system of vibrations, and that the player creates
the vibrations in accord with his melody. Yet the listener is not really
conscious of this, but is only aware of pleasing sounds corresponding to
the vibrations. "When the listener becomes really rapt in the music he
ceases to be conscious even of the pleasure of the sounds and is conscious
only of the melodious meaning of the music. Oman thus concluded:
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 170.
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tf all perceiving be of this nature, at the frontier of the
individual there is a system of symbols of vibration without
and a corresponding system of sensations interpreting them
within, and the significance of the individual frontier is that
knowledge can pass it only as our meaning. Thus knowing is
not knowledge as an effect of an unknown external cause, but
is knowledge as we so interpret that our meaning is the actual
meaning of our environment. *
If man's environment is an ordered universe which may be inter¬
preted by meaning, then sensation must be explained by meaning and not
as the creator of meaning. Oman again referred to the development of
language. Every language, he said, has been developed by attending to
the meaning rather than the process of speaking. When a man speaks he
does not think of the way sounds are produced or the symbols used in var¬
ious languages. Rather, he thinks of expressing meaning. In the same
manner, perception has come by interest in what is to be perceived and
not by thinking about the senses and the apparatus of perception. 2 Oman
thus declared:
The important aspect of sensations which deterrrvnes all
development in the use of them is that they are symbols of
meaning in a field which has one meaning, and it does not
concern any question of their physical or physiological basis,
because even this basis depends on meaning, and not meaning
on it. ^
Natural and Supernatural, p. 175.
2This same emphasis on interest is seen in Ritschl's epistemology
for he declared "without interest we do not trouble ourselves about anything."
Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Recon¬
ciliation (trans. H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. MacaulayJ! (Edinburgh: T. &T.
Clark, 1902), p. 204.
3
Natural and Supernatural, p. 191.
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Oman concluded, then, that sensations must be explained in terms of meaning
and quality rather than mechanism and quantity. Sensations are, of course,
responses to physical stimuli; however, it is important to understand that
sensations are of a different quality than physical stimuli and pass the
frontier of man's mind as meaning. Sensations may have a direct relation
to their object, but the deeper reason for their meaning is that they are in
a system of meaning and are determined by an interest which governs their
whole activity and makes them effective as response and not simply as sub¬
jective feeling. 1
Another significant emphasis in Oman's cpiotemology wac hie treat¬
ment of the reality of natural and ideal values and their relation to religion.
He reasoned that
if our knowledge is knowledge only as we establish securely
the frontier of our minds and allow nothing to pass except as
our meaning, and if knowledge is right meaning in our minds
by active interpretation of a meaning that is the true reality,
much judgement is embedded in all our knowing.^
Therefore, an essential question which all our knowing raises is whether
a value-judgement is merely an individual preference or whether it is con¬
cerned with objective reality. Oman affirmed that there are natural values
without which there is no normal relation to the world and these values are
guaranteed because if they were wrongly fixed, the species would no longer
survive.
^Natural and Supernatural, pp. 198-99.
2Ibid. , p. 201.
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.Although Oman distinguished between the natural values by which
man knows his normal relation to the world and the ideal values of truth,
beauty, and goodness, he believed that there was really no break in princi¬
ple between them. The dimmest discernment o" the material world has the
world of the higher senses waiting to be unfolded in it and no discernment
could have existed had this not been the case. So with man's first rude
beginnings of bis knowledge of the higher world he enters into the realm
of the true, the beautiful and the good. Oman concluded:
Though ail perception concerns meaning, and therefore
the reality of natural values, the reasonableness of the world
has to do with ideal values, which we speak of as the true, the
beautiful and the good. If faith is what we act on, no one ever
really convinced himself that they are the mere opinions of a
certain smooth-skinned biped, and of no significance for the
constitution of the universe. The moment we begin to live in
I
the world as a rational universe, we assume their validity. 1
The ideal values according to Oman, are integrally related to
religion and even have a religious quality themselves in certain respects.
They are all free in the sense that their sacredness gives man a right to
stand on his own feet in their strength alone. They are all of infinite rever¬
ence in the sense that their end is to discern what may have no limits of
possibility and they are all supernatural in the sense that loyalty to them
is concerned with a worth beyond all merely natural values. Religion is
related to these ideals in that it gives independent courage and cacrednees
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 206.
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of personal responsibility for seeing one's whole environment and by liv¬
ing in what is highest in it and seeing what it promises. This principle,
expressed scientifically, means "that reality is its own sole witness and
may not call any other into court"; expressed religiously, it is "I will
hear only what God the Lord will speak. Oman has developed this con¬
cept more fully in his treatment of authority, and his stress upon the in¬
ternal authority in religion is quite consistent with this aspect of his
epistemology. ^
The inseparable relation between Oman's epistemology and his
method may be seen in his insistence on the attitude of reverence and sin¬
cerity of feeling if man is to have a true knowledge of his environment. In
an emphasis which reflects the influence of Schleiermacher and which
Oman developed more fully in his interpretation of religion, he maintained
that nothing reveals itself to a man unless he has the right attitude toward
it. This attitude involves right feeling, which means sensitive, sincere,
and objective feeling, even more than right acting or thinking. One can
neither be argued nor drilled into reverence and sincerity, but must be
educated into it by the whole of life. He therefore concluded:
True sincerity means having neither hard Stoicism, espe¬
cially towards others, nor false sentimentality, especially
towards ourselves. Lack of it is not concerned merely with
ourselves and other persons. It goes to the root of our whole
1
Natural and Supernatural, p. 208.
2
See Chapter on Authority.
perception of what is true and great in all our environment,
natural and supernatural, being the essential and creative
sincerity by which our knowing is wholly concerned with
knowledge.*
The relation of Oman's methodology and epistemology to the more
constructive aspects of his theology will be illustrated in later chapters and
it is not necessary 'o prolong this introduction by examples of this relation
or by lengthy criticisms. There are, however, several important questions
which it will be helpful to raise at this point; In order to provide an orienta¬
tion for evaluating Oman's contribution to theology.
To begin with, it should be asked whether Oman's theology is
entirely free from the criticism which he aimed at rationalism's method:
namely, that it was so concerned with the form of freedom that it neglected
its content. Oman made a valuable contribution to theology by insisting on
man's individual acceptance of truth by his own insight, but in certain
aspects of his thought, such as his interpretation of authority, he appeared
to be more concerned with the form of freedom in which man accepts truth
presented to him than with the content or substance of the truth which has
been presented. It might be maintained that Oman's method of approaching
certain theological doctrines—such as authority, grace and the Church—
in an attitude of reverence, freedom, sincerity and honesty, constituted
an even greater contribution to theology than did his interpretation of the
content of these doctrines.
*
Natural and Supernatural, p. 212.
-72-
Another question which has a profound effect upon the fuller dis¬
cussion of Oman's theological themes is this: Just how capable is man, in
his condition of sin, of responding to his environment in sincerity of feel¬
ing? It is regrettable that Oman never attempted to give a very thorough
treatment of sin and its effect on man's capacity to know God or hits environ¬
ment. Still another question which should be considered concerns the nature
of man's environment which is to be interpreted. Oman was surely correct
in his emphasis on the necessity of man's starting in the widest context of
his environment, but did lie stress the personal nature of this environment
to the extent that the personalism of his theology seems to demand? Pro¬
fessor Farmer has said:
Oman's own principle that in interpreting the Supernatural and
its relation to us we should start from the highest that we know
might well seem to require that the sense in which God and His
approach to men are said to be triiy personal should have been
more deeply analyzed and put more fully in control of the argu¬
ment from the beginning. *
Further, it seems that God's revelation to man, as distinct from man's
own perception of his spiritual nature and environment has not been given
sufficient emphasis in Oman's thought. These and other criticisms, how¬
ever, may be more carefully analyzed and evaluated when Oman's other
major theological themes are considered in the following chapters.
*H. H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion (London: Nisbet & Co. ,






R E LIG ION
Oman's interpretation of religion is basically a methodological
study of the principles which he believed should be considered in any
inquiry into the nature and meaning of religion. Although he never
really defined the pattern of his interpretation in these words, his pur¬
pose may be described in the following way: he sought to combine
Schleiermacher's feeling of dependence in religion, which he interpreted
as intuitive awareness, with Ritschl's emphasis on the place of value in
religious experience. Consequently, he sought to interpret religion as
essentially the means by which one intuitively encounters and evaluates
his environment, both Natural and Supernatural, in meaningful and victor¬
ious experience. He attempted to follow the principles of his theological
method by approaching the origin and nature of religion with an extremely
broad survey of (1) the preliminary problems to the study of religion,
(2) the principles of interpreting the religious environment, (3) and a
classification of religions. It is regrettable that in his concern for breadth
and comprehensiveness in his approach, he interpreted religion primarily
as a concern for an environment which is not very clearly personal. His
interpretation remained therefore a comparative study of the basic affini¬
ties of world religions, with very little attempt made to correlate and eval¬
uate religion in the light of Biblical revelation and, more particularly, in
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the light of its highest manifestation in Jesus Christ.
The preliminary problems which Oman considered in his interpre¬
tation of religion were: the relation of interest to the study of religion, the
fact that there can be good and bad religion, religion as an objective reality,
religion as illusion, religion and the historical method, religion and anthro¬
pology. In considering the objection that for one to have an interest in reli¬
gion was to disqualify him for its proper study, Oman noted that in all
other areas of study, an interest in the subject is considered an advan¬
tage, but some seem to feel that religion is of such nature that genuine
interest in it makes a valid interpretation impossible. Oman answered
that an adequate study of religion must involve a sincere interest in the
truth which it contains. He reasoned that if the Supernatural does really
exist as our environment, men should be profoundly interested in it; and
where interest is not present, there can be no adequate interpretation.
Oman believed that for one to understand the essential nature of
religion, he must recognize its ambivalent character. There must be an
attempt to distinguish what rightly belongs to religion from that which has
been incorporated into it by human nature. This is not to say that Oman
would have excluded from the study of religion the various aberrations
which claim to be religion, for he advocated including these phenomena;
however, he did recognize that there can be bad religion just as there can
be bad bucineoo or bad morality. To overlook this fact is to be unrealistic
in the study of religion, for many things which are called religion are not
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commendable. There must, therefore, be an Ideal standard or norm of
what belongs properly and essentially to religion, and even the way men
misinterpret and abuse religion may give some indication of its true nature.
Following Schleiermacher's emphasis on religion as an original
element in man's nature, which he believed to be Schleiermacher's greatest
contribution in The Speeches, Oman insisted that religion is not merely a
creation of a mental state or a social phenomenon, nor is it a result of
theology. Religion is primarily concerned with the ultimate question of
the actual existence and nature of our Supernatural environment, rather
than with any subjective experience which the Supernatural may create.
He declared that religion is
an affirmation of what we may call broadly the Supernatural,
and that its quality is determined by this outward reference
and not by any particular kind of subjective feeling or attitude,
while its validity wholly depends on whether such an invisible
world exists or not. *
Oman found support and illustration for his interpretation of the nature of
religion in Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel in that their theories of religion
were basically metaphysical and not psychological. Although they disagree
about the way ultimate reality reveals itself to the soul, and even though
Kant interprets ultimate reality as the moral order, Schleiermacher as
artistic harmony in the universe, and Hegel as the cosmic process of
reason, they all agree, according to Oman, that this ultimate reality
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 23.
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makes an absolute claim on man. They are also agreed that the acknow¬
ledgement of this claim is the very essence of religion and that religion is
that which gives victory in the midst of the change and uncertainty of human
experience. ^ It is impossible to say here whether Oman has been influenced
by these three thinkers on this point, or whether he just used their particu¬
lar agreement to illustrate his own position; nevertheless, it is this em¬
phasis which he developed more fully in his interpretation of religion as
redemption from the evanescent.
Another preliminary question which Oman felt it necessary to
consider was the interpretation of religion as illusion.2 He broadly described
the theores of religion as illusion as those which interpret religion ac an out¬
growth of aberration, delusion and self-interest and which overlook the pos¬
sibility that ultimate reality can make creative contact with man in an envir¬
onment of freedom. Oman agreed with Ritschl that religion begins when
personal things are distinguished in value from extended things, and that
religion is continually seeking to establish the value and transcendence of
the personal over the mechanical or natural; therefore, no psychological
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 28. H. H. Farmer has developed
this emphasis of absolute claim and has related it more directly than Oman
ever did to the Christian religion. Cf. Revelation and Religion, p. 65, and
H. H. Farmer, The World and God (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1936),
p. 23, 27.
^Oman classified these theories as (a) Hegelian or intellectualist
type: Comte, A.F. Cras/ley, de la Grasserie; (b) Schleiermacherian type:
Feuerback; (c) Kantian type: Leuba, Durkheim. See Natural and Super¬
natural, p. 29ff.
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theory invalidates Ritschl's conclusion that "if this victory is possible, it
can only be because there is a reality in the world and above it akin to the
personal."* The heart of Oman's objection to the theories of religion as
illusion lies in his argument that psychology approaches everything from
within the mind and can only say that some things seem to exist externally
to the mind. Oman insisted that the truth and reality of religion could only
be determined by dealing with the Supernatural as the real environment and
considering the evidence for its validity. Moreover, he reasoned that if
the objective nature of religion could be determined as illusion on merely
psychological grounds—that is, by an analysis and description of the way
the mind works—-then there is no possibility of objective knowledge in any
sphere. These considerations on the theories of religion as illusion con¬
firmed Oman's conviction that the basic question of religion is the nature
and quality of the natural and supernatural environment.
Religion is a concern with a special kind of environment, in the
same way as any other experience, which is to say, by dealing
with it and not merely by arguing about it. If it is real, we can
think about it and even argue within it, as well as order our
actions in respect of it, and the more successful we are, the
more it will approve itself to us in one experience which is in
one universe of discourse. No kind of thinking ever reveals any
kind of reality, yet no experience comes without an active deal¬
ing with it in thought and action. It comes as meaning, not as
impact; and meaning is value; and value in the end depends upon
feeling; yet it is not upon mere feeling, but upon right thinking
and acting in relation to it . ^
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 41. Cf. Ritschl, op. cit. , p. 228f.
2
Natural and Supernatural, pp. 53-54.
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The thing which distorts religion, Oman once said, is not a preoccupation
with one phase of it, such as the intellectual or emotional, as is so often
believed, but an absence of ail reality.
The genuinely pious man, and the ardent seeker after truth,
and the prophetic labourer for the kingdom of God are all
religious men who cannot pursue their ends too intensely or
too far. Religion is corrupted not because men are not suf¬
ficiently encyclopaedic, but because they are not sufficiently
single-minded. *
Oman also refused to allow the question of the origin of religion
to be determined merely by the historical method . He maintained that it
is impossible in historical research to penetrate before the time when man
responded to his environment with a feeling that was somehow indefinably
greater than fear. Man has always acknowledged obligations and claims
upon his life which contradict or surpass his senses, and he has also
always testified to an awareness of an environment which transcends the
mere physical level of experience. Oman did admit that if the origin of
religion be treated as a descriptive record of its early appearances,
rather than as an explanation of its rise in man's experience, then surely
the beginning of religion is a legitimate historical concern. He insisted,
however, that the historical method could not possibly explain the original
emergence of religion, and any historical interpretation which claims to
do this has failed to recognize its own limitations and has imposed
* John Oman, Review of George Galloway's Principles of Religious
Development, Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XI, July, 19~i0), pp.595-96.
-80-
psychological conclusions upon its method. *
Furthermore, he maintained that it was impossible for the nature
of religion to be explained merely by the results of anthropological studies
or the findings of the study of primitive religion. Rather, he believed that
an understanding of the nature of religion is necessary in order for one to
know how to select and interpret the significant facts concerning religion.
Accordingly, he concluded:
If we do not know already what religion is, we can no more
hope to reconstruct a living religion out of a mere welter of
facts than if we had never seen a tree to reconstruct it out
of sawdust. If religion is an actual experience of an actual
environment, we can only hope for an answer as to what that
environment is by asking with all our knowledge and capacity
how it environs us.2
By thus admitting the impossibility of a completely objective approach
to the study of religion, Oman is not only honest about the assumptions and
convictions which he brings to his study, but he also illustrates the necessity
for a theological norm of interpretation. Although he did not accomplish this
intention along the lines of a Christian theological standard as fully as might
be desired, he does provide helpful commentary on the limitations of a mere
historical and comparative analysis of the phenomena of religion.
In a way quite consistent with his epistemology, Oman maintained
that man knows his environment not merely as physical impact, but as he
1
Natural and Supernatural, p. 56.
2Ibid. , p. 57.
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interprets its meaning. Although he did not really define his use of the
word "meaning" he did explain that the meaning by which we know all our
environment depends on four principles: (1) the unique quality of the feel¬
ing it produces; (2) its unique value for man; (3) the conviction of its objec¬
tive reality which cannot be separated from man's evaluation of it; (4) the
necessity of interpreting it in the whole of one's experience. These princi¬
ples are inseparably related to one another in all of man's experience of his
environment and each one is interdependent on the others. For example:
feeling and value depend on one another; the conviction of the objective
reality depends upon a proper evaluation; and a proper evaluation depends
on a right conviction about reality; and even the necessity of interpreting in
wholeness is a part of our receiving our environment properly, and interpret¬
ing in wholeness is dependent on our conviction concerning its reality. These
principles are involved in all our experience, whether physical or spiritual,
but "what distinguishes religion from all else is the unique quality of the feel¬
ing, of the valuation, of the nature of the object, and of the way of thinking
things together."1
In relating these principles of environment to religion, Oman
realized that he was distinguishing between elements which could not be
divided. Yet he attempted to show that there is in religion:
(1) a reflexion of it in a feeling of its own special quality;
(2) an immediate judgement of worth of a kind different from
Natural and Supernatural, p. 58.
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all others; (3) a conviction of a peculiar kind of reality; and
(4) a special way of thinking it all together as one experience. *
Oman summarized the most significant characteristics of his interpreta¬
tion of religion by relating these principles of environment to the carefully
defined terms, holy, sacred, Supernatural, and theology.
The 'holy' I propose to use for the direct sense or feeling of
the Supernatural, and the 'sacred' for its valuation as of abso¬
lute worth. The special object I shall call 'the Supernatural,'
and the thinking together 'theology'. . . . By the sacred, in
particular, all religion is distinguished, and all religious
thinking is right thinking only as it is about what is truly
sacred. The Supernatural is not a further inference from it
as from effects to a cause, but is felt and valued in it; and,
when separated from this manifestation, it is without content
and deprived of ail reality, because it no longer deals with
an environment, but is mere abstract argument about the
universe."
In his interpretation of the unique feeling which is created by the
Supernatural environment, Oman made a very significant distinction be¬
tween the holy and the sacred. In doing so he compared his position with
•5
that of Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy. Oman said that according to
Otto, the awesome holy, or the myaterlum tremendum et fascinans, is the
one basic religious feeling. .Although Oman did agree that the mysterium
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 58.
2Ibid. , p. 59.
^Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (trans . John W. Harvey),
Oxford: University Press, 1923).
Oman wrote an extensive review of The Idea of the Holy in The
Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXVI, April, 1925J, pp. 275-86, when
the book first appeared in English. The essential arguments of this review
were later incorporated into the Natural and Supernatural, and it is this
fuller treatment which is followed in the discussion above.
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tremendum et fascirians was probably experienced more often in religious
contexts, he felt that this feeling should not be limited exclusively to reli¬
gious experience. He wondered whether this feeling were not present in
many of man's experiences which had no special religious significance,
such as man's conquest of nature, and he even raised the question whether
or not animals could have this experience of the awesome Holy as Otto had
interpreted it. Oman reasoned that if the experience of the holy were feel¬
ing alone, then it could scracely be distinguished from such feelings as the
eerie or grotesque on the one hand, or the aesthetic feeling of the sublime
on the other, but if the feeling of the holy is related to an absolute evalua¬
tion of the holy as sacred, then this feeling of awe is quite different in quality
from dread and even loftier than a sense of the sublime.
Oman further disagreed with Otto's interpretation of the holy be¬
cause Otto insisted that the awesome holy was the basic religious feeling
even though he taught that it was totally lacking in any ethical qualities.
Otto sharply divided the awesome holy from its ethical nature, but main¬
tained that experience and common sense demand that somehow the two
are connected a priori. * Oman rejected this artificial distinction in Otto's
theory because he believed it contained a false methodological assumption
and he pointed out that two entirely distinct developments had never been
^Otto, op. cit. , pp. 136f.
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known feo be united a priori. He maintained, rather, that throughout the
development of the sense of the holy there have always been present, and
to some degree observable, the rudiments of moral characteristics. *
Oman's desire to correlate the awesome and ethical counterparts in the
idea of the holy is a commendable example of his effort to unite in the whole¬
ness of interpretation that which is really one in religious experience. It
might also be pointed out that it was probably Oman's insight on this theme
which provided the basic theological orientation for Dr. Farmer's later
criticism that Otto had made his interpretative net
of far too wide mesh to catch and isolate the essential fact of
religion. Not all awareness of 'mysterium tremendum et fasci-
nans' is religious; it is religious when the 'mysterium tremen¬
dum' takes on the quality of unconditional value resistance, and
the 'fascinans' takes on the quality of uniting man, in and through
that resistance, to a final security and well-being.^
The second principle of the religious environment which Oman had
distinguished was "an immediate judgement of worth of a kind different from
all others." Oman placed the emphasis here on the actual act of judgement
and the quality of the evaluating itself, rather than on the reality which is
being judged. He amplified this principle in his interpretation of the word
sacred, by which he meant that which is absolute in value and incomparable
in worth,that which is not merely supreme but incapable of being compared
with other things. He declared that everything which is given the value of
1Natural and Supernatural, p. 63.
^Farmer, The World and God, p. 65.
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the sacred belongs in the realm of religion, and conversely everything
that is in the realm of religion, in this sense, should be valued as sacred.
For example, doctrines are only propositional statements if they do not
deal with realities that are judged to be sacred; and religious practices
are only social in nature if they are not supported by the conviction that
they enable one to worship a power which is believed to be sacred; and
even the idea of God may become philosophical principle if this concept
does not represent and include all that man considers sacred. In other
words, the feeling of awe and reverence which one has toward his environ¬
ment must also include an appreciation of its value and worth as sacred
before this feeling may properly be called religious. Oman called that
reality which possesses the quality of absolute value the Supernatural and
declared that the most distinguishing characteristic of the sphere of reli¬
gion is its primary concern with the sacred.
Oman reasoned that one has not completed the task of finding the
sphere of religion when he has described the unique feeling of the holy and
interpreted the value of the sacred. The sphere of religion does not consist
of the feeling or the evaluation, or their combination, but rather, in the
words of his third principle of the religious environment, it consists of "a
conviction of a peculiar kind of reality" or in other words, the existence
of the Supernatural. Oman approached the question of the existence of the
Supernatural in a very simple experiential manner when he affirmed that
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man lives in the midst of Supernatural reality even as he lives in the con¬
text of the Natural world, and man is not primarily occupied with the pro¬
blem of how he knows that these realms do really exist; nevertheless,
Oman explained, the manner of knowing the Supernatural and the Natural
is an all-important factor in determining their existence and worth. The
Natural is known by sense impressions as those are interpreted meaning¬
fully to have relative value, while the Supernatural is known by the aware¬
ness of the holy which it creates and which is judged to be sacred and of
absolute value. The Supernatural is therefore that reality which has abso¬
lute value and is, strictly speaking, incomparable; consequently, it is the
unique province of interest for religion.
Oman warned that even though the Supernatural can be distinguished
from the Natural by the fact that it reveals higher values, there should not
be an easy and superficial division drawn between the Natural and the Super¬
natural. It is not possible to speak as though the Natural were a determinis¬
tic realm and the Supernatural an order of freedom, because the Natural
possesses a quality of freedom and the Supernatural contains an element
of necessity; neither may the distinction be made by calling the Natural
the normal, and the Supernatural the miraculous, because the Natural is
often quite miraculous, and the Supernatural the ordinary quality of every
day life. The Natural and the Supernatural are so interrelated and inter¬
dependent that they cannot be rigidly contrasted or ever totally isolated
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from one another; rather, they form an organic whole as the environment
for the development of man's freedom and the discovery of God's purpose.
Oman is to be commended for realizing that an adequate view of religion is
theologically dependent upon an interpretation of the Natural which will at
least admit the ontological continuity between the Natural and the Super¬
natural to the extent that revelation has the possibility of entering and be¬
coming a part of the Natural world. If the Natural does not in some way
reveal, or at least possess the capacities for receiving the Supernatural,
it is difficult to have any understanding of the way in which God reveals
himself in a historical manifestation such as Israel and the Incarnation.
Oman may have failed to follow through with an adequate interpretation
of the discontinuity of revelation which the Incarnation of Christ involves
but the ontological continuity between the Natural and the Supernatural as
a revelational threshold has been adequately prepared.
Oman drew a metaphysical conclusion when he affirmed the validity
of the existence of the Supernatural, but he stayed near to his existential
approach when he refused to follow a speculative method in arriving at this
position. He was content to base his claim for the existence of the Super¬
natural upon that immediate conviction of moral reality which the Superna¬
tural produces in experience.
We know the Supernatural as it reflects itself in the sense of
the holy and has for us absolute value directly and without
further argument: and the question is not that it exists, but
how it exists in its relation to us and our relation to it. We
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can make no more out of arguing abstractly about it than we
should out of arguing abstractly, as men long did, about the
Natural. *
Oman therefore concluded his emphasis on the Supernatural by declaring
that man's greatest responsibility is "to discover the true Supernatural,
and this means again to exercise the true sense of the holy and have the
2
right judgement of the sacred."
The final principle of interpreting the religious environment is
what Oman called "thinking it all together as one experience" and he
assigned this responsibility to theology. Oman had a Ritschlian concern
that theology should never be dependent on metaphysics. He maintained
that the knowledge of the reality of the Supernatural cannot be produced by
a metaphysical extension of human reasoning from man's experience of the
holy and the sacred in the natural world., for when this is attempted the
result is an arjKd theology which is unrelated to the reality of the Natural
and Supernatural environment in which man lives. The real source of reli¬
gious knowledge is not to be found in metaphysics or even in theology but
rather in the environment. Theology and religion can never be identified,
for theology is an interpretation of reality which must ccek to understand
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 72.
2 lb id.
^Church and Divine Order, p. 322. Cf. Ritschl, Justification
and Reconciliation, p. 16, 222, 237.
-89-
the Supernatural in the same way that other sciences deal with their
environment: that is, by living within it and interpreting that which is
given. * For man to know and interpret his environment properly there
is one supreme prerequisite, according to Oman, and that is sincerity
of feeling. One of the key principles of Oman's methodology was his in¬
sistence on the need for sincerity in responding to the environment. He
applied this approach quite rigorously in his interpretation of religion
when he declared that insincerity of feeling is the most corrupting, destroy¬
ing and repelling factor in man's relationship with his environment and the
effects of this attitude are especially devastating in his relationship with
the Supernatural in the realm of religion. Sincerity of feeling means even
more to Oman than intellectual integrity or moral character, for a man
may in all appearance think logically and conduct his life along moral lines,
and yet "his mind and conscience be as elusive for earnest thought or
2
moral insight as a ghost for cold steel." The essence of insincerity in
religion, according to Oman, may be defined as that attitude of dealing
dishonestly with the basic confrontation of reality by attempting to dictate
one's own meaning to reality rather than letting it give its own witness,
which in turn results in man's dealing unrealistically with himself and
with all his relationships.
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 72.
2Ibid. , pp. 77-78.
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Having thus described the nature of the religious environment,
Oman attempted a classification of ail religions. He believed that all
religions are in various ways basically religions of redemption, and
that if one only sees redemption in the highest religion, then he has
failed to understand the basic quality of every religion; therefore, he
sought to classify religions according to the type of redemption which
they claimed to give. Oman had actually determined this criterion very
early in his thought when in Grace and Personality he explained that the
factor which distinguishes the Christian religion from ail others was the
nature of the redemption which it provided, namely, not renunciation of
the world, but redemption from it by reconciliation. 1
The basic problem which religion seeks to solve is the relation
between the Natural and the Supernatural, which according to Oman,
means the relation between the changing or evanescent, and the abiding
or eternal. All religion in some way seeks redemption from the evanes¬
cent, and every religion, even the most naturalistic, seeks some form of
the eternal. Oman approved of Ritschi's statement that in every religion,
"what is sought with the help of this superhuman spiritual power reverenced
by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as
both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to
*Grace and Personality, p. 111.
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dominate nature."* The real character of a religion, Oman explained, is
determined by the way that it approaches the problem of the evanescent
with its concept of the Supernatural. Although there is no priority of time
involved in man's experience with the Natural and the Supernatural, there
is a sense in which man's relation to the natural is primary and his relation
to the Supernatural or his concept of God is secondary, for actually the
2moral experience precedes the theological. It may be here that Ritschl
has influenced Oman's basic met od of approach to religion most significantly
by stressing the priority of man's relation to the world, for Ritschl said that
religious knowledge
moves in independent value-judgements, which relate to man's
attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain,
in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouch¬
safed him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to
that end. ^
Oman weakened his theology when he placed priority on man's valuation of
his experience with the world before his acknowledgement of the claims the
Supernatural tr akes upon him. It may be only u minute distinction that Oman
has admitted, and it will be granted that man has his experience with the
Supernatural in the midst of his dealings with the Natural, but there is a
*Ritschl, Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung, 3rd edition, Vol. Ill,
p. 189, quoted by Oman in Natural and Supernatura , p. 20, and referred to
in Faith and Freedom,pp. 360-61.
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 367.
3Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 205.
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limitation here which involved Oman's whole system, for having admitted
this structural priority, Oman's thought never recovered the reveiational
initiative in religion.
Oman concluded his interpretation of the basis on which he classi¬
fied religions by declaring that a religion must be evaluated upon both its
approach to the Natural, and its theological understanding of the Super¬
natural, for a religion receives its distinguishing characteristics by the
way that it unites these two principles. The basic quality of a religion is
therefore determined by its concept of redemption as it is evaluated morally
and theologically. *
Upon this criterion Oman presented his major classifications:
primitive, polytheistic, pantheistic and mystical, ceremonial-legal, and
prophetic. He defined their distinguishing characteristics:^
(1) "Redemption by seeking the abiding in the Natural through faith
in an animistic force indefinitely many and vaguely one." All primitive reli¬
gions are included in this category.
(2) "Redemption as the management of the Natural by faith in the
Supernatural concei ed as individual spirits who rule over various parts of
the Natural." ¥/ithin this classification are included all polytheisms.
(3) "Redemption either by accepting the Natural in its wholeness
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 367.
zThe brief definitions which follow are from Natural and Super¬
natural, pp. 368-70. '''
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as the Supernatural, or by excluding the Natural wholly from the Super¬
natural, as illusion." The former Oman calls Cosmic Pantheism, which
can be distinguished from the religion of nature because of its dialectical
method rather than its understanding of faith. The latter is Acosmic Pan¬
theism or Acosmic Mysticism. He concluded that Acosmic Pantheism and
Acosmic Mysticism differ from one another in method rather than in
essence, for both interpret the abiding as "mere undifferentiated unity"
and each comes to the end result of a "feeling which has no objective mean¬
ing and victory, of a self that has no difference of quality or profit from
experience, and of a universe which has no meaning or purpose in its
changes. In all it is the unchanging oneness which alone abides amid the
fleeting. "1 Oman's Ritschlian distrust of mysticism carried over into his
interpretation of the Christian religion, for he believed that strictly speak¬
ing there could be no such thing as Christian mysticism. Although he ad¬
mitted that mysticism may have the value of recollecting or recovering
the forms of Christian experience which keep the content from being mere
meaningless impressions or activities, he nevertheless insisted that mysti-
cism was essentially an escape from the world and the moral claims of God.
^Natural and Supernatural, pp. 368-70.
Ibid. . Oman spoke very pointedly about Christian mysticism when
he said:
Though the church benefited more than the world from the services
of the Catholic mystics, some of them were capable and efficient
persons. We may think that St. Theresa might have been better
occupied than shutting up young girls in nunneries and tightening
the rules over them, but there is no doubt that she was a very
(continued on next page)
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(4) "Redemption by distinguishing sharply in the Natural the
secular from the sacred, and in the Supernatural the power of good from
the power of evil." In this type of religion the sacred is thought of as
material in nature, and redemption is obtained by obeying ritual and ethi¬
cal ceremonial laws; it is called Ceremonial-Legalistic, and includes
Zoroastrianism, priestly Judaism, and Mohammedanism.
(5) "Redemption as reconciliation to the Natural by faith in one
personal Supernatural, who gives meaning to the Natural and has a purpose
beyond it." This is the only genuine monotheism, according to Oman, be¬
cause it sees that God has a purpose w ich is large enough to include the
Natural as well as the Supernatural. There is something of this basic
quality in all religions and no religion possesses it exclusively; however,
it receives its most adequate expression in Prophetic Judaism and Chris¬
tianity, and if these are considered together, it may be called Prophetic
(footnote continued from page 93)
forcible character. Probably also we cannot deny an increase in
St. John of the Cross's practical discernment, any more than we
can deny an increase of Suso's distressing sentimentality. But
most of the mystics would have been very ill to live with, as good
people ought not to be: and the writings of those who carried out
the full cult of withdrawal from ideas of the senses, claims of
desire, discursive thought, all lack the simple directness of
reality." Natural and Supernatural, p. 500. Cf. Ritschl, The
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 98, 112-14.
Evelyn Underhill was very critical of Oman's interpretation of
mysticism. She noted that while Oman persisted in rejecting "the sense
of the holy in the Mystic Saints" he maintained an emphasis on the witness
of feeling that "would shock St. John of the Cross." "Supernatural Religion,"
The Spectator (Feb. 27, 1932), p. 293. The force of her criticism may be
somewhat lessened when it is remembered that Oman interpreted feeling
primarily as intuitive awareness rather than emotion.
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Monotheism.
Even though it has been suggested that all religions are concerned
with redemption in that they strive for the Supernatural in the midst of the
changing Natural, prophetic religion is the only one which attributes recon¬
ciliation altogether to God throughout the whole breadth of man's experience.
The prophets were reconciled to God in all of their experiences of difficulty
and travail in such a way as to make it clear that reconciliation is not just
one aspect of religion but the essence of it. Their monotheism was not a
metaphysical assertion of the oneness of God but the conviction that there
is no area of man's experience which does not reveal God's reconciling
purpose in and beyond this world.
Prophetic religion, according to Oman, is not distinguished by its
doctrine of the Supernatural, although this is certainly involved, but by its
approach to the Natural. Prophetic religion interprets the Natural as a
realm in which meaning and urpose may be realized, and in which all
things work for good. Its monotheism and the doctrine of reconciliation
are therefore united. Prophetic monotheism is not the result of metaphy¬
sical argument, but it is
a development of the way all life, from the beginning has
advanced into higher environment, mainly by recognizing
through the higher a higher use of the lower. The revela¬
tion of the Supernatural was by reconciliation to the Natural:
and this was made possible by realising in the Natural the
meaning and purpose of the Supernatural. *
*
Natural and Supernatural, p. 448.
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Oman came to the above conclusion on the basis of the way the prophets
dealt with the horrible agonies which befell their day and civilization.
They did not seek to explain away the grim realities or isolate themselves
from the dangers. They understood that the Natural is passing and unendur-
ing and really quite harmful if man uaes it selfishly; therefore, they sought
for a more abiding meaning which would transcend the natural. They trans¬
formed pleasant and unpleasant sensations into an interpretation of higher
values which are revealed in the Natural and at the same time beyond it.
Physical and moral evil were met and interpreted realistically, but God's
sovereign purpose was realised in and above the evils of this world. The
prophets had an assurance based on their experience that no eventuality
could destroy the unity of the moral order nor defeat their faith in God's
purpose in the midst of the most difficult circumstances. This conviction,
Oman affirmed, remains the only adequate foundation for a belief in the
oneness and sovereignty of God.
The basic conclusion of Oman's interpretation of religion is that
man has the responsibility to respond in freedom to his environment in
both its Natural and Supernatural aspects in such a way that all his deal¬
ings with the Natural will be an eternal revelation to him, and his conscious¬
ness of the Supernatural will be a reconciliation of ail that is involved in the
Natural.
If reconciliation to the evanescent is revelation of the eternal,
and revelation of the eternal a higher reconciliation to the
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evanescent, that is only as we know all environment, which is
by living in accord with it. The faith in this as personal inter¬
course differs only by the deeper significance a higher environ¬
ment gives to the personal.
Religion is, therefore, the unique expression of man's concern with and
relation to a higher environment which is "at least not better expressed
by anything less than the mind of a person." Oman has given more ade¬
quate development to the personal nature of man's environment and greater
clarification of man's role in responding to the environment in his treatment
of freedom, which shall be considered in the following chapter.
xNatural and Supernatural, p. 470.





John Oman made his most distinctive contribution to theology in
his interpretation of man's freedom as the methodological and interpreta¬
tive principle which gives meaning and orientation to every phase of man's
response to his environment. He integrated his concept of freedom with
every major aspect of his thought: religion, authority, grace and the
Church were interpreted from the basic conviction that man is a being
who can be true to himself In the dignity of his personality and the personal
nature of his environment only if the essential freedom of his response to
his environment be adequately recognized. He interpreted freedom in his
characteristic comprehensiveness by attempting: (1) to describe the cos-
mological relations of freedom and necessity; (2) to relate freedom to the
development of man in the process of evolution; (3) to interpret the rela¬
tion of freedom to the Natural and Supernatural environment; and (4) to
show how faith and freedom are correlated in religious experience.
The problem of relating necessity and freedom is a cosmological
question, according to Oman, involving man's actual experience of living in
two realms, the quantitative and the qualitative, at the same time. One
aspect of man's experience takes place in a realm which can be measured
and mathematically calculated according to the principle of cause and effect,
and which gives some evidence of the past actually determining the present.
At the same time, man is convinced that he is living in a realm not merely
quantitative, but one which somehow meaningfully and qualitatively responds
to his actions and purposes. It is therefore a realm determined by the pur¬
poses toward which it is being moved, rather than merely that which has
happened in the past. The basic difference between the two realms is that
the quantitative order appears to be determined by the laws of cause, while
the qualitative order is characterized by purposive cause which is concerned
not just with things as they are, but with things as they ought to be. The
quantitative and qualitative realms are both valid and necessary aspects of
man's experience, and the intelligibility of the world depends upon an ade¬
quate recognition of both realms. * It is impossible to separate these two
realms for they are really two aspects of one experience; however, there
have been at least two attempts made to interpret this paradoxical situation
by isolating one aspect from the other and interpreting it as a comprehensive
cosmology. Oman called these attempts the "cosmological law of award"
and the "cosmological law of inertia."
The "cosmological law of award" had as its thesis that "all acts are
acts of freedom up to the time when actually done, and then they are awarded
the exact equivalent of their merit."2 This cosmology was dominant in the
1
Natural and Supernatural, p. 218.
2Ibid. , p. 221.
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sixth century B.C. , but has had some influence ever since that time.
Some of its representatives, according to Oman, are Xenophanes, Plato,
and legalistic Judaism, but it received its fullest cosmological expression
in the Buddhistic Law of "karma" which is essentially "the exact equiva¬
lence of action and award* This theory has survived because it does
express, even though inadequately, the conviction that man's environment
is basically founded upon justice. The element of truth within it became
distorted when it was exalted into a comprehensive cosmology which
allowed the theory to dictate to experience, rather than letting the exper¬
ience determine the limits of the theory. This cosmology is theologically
unsatisfactory, according to Oman, because it reduced God to one who
merely gave awards of fate or destiny according to the exact proportion
of human merit.
The other effort to resolve the tension between freedom and neces¬
sity which Oman considered was the "cosmological law of inertia." When
the Newtonian laws of motion were reduced to the single law of inertia,
many thought that it was possible to form a satisfactory cosmology from
this one principle. This hope received encouragement from the amazing
success which the mechanical law of inertia had when it was applied to
1Nafcural and Supernatural, p. 226. Oman drew an Interesting
parallel between the Buddhist law of "karma" and nineteenth century
Naturalism. Both interpret the world along the lines of exact equivalence
and both take this theory of equivalence to be the full measure of reality.
The effect of both systems is that no real significance can be given to our
experience of the world, our individuality, or to God as personal. (Cf.
pp. 227f.)
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the practical realm of material production. Men became obsessed with
the achievements of mechanism and were hardly willing to acknowledge
anything else in their environment. The belief in the quantitative equiva¬
lence of cause and effect was transformed into a cosmology by those who
declared with religious fervor that the fullness of the world was only
mechanical vibration and freedom an illusion. * Oman believed that the
theory of mechanical determination was even more unsatisfactory than a
theory of moral determination, and he noted that one need not embrace
mechanical determinism as a cosmology to be affected by it. When the
meaning of life is thought of as mere mechanical equivalence of cause and
effect, our courage to live in faith in what is good is destroyed, and values
have no correspondence to reality. When this situation prevails,
the Natural ceases to be a joy and an inspiration; and the Super¬
natural, instead of being peace and strength and victory over
ourselves, and thereby over all things seen and temporal, be¬
comes a mere distressing uncertainty which we cannot make up
our minds to dismiss. It seems folly to talk of purpose; and
without purpose, it is folly to talk of spirit in the universe or
in any part of it, such as ourselves. The Natural gives, in its
values, no gracious, reliable good that is, and the Supernatural
no power to realise the good that should be. Under this shadow
men can be merry, but they cannot be blessed; they can acquire,
but they cannot possess.^
*
Natural and Supernatural, p. 234.
^Ibid. , p. 235. Oman came unusually close to Emil Brunner's
diagnosis of the threat of determinism in the modern world, for Brunner
is convinced that "the denial of human freedom by a naturalistic determin¬
ism is far more characteristic of the present 'spirit of the age* than the
(continued on next page)
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Oman recognized that his own age was so dominated by the
atmosphere of deterministic cosmology that it could not realize the
absurdity and futility of an abstract theory which limited the world to
a meaningless recurrence of motion. He admitted that the law of in¬
ertia described an important aspect of our experience with the mech¬
anical world, but indicated that the history of science revealed the im¬
possibility of transforming a working theory into a cosmology. * He
was actually more effective in his rejection of the cosmoiogical law
of inertia than he was in dealing with the cosmoiogical law of award.
He made the mechanical determinism of inertia appear ridiculous,
as it certainly is, when applied to every realm of experience, but
he was content merely to reject the cosmoiogical law of award without
(footnote continued from page 102)
humanistic theory of freedom." Brunner believes that "to-day, the
drift towards determinism, which our Reformers in their struggle
against their sole opponents—the open liberalism of the Humanists
and the disguised liberalism of Catholic theology—to some extent
allowed to go unpunished, has become a far more serious matter.
Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1947), pp. 286-87.
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 239.
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really coming to grips with the issue of moral consequences in man's free
acts, which are in some way related to a personal God who does in his per¬
sonal freedom reward and punish. While it is true, as Oman has pointed out,
that many have taken the concept of award and perverted it into a cosmology
divorced from experience, it is also true in a way which Oman never dis¬
cussed that one need not interpret the concept of award and punishment in
deterministic fashion to maintain that God is a God who rewards and punishes
in a way quite commensurate with man's freedom. This omission in Oman's
discussion of freedom illustrates a pattern of exposition and interpretation
which frequently weakens his thought. He is often quite satisfied to reject
a partial aspect or a false solution to a problem and then never proceed to
acknowledge or interpret the aspect of truth which is actually present in the
issue. *
Although Oman never said very clearly how our acts of freedom
produce moral consequences and are related to reward and punishment, he
did maintain that the failure of either the equivalence of action and award
or the equivalence of cause and effect to provide an adequate cosmology
does not alter the fact that man does live in a world where his acts of
*For example, this tendency will be noticed in Oman's criticism
of "external authority," and his treatment of the Church as an institution,
and in other places which shall be noted; however, at this point it will suf¬
fice to observe that Oman never really dealt adequately with the moral con¬
sequences of man's freedom which are in some measure to be interpreted
as award and punishment.
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freedom produce commensurate awards, and where causes and effects do
appear in reliable sequence. The scientific approach, which he said at
times may be quite unscientific, is often characterised by the assumption
of a closed order of mechanical causation, and the moral order is usually
thought of as a realm where freedom introduces new conditions. Both of
these aspects of man's experience with the world are valid in their proper
realms, for science has the responsibility of interpreting the continuity of
experience in the midst of change, and morality has the task of interpret¬
ing new decisions as though they are not enslaved to the past. Therefore,
since man is continually involved with freedomand necessity in his practical
experience, it should be possible to reconcile them in interpretation.
Oman was keenly aware of the most advanced developments of the
science of his day, and he looked in that direction for a possible ameliora¬
tion of the antithesis between necessity and freedom. Though the Quantum
Theory, "that energy is not a mere diffused system of infinite gradation, but
occurs in certain definite units" was still a relatively new theory, it gave evi¬
dence and support for the belief that nature is far more than a closed mechani¬
cal system. It stressed that nature tends to individualise itself and implied
that mind should not be treated as an intruder in the universe but placed at
the very center of interpretation. 1 The theory of Relativity, which Oman
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 249.
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admitted could only be understood by those who have mastered higher
mathematics, "reintroduces the mind which physics has seemed to ignore,
by relating the order of time and space to the observer."* These theories,
as interpreted by Oman, meant that the universe could not now be inter¬
preted according to the Newtonian concepts of matter and cause. The law
of inertia interprets one aspect of man's experience but not the whole of it
as once believed. Oman therefore believed that the science in his day had
substantiated James Ward's prophetic statement that "the advance of physics
is proving the most effectual cure for this ignorant faith in matter and
motion, as the inmost substance, rather than the most abstract symbol
of the sum of existence." Furthermore, Oman concluded that modern
science was bearing out Ward's interpretation
that the real world is the concrete, wherein no two things, no
two events are ever the same, in development and progress,
and that identity and uniformity is a mere device for enabling
our finite minds to deal with an experience of endless variety,
and that it is truer to say that the universe is a life than that
it is a mechanism.^
Nevertheless, Oman believed that there is a reliable or fixed
order in the world which, if properly interpreted could provide an impor¬
tant clue to the relationship between freedom and necessity. There is the
"exactly calculable frame of things" which is a kind of reliable rigidity
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 249.
2lbid.
^Ibid. , p. 252 .
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in the world which does not exclude meaning, but which is necessary as a
framework upon which meaning may be imposed and from which meaning
may be drawn. The fact that man knows meaning in his environment and
can even place his own meaning upon it is the very reason why he probes
behind phenomena to interpret the reliability of his world through the fixed
symbols of science. It is the responsibility of science to interpret the mean¬
ing of environment through symbols in such a way that it will not dictate the
meaning which we want to express through our environment, nor circum¬
scribe the meaning which environment gives to us through the symbols.
The proper starting point for this task is concern with the meaning of en¬
vironment, rather than with its quantitative nature. For example, speech
and music are possible because there is a fixed and reliable environment
which responds to man's desire to communicate his meaning, but the way
to approach speech and music is to seek to understand their meaning,
rather than to calculate and quantitatively measure their sound. Science
is man's free but limited attempt to understand the meaning of his environ¬
ment in its quantitative aspect and is therefore not adequate to produce a
cosmology; however, it is a necessary and effective instrument of inter¬
pretation which endeavors to enable man to deal practically with his envir¬
onment and to discover ways to make the world convey his meaning. *
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 252.
Dr. H. H. Farmer's interpretation of the world as the medium or
symbol of God's personal relationship with man is strikingly similar to
Oman's emphasis, although Dr. Farmer goes on to state the significance of
this concept for freedom more clearly than Oman, (continued on next page)
Oman's interpretation of freedom in its cosmoiogical setting may
therefore be summarized by saying that he believed man's experience of
freedom could not be negated by any deterministic interpretation either
moral or mechanical, and that the mechanical framework of natural law
did not exhaust the meaning of the world, but provided the necessary relia¬
bility and order of the world which enabled a man to interpret its meaning
and express his own meaning upon it by the exercise of his freedom. By
dealing with the breadth and scope of freedom in its cosmoiogical context,
Oman emphasized the infinite significance of man's freedom, for the con¬
sideration of the heavens and the ordinances of nature, even in its modern
framework of natural law, is still an appropriate context in which to ask the
question, "what is man that thou art mindful of him?"* His conviction that it
(footnote continued from page 107)
Dr. Farmer says:
In the highest personal relationship the other does what I desire,
not because my will has been imposed on his, but because we are
in the same world of values, because my insights have become his
insights, my meanings his meanings. So it is in God's personal
dealing with man; and because it is so, there is necessitated a
world as the medium of the relationship. For a conveying of mean¬
ing which is not a mere imposition of it seems to require that it
should be mediated through symbols. By a symbol we mean a sign
which indicates meaning, and the peculiar quality of a symbol is
that it can only enter formatively into the mind of another, and
affect his activity, if he in some measure apprehend its meaning
and accept it for himself. It is not possible for a symbol whose
meaning-cannot be read, or being read is not accepted, to enter
formatively into the personal life. It has to stay, so to say, on
the frontiers of the mind.
The world is God's symbol, God's medium of speech with the
soul of man. Farmer, The World and God, p. 70.
*Psalm 8:4.
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is "not till we have traversed immensity and eternity have we attached any
adequate meaning to the assertion that the things of the spirit have greater
issues depending on them than the mightiest law or the vastest process,"*
is surety valid, and Oman's cosmoiogi* al considerations have provided a
valuable dimension of interpretation which a purely religions treatment
could never have given.
Another pfcase of Oman's comprehensive orientation to the problem
of freedom was his consideration of the important issues raised for freedom
in the anthropological framework of the theory of evolution. The theory of
evolution was interpreted by Oman not only as being compatible with free¬
dom, but as giving evidence and confirmation of the existence of freedom
and its significance in environment and history.
The Newtonian theory, which had assumed that the world was a
closed mechanical system in which there could be nothing really new, re¬
ceived a serious challenge when the discoveries of Darwin revealed that life
on earth was in an evolutionary change which was not mere recurrence but
which, with reference to both origins and goals, suggested progress. How-
ever: Darwin believed that his theory of evolution could be interpreted within
the framework of the law of inertia as long as it was recognized that the
destruction of the unfit was to some degree the result of the actions and
purposes of the creature. Soon Darwin's theory was transformed into a
* Faith and Freedom, p. 327.
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Newtonian Darwinism, and the theory of evolution, which had at first
appeared to destroy any belief in the universe as a closed mechanical
order, was 'turned into a triumph so great as to seem to justify the con¬
fidence that some day the mechanical explanation would cover the whole
field of knowledge and dispose of every suggestion of freedom as exploded
superstition."* Even so, Oman did not believe that evolution had to be
interpreted along mechanical lines. The mechanical interpretation of life
acknowledges the fact that all of life is involved with mechanical processes,
but it does not begin to deal adequately with such questions as the place of
meaning, mind and purpose in life. Evolution may have shown man that he
was later than he formerly believed in dealing with his environment with
value and freedom, but this does not alter the fact that it is this free and
meaningful response to environment which gives significance to life and
makes any mechanical interpretation of it impossible.
And if life be thus developing towards mind and purpose, and
if nothing can be known concerning it except from this its high
achievement, is it not more rational and convincing to carry
mind and purpose as far down as we can than to carry up
mechanical explanations to the utmost limits of plausibility.^
It is precisely at this point, according to Oman, that Darwin was signifi¬
cant. By stressing the struggle for survival which the creature has against
its environment, Darwin illustrated the truth that there is an element of
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 259.
2 lb id . , p. 264 .
independence or freedom, however small, in even the lowest form of life.
Darwin has therefore made a significant contribution to our understanding
of the universe, "but it is in the direction of freedom and not of process. "1
One of the strongest aspects of Oman's interpretation of freedom
is the way in which he deals with the dangers and evils which are possible
in a universe where freedom is real. He readily admitted that if the universe
is constructed along the lines of freedom and if evolution is an unfolding of
this order of freedom, the achievements of freedom are won at the expense
of heavy losses along the way. Oman would have agreed with Emil Brunner,
who said: "Humanly speaking—must not the hand of God have trembled
when He created man with this independence? For ... it is the most
dangerous, and indeed the only dangerous element which God has created."^
Oman realized that many find it difficult to believe that the pain and evil
which freedom causes, or at best allows, can ever be justified by the vic¬
tories of freedom . It appears that individual freedom is attained only in
an order which allows many to fail in their purposes and suffer overwhelm¬
ing defeats. Would it not have been far better, they ask, to have mechani¬
cally elevated everyone in a scheme of cosmic process and foregone the
privileges of freedom? Oman answered that surely the evils do exist in
an order of freedom, but therein lies the justification for freedom and the
only way possible to interpret the universe rationally, because if evil is
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 273.
2
Brunner, Man in Revolt, pp. 286-87.
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only a result of process and not an aspect of struggle and achievement,
then there is no solution to evil possible, for process without freedom
cannot correct itself. He concluded that
the way of freedom, though its final justification can only be
its goal, at least saves life from being a dull as well as a
ghastly nightmare, because, with it, there is a universe of
living interests while, without it, there would be no more
than a Punch and Judy show with conscious and sensitive
puppets. And supposing an infinite mind contemplating it,
could we expect him to be eternally interested in making it
pirouette around him, however graceful and intricate he could
make the performance. *
One of the most serious issues which the theory of evolution
raised for the interpretation of freedom was brought about by the stress
which evolution put upon the continual change of one moral phase into a
higher phase which apparently obliterated all absolute moral distinctions.
Oman very wisely refused to allow the theory of evolution to force him to
abandon the category of absoluteness. He felt that it would be "iron in the
blood of our age" if we could realize as Kant had emphasized that absolute
2
distinctions are valid even though we may be slow in accepting them.
Oman's position was that "without absoluteness, nothing is sacred; if
nothing is sacred, there is no real morality; if there is no real morality,
progress is a meaningless word; if progress is a meaningless word,
change is an aimless process. "3 Absoluteness is present when one acts
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 290.
^Faith and Freedom, p. 189.
3
Natural and Supernatural, pp. 326-27.
-113-
conscientiously toward his higher environment, and it is a mistake to
think that absoluteness can be present only when there is the actual realiza¬
tion of an ideal standard. Absoluteness is basically determined by the direc¬
tion one is going and evolution interprets the absolute difference in direction
as clearly as any "infallible imperative of right and wrong."' Evolution
is not a mere question of slow change, but of direction. Absolute¬
ness of particular acts may be affected by slow realisation, but
not the absoluteness of the direction in which we are facing. In
the end this must put right and wrong as infinitely apart as the
old way of expressing it as heaven and hell.^
Oman maintained that the moment man makes the distinction between right
and wrong, however dimly, he is a religious creature, and one may wonder
whether he would be man if he did not possess this capacity.-* This acknow¬
ledgement of absoluteness which Oman made with regard to the matter of
direction involved in evolution, and in man's decisions in history is an im¬
portant and constructive aspect of Oman's thought which has important impli¬
cations for his interpretation of religious authority. Oman must be criticized
in later discussions for allowing his personal existentialism to lead him to
an over-balanced individualism which tended to reject any kind of 1 external"
authority, but it must be very clearly understood that his existentialism did
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 327.
ZIbid. , p. 293.
3" John Oman, review of C.J. Shebbeare and Joseph McCabe's The
Design Argument Reconsidered, Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXVI,
1925), p. 87-38.
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not lead him into the kind of relativism which denies the possibility of
absolute moral distinctions. While it is true that Oman criticized very
severely the external" authorities which pose as "infallibilities" it is to
his credit that he never at any place, even in a discussion involving the
early stages of evolution, intended to discredit certainty or absoluteness
in moral distinctions provided these convictions were the product of the
truth as it was received by man in freedom.
Oman's conclusion that evolution was not just a structural develop¬
ment which was determined by an original force, but a development of free¬
dom in response to a higher direction toward which life was being drawn,
led him quite appropriately into the next major consideration in his inter¬
pretation of freedom; the relation of man's freedom, especially in his
moral experience, to his Natural and Supernatural environment. He con¬
sidered the "will to live" the basic experiential source or form of man's
freedom, and maintained that from this source there springs man's desire
to "live better."* This raised the question of whether man has the ability
to perform that which he feels he ought to do. Oman believed that Kant's
principle that "a man can because he ought' was not an adequate interpre¬
tation of man's moral experience because it interpreted the "will to live
better" as only a moral maxim which man can accomplish by sheer will
power. According to Oman, Kant was right when he held that freedom
*Natural and Supernatural, p. 298.
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does have the authority to acknowledge an absolute claim which is not deter¬
mined by its benefits to the individual. He was also right when he empha¬
sised that nothing is really good unless it is freely chooen; however, Oman
believed that Kant's interpretation of ethics was inadequate when he limited
absolute claim upon man to a moral maxim, regardless of how categorical
it may be. According to Oman, the absolute claim which is made on man is
made on the whole personality and character of man, not just on his moral
faculties, and this claim is laid on him by the whole of his environment.
Oman should be commended for dealing with freedom as it relates to the
whole man and not just to his will, for this saves his interpretation not only
from an artificial division of personality, but also from the problem of show¬
ing at what psychological point responsibility enters into man's relationship
with his environment, as if freedom were a thing or a "function" of the will
which enters into man's moral experience.
Oman admitted that to a large extent our wills determine our char¬
acter, although he did not define very adequately the extent of this determina¬
tion. He was primarily concerned to emphasize that the freedom which God
intends for his children involves far more than the ability of man's will con¬
cerning a moral maxim. lie made perhaps his clearest statement regarding
the inability of man's will to respond properly to his environment when he
declared:
Though there is a sense in which we can because we ought, it is,
therefore, obviously not in the sense that we can by mere fiat of
will, it matters not what kind of persons we are or in what kind*
*Due to a typographical error, pagell7 immediately follows page
page 115. The continuity of text is uninterrupted.
-117-
of world we act, do what we see to be right, or even put our¬
selves in the way of seeing what right truly is. *
If man is to be genuinely free he must, in a sense, be made free by the
response of his total personality to both his Natural and his Supernatural
environment. To be free in the Natural means to reject the dominance of
the fleeting things of life and respond appropriately to the higher environ¬
ment of the Supernatural which is revealed in the Natural and which enables
man to live properly in the Natural. To be free in the realm of the Super¬
natural means to accept freely, reverently, and sincerely the absolute
value and claim of the Supernatural environment, which reveals itself so
clearly that it needs no external authority for support, and which can
acknowledge no other authority above itself. Oman maintained that accord¬
ing to this understanding, no one is free. "At best we are only being made
free. Yet only as we are thus free, are we the kind of persons, in the kind
of environment, who, in practical experience, can because we ought."
To illustrate the thesis that man should respond in his total per¬
sonality to his whole environment, Oman made a distinction between con¬
science and conscientiousness. The conscience is not infallible, nor does
it provide us with finality, but it is that faculty cf man which presents to
him those values and obligations that should be received as absolutely
sacred. Conscientiousness is interpreted by Oman as being that attitude
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 302.
2lbid.
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of reverence and sincerity toward our environment which is ever striving
toward more light and a better realization of that truth which has already
been received. Oman felt that Kant had interpreted the conscience as the
moral form of the individual in such a way that it was seen to produce only
moral maxims that were little more than intuitional generalities, primarily
negative in nature, which failed to consider the fact of difference in indivi¬
duals. * While Kant failed to realize that the conscience is but the form of
moral experience and that the form cannot supply the content of experience,
Oman believed that the form of experience had value if it were interpreted
along the lines of a conscientiousness which continually endeavors to corre¬
spond more completely to the witness of the whole environment.
Oman realized that he could speak of absoluteness and conscien¬
tiousness in man's experience because man's environment is essentially
personal in nature. Man can make progress from the lower or actual
level of his life to the higher or the ideal level when he, as a self-con¬
scious being, freely chooses the higher course, and this kind of decision
is possible only in a universe which is personal and capable of responding
to man's freedom. Our environment is, therefore, not just an area for
pleasure or pain in the realm of biological progress, but a realm where all
of our experiences are of the nature of personal intercourse which may
contribute, if interpreted aright, to the progress of the spirit.
Oman portrayed the personal nature of man's intercourse with his
^Natural and Supernatural, pp. 319, 320.
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environment by a consideration of the absolute value of truth, beauty, and
goodness. He insisted that truth and beauty and goodness have absolute
value whether men accept them or not. He went on to declare that truth and
beauty and goodness are not material and impersonal substances which are
mechanically Imposed on man, but they are absolute values which have sig¬
nificance only when they are freely accepted by man, and when they are
accepted in such a way that they transform his character. When a man
realizes that his Supernatural environment is a realm of free persons
where he may refuse or accept the claims of value made upon him, he
)
can understand more fully what it means to interpret God as a person.
Oman concluded:
An order which is thus a realm of the free children of God, and
not a theatre of even the most admirable puppets, and has its
values in even the imperfect accord of their freedom, and not
in the most perfectly correct opinions and gracious sentiment
and impeccable behaviour imposed on them, is at least not bet¬
ter expressed by anything less than the mind of a person. *
Although Oinan never gave an adequate interpretation of the effects
of sin upon man's freedom, it is true that one of his most adequate treat¬
ments of the nature of sin is in connection with his discussion of man's
freedom in relation to his personal environment. When sin is considered
as more than a lack of perfection in evolution, and more than an irregular¬
ity in a system of process, and even more than a transgression of a moral
law, and when it is interpreted in the fuller context of an insincere and
1Natural and Supernatural, p. 341.
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hypocritical response in all of our relations with the whole of our environ¬
ment which is essentially personal, then the essential personal nature of
sin can be understood. As long as sin is believed to be merely against
process, there can be no such thing as forgiveness, for process cannot
atone or restore, but when it is understood that "the essence of sin is
estrangement from our true environment," which is essentially personal
in nature, then there can be hope for a reconciliation with that environment,
and furthermore,
if we find forgiveness a real and transforming experience, we
shall be able to speak of God as a person with the certainty that
we are not merely seeing the reflexion of our own faces, but
know that our own forgiveness of others is a reflexion of the
highest perfection which is kind to the unthankful and evil. *
Oman was not primarily concerned with the cosmological or anthro¬
pological framework for freedom, however, for his main interest lay in the
religious significance of freedom and what he called the problem of faith and
freedom, and he made the solution, or the amelioration, of this problem one
of the major endeavours of his life and thought. He declared that "the ulti¬
mate problem of at least the last two centuries" is "the relation of Faith and
Freedom, the problem of how Faith is to be absolute and Freedom absolute,
yet both one."^ The long struggle in history between faith and freedom con¬
vinced him that there was no essential conflict between the two realities,
^Natural and Supernatural, p. 342. Cf. also pp. 327-29.
2
Faith and Freedom, p. 4.
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bufc rather that faith is not possible except through freedom, and freedom,
even in the practical realm, can only survive as a spiritual result of faith.
Man must realize that Ihe mechanical structure of his life is but the frame¬
work for his freedom, and no external authority can be an adequate basis for
his faith.
Oman maintained that from the Reformation to Ritschl there had
been the development of the mechanical system of law which had been accom¬
panied by an equally significant development of the idea of freedom and a
consideration of the important issues which it raises for faith. The tremen¬
dous importance of freedom and its full implications for every area of man's
thought and activity really only began to be realized, according to Oman,
when men understood freedom to claim its prerogative alongside the exten¬
sive system of mechanical law and when men acknowledged that conscience
had the authority to make decisions even in the processes of evolution.
Oman realized that Ritschl had not completely solved the problem of
faith and freedom, but he believed that Ritschl had interpreted the task
and method of theology in a way which greatly clarified the ultimate signifi¬
cance of freedom. With Ritschl as his guide, Oman sought to conserve the
insights of rationalism on the form of freedom as the basic structure of
moral personality and the conviction that nothing is really good unless freely
chosen, and went on, as Ritschl had done, to interpret freedom with a clearer
understanding of its significance for individuality and for history.
Ritschl interpreted freedom as that personal quality of an individual
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which gave him his basic distinction not only between himself and the
world, but also between himself and God. Ritschl's task is therefore
described by Oman, in words that might well depict Oman's own thesis
in his interpretation of Grace:
He labours so to conceive the operations of God's gracfe as to
exalt and not to obliterate the human personality, and he con¬
tinually takes up his parable against that mysticism which
teaches that 'the life of God works in the believer at the cost
of moral freedom', in the belief that no error has so widely,
so continuously, so deeply corrupted Christianity.1
Furthermore, Ritschl made freedom central in his theology by insisting:
Man and his vocation are supreme realities; victory over the
world is at once our supreme need and the supreme evidence
of God's help; free-will is the basis of all rationality; the
judgement of worth is the fragmentary but moral comprehen¬
sion of the universe.
Oman also believed that Ritschl's method illustrated the important
historical developments of the problem of faith and freedom in the follow¬
ing way: Ritschl insisted that man has not only the privilege but the respon¬
sibility of personal freedom under God to follow the truth in investigation
wherever it leads. Ritschl was not alone in this conviction, but he did re¬
interpret all of Church history in such a way as to emphasise its importance.
Ritschl also made a contribution in his position on the necessity of solitary
dedication to the truth, for Oman believed that there had never been any
progress made without someone who had been willing to stand alone for
1 Faith and Freedom, p. 356.
2Ibid. , p. 357.
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the truth even unto death. Still another theme in Ritschl's method was
his emphasis on the value of the individual as an authority which is above
the authority of an institution. Oman recognized that it was impossible to
overlook the significance of the Church or State as an institution, but he
was convinced that man's greater understanding of the immensity of the
universe made it impossible for him to conceive of any institution as the
ultimate basis for his spiritual allegiance. The institution which was
once considered so important because of its size now appears relatively
insignificant in comparison with the universe as we know it. There has,
however, appeared a new standard of greatness which has no relation to
size when one realizes that God deals directly with man and that man has
the real freedom to accept or reject His law. Conscience, therefore,
cannot share its authority with any institution.
If conscience has an absolute right to govern the world, it
cannot divide its throne with another sovereign; if the very
mark of conscience is to announce right, free from all other
considerations, all other considerations whatsoever must be
subordinated. The tremendous thing about right, as distinct
say from deference, is that it lays us directly on the bosom
of reality. If right is right, and not a misleading synonym
for convention, it rests on the pillars of the world, and makes
a man in all humility a king in Divine right. *
The final aspect of Ritschl's method which Oman made the basic thesis
of his own theology was the principle that freedom is "not merely the funda¬
mental, it is the exclusive basis of spiritual belief now left to us. We must
* Faith and Freedom, p. 399.
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now found faith upon the very thing we have so long feared would destroy
it."1
From his observations cti the development of the problem of faith
arid freedom in the last two centuries, and from his conclusions concerning
the significance of Ritschl's method in interpreting those developments,
Oman formulated the thesis that if freedom and its consequences are real,
then it is possible to make absolute distinctions in life.
A view of life is involved which has God on one side and what¬
ever we like to call the absence of good on the other. Evil can
no more be the mere necessary shadow of good. Between the
choice of agreement with eternal right and disagreement with
it there must be something of the absolute distance of heaven
and hell. ^
If freedom is a reality and not just an illusion or a misunderstand¬
ing of process, then it is possible to make absolute distinctions in history.
History is not only a process which conditions or affects man's life, for
history is itself also affected by man's free choices; consequently , if
man's decisions concerning good and evil do not involve important results
in history, then history really has no significance at all.
History interests itself in institutions, but is a long record of
their insecurity, and if they were not for the building up of
something spiritual they were all passing vanities. History
interests itself in culture, but if that only concerns the intel¬
lect it is writing upon sand. History interests itself in races,
but if they are only the playthings of destiny, they are as the
1 Faith and Freedom, p. 401.
^Ibid. , p. 404.
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swarm-of summer flies. To find the strings which work this
puppet-show may add to the interest: it cannot add to the sense
of reality. 1
But if man is really free, and if his consciousness of right reflects the
ultimate nature of his environment, then history is a meaningful record
of man's progress and failure in achieving God's purpose. The real worth
of history, and that in which men are more truly interested, is not in his¬
tory as an impersonal document of events, but as a living record of men's
noble decisions in the great crises of their lives and times. Freedom in
an institution is easily distorted and corrupted but the freedom of a coura¬
geous individual has absolute value and produces eternal consequences. An
individual man with his aspirations and objectives, therefore, has an abso¬
lute value which cannot be determined by the quantitative standards of space
or time, nor can his worth be derived from any institution or culture in
society. When men's free choices are seen to have absolute worth in
their relationship to God's purpose, then history may be understood to
possess not only finite but infinite significance. "History, being in this
way a continual dealing of man with God, is all of the nature of a revela¬
tion."2
The interpretation of freedom also has important consequences
regarding the nature and necessity of religion. If man is really free, the
*Faithand Freedom, p. 408-09.
2Ibid. , p. 410.
-126-
history of religions is the history of his struggle to keep freedom alive,
and of the striving of his freedom toward the eternal in the midst of the
changing. If, however, there are no genuine issues for freedom, but only
determined processes, then religion is totally irrelevant and unnecessary.
The concept of determined process cannot explain why man believes that
he has a sense of obligation and an awareness of being strengthened by his
religions. If freedom is a reality, one can at least begin to understand
man's experience with his world as a relationship which is dependent upon
a belief of both his freedom and the freedom which undergirds his world.
"In that case religion must be as vital a concern as morality, and right
morality and true religion must be in entire accord."* Religion and moral¬
ity cannot be identified for religion is concerned not only with the will but
with feeling as intuition, and also with understanding, for faith must be in¬
telligent. Religious faith must not only include the will, the feeling and the
intellect, but it must integrate them in one vision. This vision is not at¬
tained by intellectual means alone, but it is perceived when one evaluates
himself and his world in the light of the struggle for his freedom in a world
which is on one hand his greatest enemy and on the other hand completely
constituted for his good. The way of faith involves one's total experience
of life, and faith can advance only when one responds appropriately to the
* Faith and Freedom, p. 411.
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insights which he has been given; consequently, the progress of the his¬
tory of religions is complex and it is slow, but it is this very struggle for
freedom which gives meaning to every aspect of man's religious life.
This significance of freedom in the history of religions was
developed further by Oman as a principle in determining whether there is
any absolute distinction between Christianity and other religions. When the
essence of Christianity is believed to be the visible church whic is primarily
an institution with ecclesiastical authority, Chris
poral significance, and although it may be the no , .
claim men's ultimate and absolute allegiance. Even if it embodied infalli¬
bility as an institution, it could only be a temporal phenomenon.
But if Christianity is rather obscured by those external but¬
tresses which we have tried so hard to maintain; if its real mean¬
ing lies in the absence of these external authorities, and if the
process which to so many has seemed to be sapping its founda¬
tion has only been displaying its true proportions; if it trusts to
nothing in the last issue except reconciliation and grace; if it
will be satisfied with nothing less than a relation to God in which
we shall be wholly free intellectually and morally, it must be¬
long to the absolute, the eternal order. 1
Even so, the absolute distinction between Christianity and the
other religions can be maintained only when Christ's absolute difference
from other men is acknowledged. Christianity became involved in the evils
of the world in order that men might learn that freedom is not only a gift
which is received, but that it is also a capacity which must be developed by
1 Faith and Freedom, pp. 412-13.
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proper use. To understand the Christian religion it is necessary to
return continually to Christ. Although Christ can be known outside the
Church, the Church cannot be adequately interpreted when separated from
Him. To illustrate the place of Christ in the Christian religion, Oman used
the analogy of the concept of right in morals. Just as the concrot of right,
regardless of its complexity, obscurity, and error in application, holds
absolute significance for every moral man, so Christ notwithstanding the
difficulties involved in knowing His life, the confusion concerning His im¬
portance, and the misinterpretation of His meaning, embodies that which
is not only relative but absolute in obligation to every religious man. * It
must be remembered that
the Person of Jesus loses all real significance as soon as we
interpret Him mainly as the Founder of an outwardly authori¬
tative institution. The key is lost to all His unique greatness
when the freedom of a Son in His Father's house is omitted,
and the gift of this freedom to His followers is regarded as a
Protestant prejudice.^
Christ revealed the complete freedom which is possible only to one who is
perfectly related to God and therefore Oman concluded that the Christian
religion is absolutely distinct from the other religions of the world.
Oman had little sympathy for the belief that everything is relative
and that nothing is final, and that the only result of our striving is the privi¬
lege of further struggle. He attempted to modify this position by asking how
*
Faith and Freedom, p. 413 .
ZIbid. , p. 322.
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can there be any distinction between what is higher and lower in our striv¬
ing if there is no realization of absolute value in the present struggle? He
maintained that man can have absolute convictions that are dependent on
neither argument or tradition when he receives God and his truth In freedom.
God's revelation awakens in man the singular and noble qualities that are in
all men. It is therefore foolish to expect God's revelation to be written on
the skies, for it is "written on something far greater—on the souls it has
made free."* The prophets and the apostles, therefore, were men who had
received the freedom which God had given them. When revelation is inter¬
preted in this way, man's freedom becomes an important factor in the prin¬
ciples of Biblical criticism. If the significance of freedom be acknowledged,
man may become impatient with those "who never wrote an inspired sen¬
tence in their lives and who do not know that an inspired sentence never was
written except with an attitude of inward freedom towards living events."2
Furthermore, the critic would have the responsibility of interpreting the
process and the means by which men's experiences of freedom were recorded
in the literature of scripture, and regardless of his conclusions concerning
authorship and date "the Scriptures would remain the heroic record of God's
3
dealings with heroic man."
*Faith and Freedom, p. 414.
2Ibid. , p. 415.
3Ibid.
Oman's emphasis on revelation as "God's response to man's
aspirations after freedom"* had important implications for his
interpretation of the place of Christ in revelation. Christ is inseparably
related to all revelation, and superior to all other aspects of revelation
because He deals so straig'nt-forwardly with men in their need "that He
stands quite alone in His significance for our freedom as children of God."
Oman felt that Ritschl did not go far enough when he gave emphasis only to
Christ's revelation of God's love and moral nature, for Oman believed that
Christ's revelation of God was also a revelation of God's power. Christ
revealed the perfect union of God's love and power in such a way that men
realized that God was not mere force or process but One who chose to deal
with them in their freedom:
When God undertakes to work with freedom, He undertakes to
bear and forbear, and the method of Christ becomes the revela¬
tion of a higher Omnipotence. Power becomes love, and gains
in power by being love. Power can only rule by iron law, love
can rule with the freedom of God's children; power can only
create a vast plaything, love can create a Kingdom of God.-*
One of the most wholesome emphases in Oman's treatment of freedom was
his frequent admission that God's method of working with man in freedom
was a slow process, often accompanied by men's misuse of their freedom
*
Faith and Freedom, p. 415.
2 Ibid.
3Ibid. , p. 416.
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and by their failures; however, he insisted that there was no other way
possihle in the spiritual realm. The only way that a loving and all-powerful
God can give Himself to man without His power annihilating man's will, or
enslaving him, is for God to wait for man's faith in free response to His
love.*
Another principle which Oman derived from the significance of
freedom is that no institution, including the Church, should be an end in
itself, but should be the means by which men are shown the privileges
and responsibilities of their freedom. Oman must be criticized for a
pattern of exposition which often places the individual and the institution
in an artificial and unnecessary antithesis, as in such passages as this,
in which he declared: "Freedom embodied in an institution may be on
its way to decay; freedom embodied in a heroic soul is absolute in its worth
2
and eternal in its influence." Although it will be pointed out later that he
was content to make an impossible distinction between "external" and
"internal" authority, it should be acknowledged that he probably did not
intend to minimize the importance of the institution. He recognized that
every legitimate institution had contributed to man's struggle for freedom,
but he sought primarily to emphasize the purpose of every institution to
lead man to an acceptance of the responsibilities of his freedom until the
*
Faith and Freedom, p. 416.
2Ibid. , p. 410.
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institution itself should become increasingly insignificant and unnecessary.
He believed that the Church more than any other institution should contin¬
ually be judged and evaluated in respect to its ideal purpose, which is "to
call men into the glorious liberty of God's children, always demanding of
them a higher more personal faith, and a more inward more personal obed¬
ience than she has any right to demand of them for herself."*
Finally, Oman looked to freedom for a point of departure for a
philosophy of history. God has ordained the legal aspects of our world so
that the whole responsibility of freedom will not overwhelm us, and so that
men may occasionally have a respite from the burden of freedom, and so
that the legal element may serve as a discipline when freedom is abused.
Man may tarry in the legal period of history with some profit, providing
he does not stay there too long. History is made up of the cycles of Law
and Gospel, and each is necessary preparation for the other; however, the
dominance of external authority is an indication of the loss of freedom;
therefore, ail men should accept the privileges of freedom and strive to
live for the Gospel. Oman concluded his interpretation of the significance
of freedom by warning against an extreme rejection of all mechanical law.
While it is true that mechanical interpretations have quite presumptuously
attempted to ignore man and the most meaningful elements of his life by
interpreting everything as a process of development, there can be nothing
gained by a reckless rejection of all mechanical law and the process of
*Faith and Freedom, p. 418.
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development. Man should now have the maturity and understanding of
himself to realize that the most basic realities of his life have not been
affected by either law or process; therefore, Oman concluded:
I have entirely failed in my purpose if I have not shown you that
it is just when set in the midst of this vastness that freedom and
faith attain their high significance. Not till we have traversed
immensity and eternity have we attached any adequate meaning
to the assertion that the things of the spirit have greater issues
depending on them than the mightiest law or the vastest process.
In the present feeble beginnings of man's freedom, nourished
tenderly by God's grace, we see the baby hand that holds the
sceptre of this realm, and we should resent nothing that displays
either its vastness or its permanence. Thus in a higher sense
than his we realize the force of Hegel's great saying: "The truth
of necessity is freedom.
Since Oman's contribution to theology will largely be determined by the
success or failure with which he has integrated the principle of freedom
into his doctrines of authority, grace, and the Church, it is necessary to
turn to these specific areas where a theology of freedom may be more
carefully analyzed and evaluated.
1





Oman's interpretation of freedom is so carefully integrated with
his doctrine of authority, and his doctrine cf authority is so consistently
and comprehensively amplified into the other themes of his theology on
grace and the church, that at times it is even difficult to isolate the con¬
cept of authority for exposition and evaluation; however, his major empha¬
ses are upon: (1) the loss of infallibility, (2) internal authority, (3) ex¬
ternal authority, (4) authority and the church's creed, and (5) authority
and the church's method and task. He summarized the results of his sur¬
vey of the relation of faith and freedom in the last two centuries in a pas¬
sage which describes his understanding of the historical and theological
background of the problem of authority, and which may well serve as a
point of departure for understanding the central emphasis of his own in¬
terpretation of authority:
Christianity has no means left to it whereby to compel consent
from the outside. There is no sound doctrine of Scripture which
can overbear us; and just as little is there any sound doctrine of
the Church. . . . The Protestant cannot say: Here is the infalli¬
ble Scripture, submit to it; nor the Catholic: Here is the infalli¬
ble Church, submit to it. Hence ail theologies which go no deeper
than Scripture texts or Church dogmas are insufficient. As soon
as they turn upon us and say: It does not matter what you think,
this is the doctrine of Scripture, or this is the dogma of the
Church, which it is your duty to accept, they are building on
-136-
the past in a way which our whole inquiry shows to be not only
intellectually but spiritually indefensible. *
Infallibility, according to Oman, received its most devastating criticism
from rationalism, and this movement along with the theory of evolution and
the development of the historical method has made the concept of infallibility
unacceptable for the modern mind. Oman pointed out, in apparent agree¬
ment, that some believe the greatest revolution of Christianity did not
occur during the Reformation but in the movement broadly characterized
as the Aufklarung or the Illumination. According to these interpreters,
the Reformation consisted primarily in an ecclesiastical reorganization,
while the old basis of external authority in Church and doctrine continued
unchallenged. The Reformation was therefore, according to this view, only
a preview of the more complete victory of individual freedom which was to
come later in the movement of rationalism. Whatever Oman may have
thought of this interpretation of the Reformation, there is no question that
for him the most significant development for freedom in the history of the
Church was brought about by rationalism, that movement which had at its
very center "the conscious rejection of all the external, authoritative infalli¬
bilities." Rationalism was, according to Oman, the unique and radical move¬
ment of thought which had at its heart the "positive assertion that nothing is
either true faith or right morality which is not our own; and that, in conse¬
quence, external authority is, in principle, an unsound basis.
^Faith and Freedom, p. 327.
^Grace and Personality, pp. 3-4.
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The other factors which aided in destroying the concept of infalli¬
bility of Church and Scripture were evolution and the historical method.
When the theory of evolution appeared, men believed that it should be in¬
terpreted as a "flow of progress on which the generations needed but to
float", and the result was that moral and religious issues were blurred
and apparently lost any quality of absoluteness which they may have once
possessed. "Absolute distinction between truth and error, good and evil,
even at the centre, disappeared from a territory where lately all had been
absolute."* The rise of the historical method was also an important devel¬
opment in the destruction of infallibility. The earlier method of dogmatic
authority had worked on the principle of assuming an a priori standpoint
from which it might reason concerning what it believed to be appropriate
to the concepts of omnipotence and omniscience, whereas the historical
method sought to interpret without a priori assumptions that which God has
really accomplished.2 These movements made the concept of infallibility
an anachronism which no one could honestly and realistically accept.
Oman's rejection of the a priori method in theology on the basis of
rationalism, evolution and the historical method provides a significant illustra¬
tion of the contrast between the philosophical orientation of his theology and
the more biblical approach of neo-orthodoxy. Notice that even though Oman
*Grace and Personality, p. 6.
2Ibid.
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rejected the speculative method, he did so on philosophical and historical
grounds, whereas Emil Brunner rejects the a priori method at precisely
the same point of interpretation of the doctrine of God on the principle that
such an approach "would be impossible for a genuinely Biblical system of
theology."1 Surely Brunner uses philosophical categories for his under¬
standing and exposition of theology just as Oman did, but Oman's theology
would have been stronger if he had made a more conscious effort to show
clearly the Biblical sources for his thought.
Since the dogmatic infallibilities are no longer really open to men,
Oman believed that one must explore the very foundations of religious auth¬
ority and return to the ultimate principles upon which the Church is founded.
In thoughts which must have had their origin in Oman's early convictions
regarding the Robertson Smith controversy, he reasoned that if God is a
God of truth, the very essence of bad religion would be for the Church to
condone and even rest its claims for authority upon that which is not truth.
If this situation is to be avoided, the Church must be willing to ask
upon what Divine word within or without the authority she sets
up against man's selfish impulses truly rests. She may no
longer, with hope of success, merely set forth her creed and
assert her claim, and then try to find some ground for main¬
taining them, but she must build only as her foundations will
allow. ^
^mil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God (Dogmatics: Vol-
ume I, translated by Olive Wyon, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950),
p. 249.
2
Vision and Authority, p. 23.
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In other words, there must be a reconciliation between the Church's
"ecclesiastical confidence and her theological uncertainty,"* for it is
only when this has been accomplished that the Church will be able to be
true to herself and express effectively the proper claims of her authority.
The major thrust of Oman's development of authority was directed
toward a religious reorientation of the form of freedom in rationalism which
insisted that nothing is really truth for man until it has been properly ac¬
cepted. Oman rejected the negative moralism and intellectualism of ration¬
alism and characterized its attitude of self-sufficiency as being like the sou
who has acquired a key to the house, yet fails to understand the wider impli¬
cations of his responsibilities and the fact that he may still learn from his
parents.^ Oman stressed the internal nature of that authority which only
God can give and which man must receive for himself as a spiritual vision.
The greatest responsibility which the Church has regarding its authority is
to "establish freedom upon that impelling necessity wlich a man's own spiri-
tual vision can alone impose." Oman explained, in an emphasis which is
entirely in keeping with his epistcmology, that our experience shall always
exceed our analysis, and our vision will always be more profound than our
interpretation; however, ultimately every noble direction which men are
*
Vis ion and Authority, p. 23.
^Honest Religion, p. 19.
3 . .
Vision and Authority, p. 22.
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given mast be received as a personal insight or vision of that which is
truth. He found it difficult to understand why the method of spiritual
vision for discerning God's truth had been so frequently neglected by the
Church throughout her history, even though the Church claimed to believe
that the dignity of man and the will of God could be acknowledged in no other
way. The Church itself has often been fearful of the only true means of
authority and has resorted to the lower methods of compulsion and exter¬
nal control, but if spiritual vision is not present there can be no true pro¬
gress. External regulation can never be adequate to deal with the real
depths of man's involvement in evil and "even could outward compliance
be enforced, it were only a hypocrisy and a dangerous covering up of a
malignant sore."* Where vision is lacking it may not be compensated for
by a claim to possess it or by the vision of another, because even the lofti¬
est belief becomes superstition when it is held on merely external grounds.
The authority of spiritual vision places upon one an obligation which is abso¬
lute in its claim for its demands are based not just upon the externals of
man's life but upon the whole structure of his environment and his being.
This necessity is of greater strength than any external force or physical
law and since it is a necessity of man's own acceptance it is the sole guard¬
ian of his freedom. 2
*Vision and Authority, p. 24.
2Ibid., p. 25.
-141-
Cman taught that there is only one qualification necessary for
perception of the spiritual vision, and that is childlikeness before God's
truth. The one thing which men are required to do is to follow their own
insight, refusing to allow the interpretation of others or their own fear and
prejudices to prevent them from seeing that which they should see for them¬
selves. The requirement is that no one should allow himself to become
dominated by others but that he should seek to become really free by sub¬
mitting only to that which is truth for him. Even though one may avail him¬
self of the wisdom and counsel of those who are also seeking the truth, he
must never allow thern to control his freedom in the search for truth.
Oman explained himself more clearly on this matter when he
made the distinction between personal authority as a primary and as a
secondary source of belief. He admitted that men often hold their beliefs
on the ground of the secondary authority of others who have reasons and
evidence for their beliefs. This is a necessary condition for many of
man's beliefs and much of his experience, and it can be a very helpful situa¬
tion provided this secondary personal authority is never allowed to become
the ultimate authority upon which beliefs are based. To illustrate this dis¬
tinction Oman related an experience he once had in the Cologne Cathedral.
He heard a monk saying, in effect, that in spite of the evidence of one's own
senses, which seem to indicate that the sun goes around the earth, men
believe, on the authority of the astronomers, that the earth goes round the
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sun. The monk pointed out that the astronomers are merely fallible men.
How much more, then, he reasoned, should men receive the witness of
the infallible Church, even though, as with such doctrines as transubstan-
tiation, the witness of one's own senses may appear against them. Oman's
refutation of this interpretation was that man believes in the astronomer not
because of his authority but because he has convincing reasons based on
actual study and experience; moreover, an astronomer has an obligation
to justify his beliefs by evidence. Thus Oman drew his conclusion that
"the only primary authority is the authority of the witness of the reality, and
the sole personal authority is the extent to which, in knowledge and discern¬
ment, it has been submitted to."*
Oman had discovered an important aspect of the Subject-Object
relationship which has been so prominent in contemporary theology when he
recognized that the only ultimate authority exists in the reality itself, but
unfortunately, he did not emphasize the personal dynamic quality of this
reality which is the other dimension of this theme. He realized the impor¬
tance of surrendering oneself to the evidence of the environment, the truth
of God and even to God Himself, but the freedom of God who is the address¬
ing Subject in this relationship was never adequately acknowledged. Although
Barth is willing to think of God as a particular Subject,^ and Paul Tillich
* John Oman, "The Roman Sacerdotal Hierarchy," in Why I Am and
Why I Am Not a Catholic (London; Cassell & Co. , Ltd., 1931), pp. 234-35.
"Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume II, The Doctrine of God
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), Section I, pp. 15ff.
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speaks more in terms of God as being itself as Subject, they both seek
to make it clear, without denying the objective reality of God, that God
is always Subject. Karl Earth says, "The Subject of revelation jpodj is
the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject. We cannot get behind this
Subject. It cannot become an object."* Paul Tillich points out that "God
remains the subject, even if he becomes a logical object." Therefore,
"theology always must remember that in speaking of God it makes an ob¬
ject of that which precedes the subject-object structure and that, therefore,
it must include in its speaking of God the acknowledgment that it cannot
make God an object." Oman was not tempted to make God a logical cate¬
gory in the cenee which Barth and Tillich are primarily concerned to reject,
but he did not escape the danger of neglecting the personal initiative of God
as Subject in revelation.
Oman never tired of stressing the principle that truth is not truth
for men until they have seen it for themselves and responded to it. He sum¬
marized his position quite well when he declared:
Nothing is ours, however it may be presented to us, except we
discover its truth and except it prove itself again in our exper¬
ience. Mere acceptance of the conclusions of others, mere uni¬
formity of creed or conduct with those who have gone before us,
*Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I, The Doctrine of the Word of
God, Section I, p. 438.
^Tillich, op. cit. , pp. 172-73. Cf. I Corinthians 13:12.
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mere unity through suppression of difference, is not the way by
which we profit fromthe labours of the saints,or lay broad and
deep our foundations on the whde experiences and discoveries
and victories of mankind. *
The only true and ultimate authority, according to Oman, is God's truth as
it gives witness to itself, for "after ail possible demonstration, nothing is
truth for us till it flash upon our Inward sight, and something goes out of us
to meet it, which makes it, when we find it, the native country of our spirits."2
A man can therefore be a personal authority in religion only in the sense
that he may speak about that which he has seen and known for himself.
Although Oman never really made the nsition very effectively
from his emphasis on the "form of freedom" or the necessity of personal
reception of truth into the "content of freedom" or that which has been
accepted as truth, he did attempt to relate the internal authority which man
receives as an individual to the external authority of the Church, Scripture,
Christ, and the Church's creed. Oman never really developed the historical
and communal dimensions of his interpretation of authority as fully as this
emphasis was needed in his theology, but he did at least acknowledge that
even though religious authority is intensely personal it should not be inter
preted as wholly individualistic. The individual should not be considered as
an isolated being, but as one who can only know the fullness and absoluteness
^Vision and Authority, p. 58.
2Ibid. , pp. 109-110.
145-
of his freedom when he has found his proper relation to the whole uni¬
verse, and has taken his place among other men. Therefore, Oman be¬
lieved that while God's revelation is given to individuals, it comes to them
as they are a part of the whole race of men who live in the historical order;
consequently, God's revelation is progressive and can only be understood
in the context of its historical development. It is unfortunate that Oman
did not develop the positive aspects of this historical theme further, but
he chose rather to turn the force of his discussion in the direction of a
rejection of the doctrine of infallibility.
Many believe that to keep religious authority from becoming a
matter of mere individual desire or inclination that it is necessary to
accept the doctrine of an infallible Church or an infallible Scripture.
They believe that the Church must be an infallible spokesman for God's
revelation, with an authoritative tradition for interpreting that revelation,
and an infallible head to implement that truth in any of its contemporary
situations. Oman declared that the Church of Rome attempted to establish
this kind of authority "not without some indifference to the facts of history"
but "with a clear notion of the requirements of an authority which men shall
obey and not discuss."1 He rejected the Roman claims for an infallible
external authority on the grounds of the central emphasis in his interpre¬
tation of freedom—that a blind surrender to external authority is not the
Vision and Authority, p. 92.
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way that God has chosen to deal with man, or the way that men should
deal with one another, for this kind of submission is the sacrifice of free¬
dom to necessity. Oman warned that if the kind of authority which Rome
proposed be allowed to go unquestioned that there would be not only the
loss of the noblest element in religious experience but that the whole
pattern of our dealing with God and men in freedom would be denied.
Oman asked if God had intended for men to be nothing more than objects
in His universe who are distinguished from other things only by their
being aware of the process of which they are a part, why did God not
establish this mechanical perfection at the outset; why does He choose
to deal with men in the limitations of their freedom in history? The
doctrine of the infallibility of the Church, therefore, not only calls inlo
question the nature of religious authority but every area of human exper¬
ience. *
The belief in an infallible Scripture was equally unsatisfactory
to Oman. He felt that the basic issue should not be approached, as it was
so frequently done, by declaring the kind of authority which Scripture
should have for the external authority of the Church to be secure, but
that the matter should be approached by seeking to discover what kind of
authority the Scripture really possesses. Oman believed that it was very
difficult to discover and describe the authority of the Scriptures and he
*
Vis ton and Authority, p. 95.
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simply affirmed his conviction that the Scriptures have an intrinsic
quality about them to convince men of their validity if they will accept
them, and then hastened on to declare that the authority of Scriptures is
nevertheless not the word of God in an infallible form which may demand
of men their surrender. Regardless of the way one may interpret the in¬
spiration of the Scriptures, there appears to be no basis left for consider¬
ing them as documents which God revealed by dictation to men who were as
free from error as if they were mere pens in the hand of God. For whatever
the authority of Scripture may be, "it is not of the infallibility of verbal
inspiration."* Oman would have approved of the way Karl Barth recog¬
nizes that one can speak of the Bible as the V ord of God only if this is an
expression of faith which one has known for himself; however Oman could
have strengthened his thought considerably if he had declared as clearly as
Barth does that the confession of faith, "The Bible is God's Word," is a
statement which
we allow to be true quite apart from our faith and above all
our faith, allow to be true even and actually against our un¬
belief, we do not allow to be true as a description of our
experience with the Bible, but allow to be true as a descrip¬
tion of the act of God in the Bible, whatever the experiences
may be which we have or do not have in that connection. ^
*
Vis ion and Authority, pp. 93-94.
^Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. I, Section 1, p. 123. E. Brunner
makes essentially the same emphasis in Revelation and Reason, p. 32.
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Oman was confident that the loss of the infallibilities did not mean
the defeat of the Kingdom of God, even though it might mean the destruction
of some of the external manifestations of the Church. Oman was always
confident that the purpose of those events which destroyed the mere exter¬
nals of the Church was "not to take away what we truly possessed, but to
show what we only supposed we had."1 The Church should not regret the
loss of the infallibilities, but rather be thankful that it now stands like the
early Church with no other authority than that which confronts a man in
freedom; and, furthermore, it should be remembered that the Church
has never witnessed greater power than in those early days when it had
no external means to support its claims. The fact that there are no infal¬
lible external authorities does not mean that God has failed, but that He has
chosen to deal wisely and patiently with man in freedom. If one will acknow¬
ledge God's method of leading man by his freedom, he will discover that
every area of his experience may be related to the purpose of God either
as discipline or responsibility. Man is often very slow to accept his respon¬
sibilities in freedom, and there are many defeats and failures involved in the
process, but these are not God's failures, for if the method proceeds slowly
it is due to the fact that man cannot accept all of God's truth at once, and
that God is patient with his struggle. If God in His revelation were not
patient with man and his failures, He would never be able to develop the
^Honest Religion, p. 16.
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response of freedom in man, but would make freedom impossible.
Human freedom could no more have borne the grasp of absolute
truth and absolute perfection than it can suffer the grasp of abso
lute mechanical law. To lay hold of man by infallible and final
proclamation and dare him to disobey, would not have been to
implant in him the Divine image, but as it were, to put out the
fire by the blaze of the sun.1
Although Oman dealt with the authority of Christ under the topic
of external authority, he actually stressed the same basic thesis of the
internal authority which he had applied to the authority of Church and Scrip¬
tures and concentrated upon the importance of receiving the authority of Christ
in freedom. Jesus is the highest authority in religion because He refused to
consider himself as an external authority, but chose rather to deal directly
with God's truth as it makes its appeal to man who is made in the image of
God. Christ never asked men to accept the truth on any other grounds than
the truth itself as its own authority. He did not base his appeal on any posi¬
tion or status which He possessed or upon any external support, which He
might "have used, but instead trusted the truth to be its own witness and bring
its own confirmation. Christ's method of presenting God's truth to men,
according to Oman, was therefore not primarily the proclamation of truth
to be accepted, but the more existential approach of seeking to draw the
truth from, men, often even very sinful men, by asking their opinion on the
issue under consideration.
*Vis ion and Authority, p. 97.
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The great demonstration of the Christ is just that He never
sets Himself, as the absolute external authority of the perfect
truth, in opposition to the imperfect authority of the finite and
sinful spirit within, but that He has only one appeal, which is
to the likeness of God and the teaching of God within. Jesus
speaks indeed with authority. He is not as the Scribes. They
had authorities, but no authority. They had nothing to speak
from direct, and nothing to appeal to direct. Jesus, on the
other hand, speaks from man to man the truth He has seen
and to which his hearers cannot be blind, unless they close
their eyes. 1
Christ was Himself the truth, and an authority in all that He thought, and
said, and did, however, when He said "I say unto you" He did not intend to
speak with an absolute finality which would forbid further investigation of
the truth, but He sought to arouse an internal response in man which would
give witness to the validity of God's revelation. Oman believed that it was
this aspect of the authority of Christ which provided the most adequate criter¬
ion for establishing the perfect truth of God because Christ "abolishes all
opposition between what God has created in us and what He reveals to us,
between the authority of the conscience and the heart and the authority of
the truth. "2
The fact that Christ refused to put His words into any kind of final
or authoritative written form is a significant indication of the kind of author¬
ity which he desired for his teaching. Christ left no written word of His
own, even though he lived in a day when people were heavily dependent on
^Vision and .Authority, pp. 107-8.
2Ibid., pp. 112-13.
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writing, and even though he taught among those who had a slavish sub¬
mission to the letter. He was confident that His words would endure, but
He did not seek to preserve them in any permanent form of expression.
It would certainly have been possible for Him to have written his teaching
in a perfect form which would have guaranteed its inerrant transmission.
If it d been His first purpose to set all dubiety for ever
aside, He might have made every word be continued to man
as a royal proclamation, with an imperative authority behind
it which none might doubt and few disobey. But this enslaving
authority over man's mind and will He ever shunned. *
He was, rather, content to give Himself and His teaching to a few who
would be able to understand and remember only a small portion of His
truth.
It was in the cross of Christ that Oman saw the supreme example
of the authority of God which chooses to deal with man in his freedom. By
removing the personal enmity which exists between God and man, the cross
makes it possible to avoid the conflict between the external authority of God
and the internal authority of man's freedom. The cross does not just abol¬
ish an external barrier of fellowship which exists between God and man,
but it is God's invitation to man to respond freely to God's grace. There
is nothing in the cross of the might which constrains, but is all of the might
which persuades, nothing of the easy proclamation of power, but is all of
the difficult participation of love."2 If man is willing to unite his finite
^Vision and Authority, p. 126.
2Ibld. , p. 117.
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will with the infinite will of God as revealed in the cross, he may receive
the personal strength which is offered to him there, and he may realize
the true and ultimate purpose of his freedom which is to accept the respon¬
sibility and the direction which God gives him. Until this personal relation¬
ship is established, there will always be a false and unnecessary division
between external authority and that internal authority which a man must
see for himself.
Another major division and emphasis of Oman's treatment of
authority was his interpretation of the authority of the Church's creed.
He made no technical distinction between the terms creed and confession,
but used them interchangeably to opcak of the essential doctrinal affirma
tions of the Church. Although he usually speaks in a negative vein of warn¬
ing concerning the dangers of allowing an external creed to usurp the place
of freedom in religion, he did acknowledge the value and purposes of an
adequate creed or confess ion .for apologetics, teaching, refuting error and
establishing union within the Church.* Oman expressed concern that the
Church should have a creed which was "clear and certain and imperative,
adequate to man's practical necessities, a call to high endeavour, and a
2
condemnation of all things base." The Church can have this kind of
creed only if it can discern the will of the Father, and the only way to
*Honest Religion, pp. 161-62.
^Vision and Authority, pp. 181-82.
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know the Father is through the revelation of the Son, who must be known
and interpreted without any interference from an external authority. At
this point Oman clearly reflected the influence of Ritschl, for he inter¬
preted Ritschl as teaching that since we are brought directly into contact
with God's revelation we are free, ' so that no human creed can be authori¬
tative for us. We are not even dependent upon the Fathers. Herein the
very significance of Christ's person and work appears. They enable us to
go behind the Fathers and all other authorities."1 Oman's own emphasis
is strikingly parallel:
If the Christ of God is not one who proclaims truth altogether
above our reasoning, but is the perfect appeal of the Divine
incarnated in humanity which demonstrates itself direct to
the nature made in God's image, the first resolve of every
disciple in every age should be to press, without intermediary,
directly to His feet. No fellow mortal, were he even an Apos¬
tle, should intervene.^
Oman realized that the Church's creed came through the historical devel¬
opment of men's witness and interpretation; however, the burden of his
emphasis was to establish the fact that the ultimate or final religious auth¬
ority could not reside in an historical tradition or in the witness of others.
Christ first demonstrated His truth and power to His own age
before men ever sought to conserve the witness to His life in a Biblical and
a historical tradition; consequently, each generation should seek to maintain
1 Faith and Freedom, p. 380.
^Vision and Authority, p. 193.
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in its creed only that for which it has evidence in a new demonstration
of Christ's power. When this principle is taken seriously, men realize
that the basic authority of the creed does not rest upon the majority of
people who accept it, or upon ecclesiastical status, but rather upon the
attitude which men have toward God's truth. It has never been possible
to determine truth on the basis of numbers or position, for truth is quite
frequently found in the minority, and even one man may possess an inter¬
pretation of the truth which is not individualistic in that his conviction may
be derived from the universal grounds of truth. Wherever this may happen,
that "one A oslulic soul, though all were faithless, would be the true repre¬
sentative of Christ and Christ's interests in the church." * The central
affirmations of the Church's creed, therefore, must not be accepted on
the basis of the ability of the Church to define its doctrine in massive sys¬
tems, but rather upon the capacity of the Church to witness concerning that
which it has experienced by its faith. The Church must accept the fact that
it can "permanently and safely retain no article in her creed she is not able
to demonstrate in her life." Since it is Impossible to confirm by experience
many vague abstractions and minute descriptions of God's order which theo¬
logy has often maintained, the Church must be content with a more modest
creed which shall wait patiently for the day when God shall reveal Himself
^Vision and Authority, pp. 211-212.
2Ibid., p. 220.
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more completely. The Church may be quite confident that if it will accept
only that which finds correlation between the revelation of God from without
and the image of God within, and respond only to that which has the ability
to make men more like God in their experience, that the truth of God has
the power to survive and enable men to conserve and implement the basic
teachings of the Christian Faith. "The Spiritual inheritance she has
received she will hand on, not diminished by the wear and stress of time,
but, enriched by man's varied experience and tested by helping at least to
solve the problems of every age."*
The final major division of Oman's treatment of authority deals
with his application of his interpretation of religious authority to the
method and task of the Church. He believed that the proper starting point
for considering this question was not to stipulate the type of authority
which the Church must possess if it is to succeed in its task, but to deter¬
mine the nature of the authority the Church should exercise in being true
to the method of Christ. Too frequently, the Church has acted as though
success must be hers at all costs, and as though her failure would reflect
upon God's power. The belief that because the Church has a purpose worthy
of success she must devise ways to force its victory has often been the cause
of her entanglement in areas which are not properly her concern, and has
often led her to resort to the use of Improper means to advance her cause.
^Vision and Authority, p. 256.
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However, Oman was thoroughly committed to that belief in freedom which
he had learned so well from Ritschl, and which he developed so fully in
his doctrine of grace, that "God has made in every heart a sanctuary into
which He Himself will not, with any other means, force an entrance."*
The Church, therefore, may fail in its invitation to men, but it must learn
to shake the dust off its shoes In a "sacrament of failure" and consider
even its willingness to fail an essential element of the gospel.^ The
supreme example for the Church to follow in this regard is found in the
revelation of the persuasive love of God as seen in the death of Christ on
the cross, for it is only in the cross that man may know the power of a
transforming love which will not violate his freedom. The Church should
continually
exalt the Cross as the symbol of highest rule, the fullest reve¬
lation of the Divine sovereignty. It is the sign of power, because
it is the symbol of the might which shall transform all things by
transforming all hearts, the symbol of the everlasting order of
conscious freedom in God's rule of love.^
If the Church, therefore, is true to the method of Christ's appeal to men,
it will seek to make its demands as strong and as weak as the cross of
Christ.
*
Vis ion and Authority, p. 313. Oman's indebtedness to Ritschl
on this theme may be seen in Faith and Freedom, pp. 356, 374.
^Vision and Authority,pp. 308f.
3Ibid., p. 337.
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Oman recognized that the spiritual authority which he advocated
would be unsatisfactory to many because it did not offer the secular force
and security which the Churches once possessed. The centuries of condi¬
tioning men to expect strong temporal power from their churches is not
easily removed from their minds; however, Oman declared that the foun¬
dation stone of all genuine authority in the Church ! is the ^eter of the com¬
mon life, whose endowment is insight to perceive every revelation of God,
as the ceaseless unfolding of the everlasting order in freedom through hoL-
ness and union through love."* It is easy to understand why men become
discouraged and confused when their old external authorities are no longer
tenable, but there can be no turning back for this would mean a rejection
of God's method in establishing His kingdom; furthermore, Oman con¬
cluded:
The old external authority of the Church is a halting place we
have in God's wise providence long passed, and by no preach¬
ing of submission can it be found again. Safety is not behind
but before, and the demand which should ever ring more loudly
in our ears is to inquire more earnestly, more humbly, more
patiently, more utterly in the spirit of love and with a more
exclusive regard to the interests of truth. So shall we follow
Him who is True and see the glory of His kingdom which is
Love."
Oman was certain that if the Church will dedicate itself to this end by these
means, that it may be assured that though there appears to be great loss of
Vision and Authority, p. 348.
2Ibid. , p. 352.
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of authority it shall one day realize how that which is truly of God has
endured. This conviction remained central to Oman's thought throughout
his life, for in his last book, Honest Religion, he concluded:
I can find no sense in life and no meaning in history on the view
that God is as much concerned with correct doctrine, approved
action and regulated institution as man is. To have made us all,
infallible in every judgment and undeviating in every action would
surely have been child's play for His omnipotence. But if the
sole perfect order be the freedom of God's children, and it in¬
volve knowing God's mind of our own insight and doing His will
of our own discernment and consecration and having a relation
to others which is a fellowship mutual both with God and man,
and, that, in the end, God will not be content with less, surely
we can see, dimly at least, the necessity for the long hard way
man has had to travel. 1
The Church, however, must continually be on guard that it does not become
proud or complacent for the one thing which God does not allow men is
2
contentment with their finalities.
^Honest Religion, p. 169. Cf. Oman, "Christianity in a New Age,"
in trud uc t ion to A. I-TT^eake and R.G. Parsons, An Outline of Christianity,
Vol. Ill (London: Waverly Book Club, 1926), pp. xvi-xvii.




REG ONC ILIAT ION
Oman believed that the most distinguishing aspect of the Christian
religion "is the kind of redemption it offers," for in contrast "to all ways
of renunciation, its way of being redeemed from the world is reconcilia¬
tion. Oman developed this criterion more broadly and fully although
less personally than in Grace and Personality, when he made his classifi
cation of world religions in his later work The Natural and The Supernatural
on the basis "of the kind of redemption they offer. He felt that the most
important task for English theology in his day wa3 to give a complete re¬
orientation of the Christian religion according to the major theme of the
reconciliation of man to God. He sought, therefore, like Schleiermacher
in his age, to reinterpret Christian theology, and especially the doctrine of
grace, from a thoroughly personalistic interpretation of God and man in all
their relationships. ^ Oman struggled with the relationship between the
human and the divine will in his first book , Vision and Authority, because
he realized that there was not only something central for the Christian faith
involved in the issue, but that there was in this problem the promise of an
*Grace and Personality, p. 111.
2
Natural and Supernatural, pp. 363ff.
^ Faith and Freedom, pp. 331, 328.
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unending debate which each generation must interpret for itself. The basic
question, according to Oman, was how is it possible for man in the weakness
of his finite will to receive the aid of an absolute and infinite God without
losing his freedom, and how is it possible for an almighty God to entrust
His creation to sinful and erring man without forfeiting his sovereignty.
Must not the very first necessity of His rule stand in hard
contrast, alien and opposite, to the thought of a human per¬
sonality of limited, but uncontrolled dominion, who has in his
own choice and resolution, not merely the destinies of his own
soul, but the additional responsibility of a large influence
upon the happiness or misery of others? If two such domin¬
ions exist, must they not face each other, forever unreconcil-
able. *
This same basic question is a recurring theme in all of Oman's writings
but it received its fullest exposition in his monumental work, Grace and
Personality. It is difficult at times to see clearly some of the distinctions
Oman makes between the variouG emphases in his interpretation of the doc¬
trine of grace, but the basic pattern of his discussion deals with : (1) the
historical setting for the problem of grace; (2) the essential nature of the
gracious personal relationship between man and God; (3) the way this re¬
lationship finds expression in the Christian life; and (4) the way that the
moral and religious aspects of experience are related in the gracious per¬
sonal relationship.
According to Oman, the underlying problem of grace as seen in its
historical setting is the same problem as that which provided the background
*Vis ion and Authority, pp. 243-44.
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for his re interpretatlon of the other major themes of his theology; namely,
the problem of the concept of infallibility. When the idea of infallibility is
applied to an interpretation of grace, the assumption is made that grace
works mechanically as an "irresistible force of omnipotence directed, in
an unswerving line, by omniscience, which, being mechanical and not spiri¬
tual, introduces irreconcilable conflict between moral freedom and the suc¬
cour of God."* Oman maintained that if grace is conceived to be a domin¬
ating force which manipulates persons as objects, there can be no personal
relationship between man and God; consequently, the noblest concern of
religion with persons and moral values can never be realized. He saw the
problem of a mechanical interpretation of grace as essentially the same
issue which took the form of the problem of free-will and predestination
in the debates between Augustine and Peiagius, Calvin and Arminius, and
which, in more recent days, may be observed in the conflict between the
emphasis on moral self-sufficiency by Kant and the rationalists, as opposed
to the importance given to religious dependence by Schleiermacher and the
romanticists.
The rationalism of the eighteenth century was Pelagian in character
in that its primary concern was to stress the rational capacity and the respon¬
sibility of the individual to recognize and accept the truth for himself. It
taught that there can be no real worth in truth, beauty or goodness unless
*Grace and Personality, p. 14.
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it be freely received, and that there can be no true morality if it is not
accepted in absolute freedom. Most of the rationalists, according to Oman,
were as naive as the earlier Pelagians had been about the ability of man to
perfect himself, but their optimism, he believed, was due to the fact that
they evaluated man and his attainments by the limited criterion of moralis¬
tic rules of conduct rather than in the broader scope of an attitude of growth
in sincerity and conscientiousness toward the whole environment. The move¬
ment failed in its basic desire to provide a sound basis for morality, and
therefore when taken by itself cannot solve the problem of the relationship
between human freedom and God's will in the doctrine of grace.
The movement known as romanticism in the poetry and philosophy
of the nineteenth century sought to enlarge the rather limited view of life
which rationalism had imposed. It interpreted the world as a vast moving,
spiritual realm and attempted to recognize in man an infinite individuality
which corresponds to the manifold diversity of the world; however, it
tended to interpret the individual as only an emergent element who reflected
the noblest qualities in an "immanent cosmic process."*
Oman discerned traces of Augustinianism and Calvinism in roman¬
ticism for he declared:
This is predestinarianism in a way to have taken away even
Calvin's breath; and it gives a calm superiority to good and
evil, which no doubt he would have rejected with all the inten¬
sity of his vehement spirit. But is it other than the logic of
his position? If the glory of God is to act by omnipotence
*Grace and Personality, p. 20.
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dlrected in a straight line by omniscience, He could only fix
the scheme of all things in an eternal process of Reason. . . .
Once you begin with the Absolute and conceive it thus mechan¬
ically as force, the only peace you can arrive at is to do your
best to contemplate the whole as a very marked improvement
upon your own unfortunate confinement to the part. ^
The severity of Oman's critique of Calvin and Calvinism is not
altogether unwarranted, for although Calvin acknowledged that faith must
involve a total response in love before it is genuine faith, there were
times when he was in danger of losing his theological balance between
God's sovereignty and man's freedom by stressing the might of God as
though it controlled the will of man impersonally. For instance, on one
occasion in his Institutes, Calvin wrote in apparent approval of Augustine's
picture of God directing the human will as a rider would manage his horse:
If God rides it, he, like a sober and skillful rider, manages it
in a graceful manner; stimulates its tardiness; restrains its
immoderate celerity; represses its wantonness and wildness;
tames its perverseness, and conducts it into the right way.
But if the devil has taken possession of it, he, like a foolish
and wanton rider, forces it through pathless places, hurries it
into ditches, drives it down over precipices, and excites it to
obstinacy and ferocity.^
Perhaps it was because Oman was actually so completely Calvinistic himself,
^Grace and Personality, p. 21.
2
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion translated by
John Allen (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, no
date) Volume I, Book III, Section ii, paragraph 8, pp. 604-05.
Ibid. , Volume I, Book II, section iv, paragraph 1, p. 334.
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at least to the extent that he realized that everything of grace must come
from God, that he recognized so clearly the dangers of a Calvinistic theo¬
logy lapsing over into a mechanical or impersonal interpretation of grace.
Oman realized that it was impossible to reach a solution to the pro¬
blem of grace as long as it was approached from the standpoint of either
rationalism or romanticism for neither movement dealt adequately with
personality. If the problem of grace is approached exclusively from the
perspective of rationalism one is driven to the conclusion that the individual
is a morally independent and self-sufficient power, and if only the insights
of romanticism are accepted then the freedom of the individual must be sur¬
rendered to an infinite and overwhelming process. Oman admitted that both
movements offered convenient mechanical theories, and he was aware that
each had contributed something significant to an understanding of the problem;
however, he concluded that neither theory alone could provide an answer to
the q estion. The twentieth century must seek to answer the problems of
both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by showing
how the nature of a person is such and the grace which succours
it is such that they cannot be divided, making it appear how a
higher sense of responsibility is a deeper humility, and a more
entire humility a more courageous responsibility, or, in other
words, how absolute moral independence and absolute religious ^
dependence are not opposites but necessarily one and indivisible.
Oman was persuaded that each half of the antinomy of the problem represented
an absolutely essential principle which could not be forgotten or compromised.
^Grace and Personality, p. 22.
He therefore rejected all solutions which either sacrificed religion to
ethics, as did Pelagius, or ethics to religion, as did Augustine, or which
separated them from one another or interpreted them in synergistic rela¬
tion .
From the religious point of view, it is impossible tc ti*\ce any
good thing tc human effort or human merit, for everything good must come
from Gcd's grace. If the only alternative is an interpretation of grace as
an infinite force controlled by omniscience, then religion should follow
Augustinianism for ultimately everything worthy of faith originates in God.
It is especially necessary to held to this conviction in view of man's weak¬
nesses and failures, because it is apparent that nothing of any real value
can have its primary source in the human realm; yet from the ethical
point of view it is impossible to see any goodness in conduct that is deter-
ministically motivated, whether by external necessity or by irresistible
divine grace. The danger of Pelagianism is that it encourages men to put
their trust in their own efforts and even in their own feelings. It demands
an anxious exercise of religious effort in public and an introspective devo¬
tion in private, but its overall emphasis on human effo-t is not conducive
to a genuine peace. The kind of belief which cannot depend wholly upon
God must forfeit peace by its continual concern about its spiritual
health, and "to he perpetually feeling our own pulse is the surest way to
rob ourselves of the self-forgetting vigour in which health is displayed."*
*Grace and Personality, p. 26.
Pelagianism is also an inadequate criterion for morality because of its
easy optimism concerning man's ability to reach perfection and obey God's
laws. The true dynamics of morality such as sincerity and proper motiva¬
tion, are obscured by a shallow concern with the mere external appearances
of respectability. The very fact that Augustinianism and Calvinism were
opposed by Pelagianism and Arminianism in what appeared to be an almost
inescapable conflict revealed to Oman that there was something basic in
man's religious experience which was not properly acknowledged by the
former theories and indicated to him also that there was an element of
truth in the latter interpretations. Oman explained that even the weaknesses
of the reasons for Pelagianism showed how essential was the element of
truth it contained, "for men are usually satisfied with bad argument only
when their convictions rest on other grounds."*
Although Oman acknowledged the value of Augustinianism in as¬
cribing every ultimate good in religious experience to God, he made it abun¬
dantly clear that he did not believe that God gives Himself to man as irresis¬
tible grace. The primary purpose of religion is to provide man with an eter¬
nal strength and stability in an evanescent world of mechanical forces; there¬
fore, man should never be persuaded to accept an interpretation of God as
mere impersonal and irresistible power. If God is understood to be an infinite
force over against the finitude of man, there remain, according to Oman,
*Grace and Personality, p. 28.
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only three very unsatisfactory alternatives of interpretation: either God's
power would be so overwhelming that it would annihilate man's personality
altogether; or He could withhold his power and abandon man in a "parched
desolation in which uninspired resolutions grow as a meagre salt bush";
or God may dispense his grace in such an arbitrary way that He would
"break up the desert only by stagnant pools. If it is maintained that
God's infinite power cannot be resisted, then human personality is destroyed;
and if the will of man is contrasted to the divine will, then morality degener¬
ates into mere outward prohibitions and religion loses its purpose for exis¬
tence. The problem seems to be so unending and so insoluble that it is vain
even to consider it—-but the problem is so germane to all our moral and reli¬
gious experience that it cannot be escaped. The dependence of man upon God
is so vital and essential for his moral and religious experience that when¬
ever God's will is understood as irresistible force over against man's finite
will, man can only interpret the two forces in juxtaposition and conflict.
When this happens "our moral independence and our religious dependence
become 'incensed points of mighty opposites', having nothing in common
save a hostile frontier."2
Oman applied the experiential principle of his methodology to the
amelioration of this problem when he maintained that it is impossible for
one to reason a priori as though he were viewing the doctrine of grace from
*Grace and Personality, p. 35.
2Ibid. , p. 36.
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God's perspective. One should rather acknowledge his limitations and
seek to interpret the grace of God as he has known it in his own experience.
The concept of omnipotence directed by omniscience as "irresistible vio¬
lence on a predetermined scheme"* must be abandoned. In its place there
must come an understanding and appreciation of the way God in His wisdom
actually deals with man in allowing him the freedom to accept the will of
God as his own choice and thereby to grow in maturity and responsibility.
The grace of God does not work in any of our experiences in isolation
from our total environment and this must include even our own participa¬
tion in the experience. Oman summarized his conviction on this principle
in a passage in Honest Religion:
On this earth and in our experience, we never find God's
power working alone in independence of all that works with it
and in particular our own cooperation. We do not find unity
apart from what we are led to see united, or wisdom apart
from seeking guidance. But when we abstract them from
earth and send them up to heaven, where our ignorance un¬
clothes them of all relations, nothing hinders us from calling
unity The One and bringing it back nal^ked and alone to reduce
all difference to illusion, to Maya. So also the foresight and
provision, which we only see working amid earth's uncertain¬
ties and difficulties, we may transfer to heaven, where our
ignorance sets them alone as omniscience and omnipotence
and then bring them back simply as the fiat of the Absolute
to explain all doings and all designs as either process or
predestination. ^
The proper starting point for an understanding of grace cannot
be an a priori definition of grace, regardless of how tempting this may be,
*Grace and Personality, p. 36.
^Honest Religion, p. 28.
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but it must be a consideration of the nature of the human personality which
will be in relationship to the divine grace. Oman defined a moral person
as a self-conscious being who is autonomous or self-directed by its own
freedom. * He maintained that the grace of God which shall strengthen
this kind of a moral being cannot be an impersonal overwhelming force,
but must be of the nature of persuasive grace.
Our dependence upon God is no more in conflict with our true
moral independence than, in any other perfect personal rela¬
tion, the basis of which is mutual respect, the relation, let us
say, of a father to the son he would equip for finding his task
by his own insight and performing it from his own fidelity.^
Only when all of God's dealings with man are understood along the lines of
a gracious personal relationship in which He does not force His truth upon
man but invites him to accept it for himself, can there be any reconciliation
possible between man's absolute dependence on God and his own moral
iGrace and Personality, p. 40. Dr. H. H. Farmer has suggested
in personal corference with the writer that perhaps Oman's basic point of
departure for interpreting man's personality as the context for an under¬
standing of grace was more directly influenced by the Biblical concept of
man's nature than is admitted or emphasized in this phase of Oman's dis¬
cussion. Be that as it may, there is surely a vast difference between this
point of departure in Oman's thought and the approach of Karl Barth, who
emphasizes first of all that man can iSnfey know himself as he is, and this
means as a sinner, only in the light of God's revelation and grace.
Karl Barth, op. cit. , Volume IV, The Doctrine of Reconciliation,
Section I, pp. 391f.
^Grace and Personality, p. 65.
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independence and responsibility.
Since God has chosen to deal with man in a personal relationship,
the doctrine of salvation must, therefore, be interpreted primarily as a
gracious invitation for man to respond in his own spiritual recognition to
the faithfulness of God. Salvation is not a magical or mystical transforma¬
tion of the personality whereby God acts on man as "impersonally as bleach¬
ing powder whitening cotton;"* neither are men, in the words of another
phrase which Oman used so frequently that his students grew weary of it,
"passive buckets to be pumped into." Oman declared that "true religion
is so far from being necessarily succoured by any sudden and transforming
experience of what Hodge describes with the Schoolmen as a material change,
that to rely upon it is to expose ourselves to grave moral and spiritual dan-
*2
gers." Salvation must rather be understood as the personal relationship
*Grace and Personality, p. 74.
^G. Stephen Brinks et al, Religion in Britain Since 1900 (London:
Andrew Dakus, Ltd., 1952), p. 61.
•2
Grace and Personality, p. 70. Cf. p. 27. Oman does not note
any specific passages in any of Hodge's writings, but he must have rejected
his interpretation of grace on the basis of such passages as the following one
where Hodge almost totally ignored the place for the freedom of acceptance
of the gospel. Hodge maintained that efficacious grace was surely not of the
nature of "moral suasion," declaring:
By moral suasion is meant the influence exerted by one mind over
the acts and states of another mind, by the presentation of truth
and motives, by expostulations, entreaty, appeals, etc. Under
the influence of this kind of moral power, the mind yields or
refuses. Its decision is purely its own, and within its own power,
(continued on page 172.)
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of a man with God which is not basically mystical or moral in nature but
primarily roligiouo. In other words, it is essentially a personal commit¬
ment to God who has revealed Himself to man in all His relationships as
One who can be trusted. Oman warned that when this doctrine is taken
seriously there will be the loss of any justification for the special adminis¬
tration of grace as a "sort of love-philtre" which can only be effectively ad¬
ministered by special persons, for if salvation is truly personal, it means
that God mugt be Father in every area of experience and not only in some
sacred realm or channel. Moreover, the whole structure of the world
is involved in our understanding of salvation as personal because the
genuineness and validity of our faith must be determined by the way in
which religious experiences are related to the whole world and confirmed
in daily life . *
As was pointed out earlier, it is difficult at times to see clearly
some of the distinctions which Oman made in the application of hie doctrine
of grace to the various aspects of Christian experience and thought; how¬
ever, in another one of his major emphases he did attempt to show how the
(Footnote 3 continued from page 171)
There is nothing of all this in the exercise of omnipotence. Heal¬
ing the sick by a word, is an essentially different process from
healing him by medicine. A living man may be persuaded not to
commit suicide; but a dead man cannot be persuaded into life.
If regeneration be effected by the volition, the command, the
almighty power of God, it certainly is not produced by a process
of argument or persuasion.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Volume II (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1885), p~684.
*
Grace and Personality, pp. 74-75.
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gracious personal relationship is made known to and expresses itself
within the Christian life. He explained that if God is not only related to
man in certain sacred realms, but is personally related to him in every
aspect of his experience, then the Christian life should surely be a blessed
life which gives evidence of its conviction that all things everywhere contri¬
bute to God's purpose for good. In an emphasis which Oman derived from
Ritschl and which he developed in his interpretation of religion, Oman
maintained that Christ taught that blessedness really began with man's
relationship to the world rather than with God. The reason why Christ
began in this order, according to Oman, was because Christ did not want
us to think of religion as mere moral precepts but as a realization that all
of our relations to God are experienced first in relation to the world and to
man as we deal faithfully and meaningfully with our environment. Blessed¬
ness is essentially the "acceptance of the duty God demands and acquiescence
in the discipline he appoints, not as submission to the inevitable, but as the
discovery that our blessedness is in God's purpose;"* therefore, man must
take his proper place in God's world, rather than in a situation of his own
making, if he is ever to be blessed.
In view of the fact that man can only be blessed as he takes his
proper place in the environment in which he lives, reconciliation in its
fullest sense must include not only a right relationship to God but also an
*Grace and Personality, p. 92.
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acceptance of the realities of the world in which God places man. Oman
felt that it was an artificial distinction to speak as though reality were
something altogether different from God, for he believed that when one
was at enmity with God he was at the same time out of harmony and rela¬
tionship with the real world. A man is at enmity with God when he is in
rebellion toward reality and lives as though it were his enemy. The mere
profession of reconciliation is not sufficient to remedy the situation, al¬
though men frequently attempt to isolate their religion from the rest of
their lives by claiming reconciliation to God while refusing to accept the
situation and direction which Ke gives. A genuine reconciliation may be
defined as a "recognition of God's gracious relation to us through blessed¬
ness in our use of the world, our dealings with our fellowmen, and our
loyalty in His kingdom;"* consequently, one can be reconciled only when
he is dedicated to finding God's purpose in every area of life, and when he
is willing to Submit to the discipline and accept the responsibility which God
may require.
The proper way to approach an understanding of God's gracious
personal relationship to men is through an adequate interpretation of faith
conceived not as mere emotion, or magic, or even struggle on man's part,
but as trust or commitment to the truth. Faith can be valid only when it
has its origin in an object which creates a true belief about itself because
*Grace and Personality, p. 121.
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genulne faith "is simply faith in the truth solely because it convinces us
that it is true."* Oman alinost invalidated his premise that an interpreta¬
tion of grace must first consider the nature of the personality which it
would strengthen when he said that true faith must be primarily con¬
cerned with the object of its faith and God's relationship to us rather than
being focused upon the experience. However, his main purpose in stress¬
ing the object of faith was not to give a revelational direction to his thought,
but primarily to avoid any dangers of mysticism in an interpretation of
faith as emotion or mere sentiment. Oman returned to his basic point of
departure in the interpretation of grace when he insisted that faith is not
primarily directed toward sentimental thoughts about God, but toward the
meaning of love in this world. Faith makes it possible to recognize that
the real structure of the world, which determines or conditions so much
of what we understand as blessedness, is constructed along the lines of
purpose and love. "We believe that God is love when we can reverse it
and say that love is God, that, in whatsoever weakness it may meet us, it
wields the might of omnipotence," and when one discerns and acknowledges
2
this truth for himself it may truly be said that he has faith. In the depth
and breadth of this kind of faith a man may be blessed in the assurance that
*Grace and Personality, p. 129-
^Ibid., p. 130.
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all the reality of which he is conscious is in his own power for
good, all the ideals by which he could direct himself unerringly1
in the midst of it are for his seeking, and all the rule of God is
for him, in all conflict, a kingdom of righteousness and peace
and joy in the Holy Ghost. 1
If grace is truly interpreted as God's being gracious to man in all
his relationships, and if it be true that faith is not a matter of magic or
achievement on man's part, then how, Oman asks, can it be said that faith
is not man's own doing but a gift of God, and how can there be an invitation
for one to have faith, or a sin for one to refuse to believe? These ques¬
tions brought Oman to the crux of the whole issue of the way in which grace
makes itself known to man or in other words the manner r method that God
uses to stimulate or create faith. Surely God does not give faith
as a medicine or faith-potion, like the ancient idea of a philtre
or the modern idea of an inoculation, but, as any person enables
us to believe in him, by showing Himself, in ail His dealings
with us, entirely worthy of trust. God gives us faith by the
whole witness of life, interpreted by the whole of revelation,
which, for the Christian, means, in particular, life as inter¬
preted by Jesus Christ.^
Oman and Karl Barth have similar emphases on this point for Barth also
recognizes the spiritual way which God calls forth faith when he says :
Knowledge of God is in obedience to God. This obedience is not
that of a slave but of a child. It is not blind but seeing. It is not
^n unusual word for Oman to use, but it is quite clear that he is
referring to the spiritual certainty of inner experience, and not to external
infallibility.
^Grace and Personality, pp. 130, 131.
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coerced but free. . . .Standing over against the object of his
knowledge in a relationship of obedience, man acknowledges and
confirms that the fulfilment of this knowledge results in binding
to God's Word. . . . Moreover, this obedience itself is not only
evoked ^ hervorgerufen , called forth, not verursacht ,
causally createdj but also determined by this object. *
The difference, however, between Oman and Barth is that Barth would not
be satisfied with Oman's generality concerning "life as interpreted by Jesus
Christ" but would insist quite rightly on a clearer understanding of what this
means in relation to Jesus Christ as the Word of God.2
From his position concerning the way God produces faith, Oman
drew the principle that the sin of unbelief consists not in man's lack of ef¬
fort to believe or defeat in the struggle with doubt, but in his unwillingness
to deal sincerely with the revelation which God has given. "Sin begins with
resisting the truth in unrighteousness. . . Thus it is not an act but a princi¬
ple, which has as its natural outcome corrupt minds, degraded consciences
and unnatural vices." Man does not really have any obligation to force him¬
self to believe anything if he has not been convinced of its truth; however,
he does have the responsibility of allowing the witness the opportunity to
*Barth, op. cit. Volume 11, Section 1, p. 36.
2
For the insight regarding the words hervorgerufen and
verursacht
, this writer is indebted to James Brown, Subject and
Object in Modern Theology (London; S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1955), pp. I64ff.
•2
Honest Religion, p. 115.
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present its evidence and make its claim upon his life. This is essentially
all that Christ ever asked. When He preached repentance and the accept¬
ance of the gospel He was prepared to give convincing evidence for his mes¬
sage, and He only requested the opportunity to demonstrate His truth,
"repentance being just the putting away of the hypocrisies which prevent
the gospel from being its own evidence."*
*Grace and Personality, p. 136. Although Oman frequently spoke
of the freedom to accept or reject the witness of one's environment, he was
reluctant to say much in his fully developed theological writings concerning
what the rejection of God's grace might mean in an eschatologicai sense.
However, in a sermon from Matthew 23:34 he did acknowledge that there
could be a finality in man's rejection of Christ as far as this life is con¬
cerned, regardless of what eternity may have in store regarding that
rejection.
Whatever judgment on that day, whatever final rejection of a love
which never can cease to pity, which can never cease to utter it¬
self as it once did over Juersalem, there will be this sure and
great calamity that in the interval all love's service is rejected
and all love's glory obscured from our eyes. That result is very
sure and we can see it every day of our lives. We see Christ
rejected and so far as this life is concerned, so far as His present
manifestation as a man of sorrows is concerned, rejected finally
and utterly. For what we may find beyond of fixed destiny or fur¬
ther opportunity, we have no warrant in this text, but there can
never be any further opportunity that can alter the fact that the
heart turned from God when He came among us as one that serveth,
meek and lowly of heart, bearing our sins and carrying our sorrows.
What He may be or what appeal He may make when He comes in the
name of the Lord cannot alter the fact, cannot make good the loss,
cannot avert the judgment which must follow of itself this rejection
of our highest good. . . . And henceforth the soul that finally re¬
jects Christ's appeal, the soul He would love and help and save
and which would not, goes onward into the unknown future in all
time at least, without God and without hope, his house left in the
end to him desolate, and no vision of a Christ who is love and to
whom his love answers. That, after ail, is the only judgment
(continued on page 179)
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Oman emphasised a theme which is also found in contemporary
neo-orthodoxy when he said that it is possible to understand how faith is the
gift of God only when the integral relationship between revelation and recon¬
ciliation is perceived. The reconciliation between man and God in personal
relationship can be brought about only when God reveals His grace toward
man and when man responds to the revelation by being reconciled to God.
Oman described the revelatory and reconciling work of Christ in concepts
that are decidedly Schleierma^cherian and Ritschlian in character when he
said:
If there were One whose absolutely right relation to God mani¬
fested adequately God's relation to us, even that line would be¬
come only a preparation for His task, and He would be an ulti¬
mate revelation, not in the sense of being a substitute for our
own insight or of exhausting the whole meaning of experience,
but as the inspiration of our insight and the pioneer of our
experience.*
The nearest which Oman ever came to providing an adequate Christological
orientation for his interpretation of revelation was when he explained that
Christ is the highest revelation of God because He is the ultimate reconcilia¬
tion whose finality is not based on any external criterion of truth but upon
"the embodiment of a relation to the Father, the perfection of which we
(footnote continued from page 178)
that can matter much, the only condemnation from which love
itself cannot save us, that we have seen the light and reject it
because we are not of it, that we hear the appeal of love and
answer it with hatred.
Oman, "Tenderness and Judgment," in Dialogue With God, pp. 115-16.
* Grace and Personality, p. 158.
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prove only as we use it to interpret His relation to us in all things and at
all times."1 The basic purpose of revelation, however, according to Oman,
is not to reveal to man the truth and unity of God as though it were telling
him some new truth about God. It is rather to reconcile the disunity between
man and God so that man will be united within himself and may have a true
vision and understanding of God. The inseparable relationship between
revelation and reconciliation which exists between personal moral beings
in a universe which is structured along personal moral lines means in
essence that the grace of God "is nothing else than the succour of our
moral personality into the liberty of the children of God, a succour which
we may sum up by saying that faith is the gift of God by the whole of exper-
ience, interpreted by the whole of Christianity." There is a striking con¬
trast between Oman's emphasis and the doctrine of revelation as reconcilia¬
tion which is offered by Karl Barth, who places a solid emphasis on revela¬
tion as an event of Christ's accomplishment which makes reconciliation
possible, and who leaves no doubt concerning the place and importance of
the person of Christ In that revelation and reconciliation. Barth says that
the work of Christ is an event of miracle in the midst of a darkened human
3
order which may be called revelation or reconciliation, and he insists that
*Grace and Personality, p. 158.
^Ibid.
3
Barth, op. cit. , Volume I, The Doctrine of the Word of God,
Section 1, p. 470.
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there can be no ambiguity allowed concerning the essential deity of the
One who is to accomplish the event of God's revdation and reconciliation. *
In the final major emphasis of Oman's interpretation of the gracious
personal relationship, he attempted to show how the moral and religious
2
aspects of experience are related in the Christian life." He reiterated his
basic conviction that there could be no mechanical or impersonal answer to
the problem and affirmed that there should be no antagonism between the two
realms if they were understood to be related in personal union. God's gra¬
cious personal relationship expresses itself in the Christian experience of
reconciliation by giving man the strength to realize the true freedom of a
child of God. The moral and religious aspects of this experience are not
isolated from one another but mutually interdependent. Christian exper¬
ience is moral in nature because it is genuinely religious, and likewise it
is religious in character because it is essentially moral. The grace of God
is indeed gracious in that while it is given to strengthen man's moral life,
it is not granted on the basis of any moral quality or possession on man's
part. Grace would be destroyed if it were allotted to man according to his
^arth, op. cit. , Volume I, Section 1, p. 470.
Oman felt that English philosophy had glossed over the problem of
independence in morals, dependence in religion, and the relationship between
the two "because it us ally assumes that its business is to reduce religion to
philosophy." He believed that this practice was as "absurd as to reduce the
visible world to what you can prove to be metaphysically necessary."
John Oman, Review of Sir Henry Jones' A Faith that Inquires,
Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXIV, 1923^Tpp. 214-17.
moral accomplishments; therefore, God has only one prerequisite for the
reception of His grace, and that is repentance. Oman defined repentance
as a sincere and moral willingness to accept ourselves and our moral
world "apart from the hypocrisy which refracts our vision till we can
esteem our privileges, however misused , as requiring even the God
who gave them to regard us with approbation."* Unless there is genuine
repentance there can be no blessedness over all of life for this would mean
that the moral demands of cne's whole environment had been ignored. Repent¬
ance, therefore, cannot be considered as merely a condition or a threshold
of faith because it is inseparable from that right dealing with reality which
is faith. There can be no priority of value or antecedent in time concerning
repentance and faith because they are so completely one in the unity of moral
experience. One must know that God has offered Himself in a gracious per¬
sonal relationship before he can repent properly, and he must sincerely
repent by responding honestly to God's witness concerning Himself before
he can ever really understand His grace. The vital and inseparable rela¬
tionship between repentance and faith was supremely illustrated by the way
in which Christ enabled men to recognize the unpleasant moral realities of
their lives without overwhelming them with defeat. He helped men to real¬
ize the grace of God which would not only make them conscious of their sin
but also forgive and set before them the possibilities of what could be accom¬
plished with God's strength.
*Grace and Personality, p. 193.
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The very fact that God's grace is not determined or dependent on
moral effort but is at the same time vitally interested in and related to
moral achievement presents man with the continual temptation of dealing
dishonestly with his sin. There is the danger that either he will accept
God's grace too lightly and thus avoid the moral responsibility that is rightly
his, or that he will misunderstand the role of his obligation and become in¬
volved in self-righteousness. If this dilemma is not resolved there can
never be the proper balance and union between man's responsibility in
morals and his total reliance on God in religion. The recurring pattern
of self-righteousness and rationalization cannot be broken by a mere lower¬
ing of God's standards, nor by a theoretical synergistic interpretation of the
combination of God's grace and man's will, nor by an easy transference of
responsibility, and surely not by a light condoning of sin. The problem
must be approached by an honest dealing with moral realities. God's
grace demands that man have the honesty and the integrity to evaluate
himself and his world as they really are, and it is the purpose of God's grace
in justification to grant man the discernment and the courage to deal with
himself and his moral condition not by an insincere legalistic consistry but
by a realism which can provide genuine peace. If justification were merely
a matter of legalistic semantics, it would be utterly helpless to deal with
man's sin and hypocrisy and could offer only an uneasy peace made possi¬
ble by spiritual dullness, but it is the express purpose of justification to
deliver man from just such a misconception because "grace sets right our
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lcgal relation to God, but only by making it cease to be legal. Man can
be relieved of the mechanical and impersonal implications of a legalistic
interpretation of grace when he understands the true meaning of justifica¬
tion by faith.
We are justified because by faith we enter the world of a gracious
God, out of which the old hard legal requirements, with the old
hard boundaries of our personality and the old self-regarding
claim of rights, have disappeared, a world which is the house¬
hold of our Father where order and power and ultimate reality
are of love and not of law.^
Justification by faith does not mean that there is some unique quality of
value in the mind of man which God has decreed to accept as worthy of His
grace. It means, rather, that man has perceived a true insight into the
mind of God. Man is justified, therefore, not by his own faith or by faith
per se but by the reality of the spiritual world of God's grace in which one
places his faith.
Justification is not a mere decree of God that a sinner may be for¬
given ao though the father had written to the prodigal to assure him that the
past would not be mentioned, for the sins of the past are not that easily
dismissed. The forgiveness of God is, however, made possible through
an affirmation and exhibition of love which shall bring its own victory from
the past and create its own conditions of peace.
*Grace and Personality, p. 204.
2lbid., p. 206.
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The Father must say by His whole bearing towards us, My son,
let us share the sorrow and live down the shame together. And
that is the meaning of the Cross. It works peace, not as an iso¬
lated event in the history of the world, but because it is the
supreme manifestation of a redeeming love which works every
day and in every event of every day. It is the high alter of
sacrifice because it shows that the whole world is its temple. 1
"The essential feature of Christianity is that in Christ God is reconciling the
world to Himself, and that the Christian morality flows from this as the
natural behavior of the household of the Father."^ It is on this very theme
of justification as personal forgiveness from the Father that Oman receives
perhaps his severest criticism at the hands of a contemporary interpreter.
Vincent Taylor declares of Oman's interpretation of justification:
All this is very truly and beautifully expressed, but is it justifica¬
tion by faith? What has happened to the idea of faith related to the
redeeming work of God in Christ, by reason of which God brings
us into right relations with Himself? In truth, it has disappeared,
lost in the smoke of successive broadsides upon the evils of 'the
legal principle'. . . . The truth is that in this description the
language of justification is retained, but its substance is lost.
What is set forth is forgiveness in the sense of reconciliation;
the references to justification are decorative embroidery.
Oman deserves Taylor's criticism in this regard for he did fail to distinguish
adequately between the Biblical terms involved and to give sufficient emphasis
to Christ's accomplishment in atonement. In all fairness, however, it
^Grace and Personality, pp. 209-210.
2 John Oman, Review of W. Morgan's The Nature and Right of Reli-
gion, Journal of Theological Studies (Vol. XXVIII, 1927), p7~43(K
3Vincent Taylor, Forgiveness and Reconciliation (London: Macmillan,
1948), pp. 64-65.
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should be said that Oman did not intend to ignore the objective character
of Christ's work in redemption. Even though Oman's basic emphasis fell
upon Christ's work as an example of God's love along the lines of the moral
influence theory of the atonement, he apparently intended to do full justice
to the objectivity of atonement for on one occasion he very strongly rejected
Hastings Rashdali's moralistic generalities concerning the atonement as
completely unsatisfactory. Oman admitted his conviction that "neither
the honest blundering of Dr. Dale, nor the passionate scholarship of Dr.
Denney, nor the super subtlety of Dr. Forsyth, nor the refined elusive-
ness of Dr. Moberly, " could give reality to the penal theory of atonement;
however, he went on to declare:
Nevertheless, one has a feeling that all these writers are
reaching out after some spiritual need with which Dr. Rash-
dall is untroubled, not because he has solved the problem,
but because he has ignored it. . . when one compares him
with St. Paul, or even with Luther, one realizes how little
he cares to live in the half lights, and how all the really
creative souls have had to live there all their time. *
The overall impression of Oman's interpretation remains, however, that
God's justification is made available to man primarily because the cross of
Christ is the supreme example of the love of God.
^Oman's review of Hastings Rashdall's The Idea of the Atone-
ment in Christian Theology, Journal of Theologica Studies (Vol. XXI,
ApxTlTl920), p. 2W.
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Oman confessed that the problem of how justification actually
"justifies" is complicated by the fact that the consequences of sin are not
automatically removed, nor are those anxious fears of guilt which produce
so much moral rationalization immediately allayed the moment forgive¬
ness takes place. He sought to deal realistically with the actual situation
by admitting that even forgiveness can not alter the events of the past as
though they had never happened, nor can it compensate for the loss of
time and opportunity which may have been caused from past sins. Man has
been given an awareness of the past and the consequences of his actions for
the purpose of encouraging him to live meaningfully and responsibly toward
God and himself and others; therefore, forgiveness cannot avoid this his¬
torical and corporate dimension of responsibility. Forgiveness must in¬
stead deepen and intensify man's understanding of the consequences of sin;
moreover, the very attempt to avoid the spiritual pain which comes from
an awareness of the results of sin may mean that the forgiveness of God
has not been properly received. The first thing which grace does with
the consequences of sin is to give man the strength to acknowledge and
deal with them realistically by allowing them to provide the setting for
much of his present responsibility. The sharing of one another's failures
and burdens in a common redemptive task will help one to see that the
whole course of life can be directed toward the removal or healing of the
effects of sin. Justification, therefore, does not mean that the moral
order of God has been suspended and the results of sin glossed over, but
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it means that reconciliation to God must take place right in the midst of
sin and its consequences, and that God has given assurance of the defeat
of sin, and of the strength whereby its consequences may be transcended.
Man must continually be reminded that he has responsibility and
moral value only because God has placed value upon him, and he may
develop only to the extent that God is personally related to him and direct¬
ing him toward a fuller realization of His purposes. The will of God is
the sole criterion and goal of man's moral responsibility and moral achieve¬
ment must remain of secondary concern. Since God has willed salvation for
man and provided for it by His love, salvation itself should not be man's
first objective, but the doing of the will of God. Only as men have confi¬
dence in the will of God and cease to be occupied with the securing of their
own salvation can they be relieved of the anxiety of self-concern and give
themselves wholeheartedly to the primary calling of doing the will of God.
Oman stressed a familiar theme of his when he maintained that the will of
God can be an effective directive in our lives only when it has been freely
and personally accepted as our own discernment and intention. He touched
upon an area not nearly so clearly amplified when he said that the will of
God must be interpreted in its true perspective with regard to the Christian
community because the will of God is not an exclusively individual matter.
Oman's thought is so predominantly concerned with the role of the
individual in religion that ons could wish for more development
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of this aspect of his thought. He did make clear his belief that tremendous
encouragement and insight could be derived from association with followers
of the will of God in the past and in the present, who comprise the Com¬
munion of the Saints.
God's will of love cannot be known apart from those who have
discerned its guidance and cherished its fellowship, yet we
cannot know it either by copying their example or by being
absorbed into their company, but only by realising our own
freedom in the midst of it.
Having thus made a good beginning on a much needed emphasis in his thought,
Oman reverted rather abruptly to his characteristic way of dealing with the
wider social aspects of a question by proceeding to describe the wrong ways
of being dependent on the Communion of the Saints, namely, the way of tra¬
dition and mysticism, with very little positive conclusion concerning the
right way by which one may participate in the heritage of the Saints and
benefit from their community.
Oman avoided an existential solipsism in his interpretation of
the Kingdom of God when he admitted that the Kingdom exists objectively
and externally apart from man's acceptance of it and might even in an
ultimate sense be considered as the only reality which truly exists; yet
he emphasized that the kingdom of God has a functional and existential
relevance only when it is personally and individually accepted. Oman
*Grace and Personality, p. 246.
2Ibid. , pp. 246ff.
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sought to base his interpretation of the Kingdom on the prophetic concept
of the Kingdom of God which, according to his understanding, was basically
ethical in approach rather than speculative. Through their struggle and con¬
flict with evil in their world the prophets gained an understanding of the ulti¬
mate nature of reality and were able to come, even as those who follow them
must come, to the discovery that though the kingdom of God appears to be
limited in scope and power, it is actually victorious over all realms; that
the Kingdom is not mere beneficence but essentially personal love ; and
that it is not even the balancing power of justice but an atoning realm of
responsibility and even suffering. * These conclusions may be summarized
around the basic principle that the Kingdom of God is a "moral rule only to
be introduced by moral means'1;^ however, this does not mean that the
Kingdom is a shallow moral accomplishment on man's part but that it in-
voives man's total moral response to God's realm of love. When this
truth has been allowed to permeate every area of the moral life then it
will be realized that the world is not really a faDure in God's plan, be¬
cause the Kingdom of God is not like a mechanical law or force, but is the
love of God which even permits its own limitation and rejection due to its
*Grace and Personality, pp. 263, 269.
2Ibid., p. 272.
3 lb id. , p. 282.
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respect for human personality and freedom. x
Oman believed that the requirement which the moral order places
upon man to accept the will of God and His Kingdom in spite of all the appa¬
rent defeats and contradictions in this life provides an important insight for
a proper understanding of eternal life. He followed a Kantian line of reason¬
ing when he based his argument for the existence of an eternal life on the
conviction that it is possible to say that all of life's experiences, both good
and evil, are subsumed in an overall purpose for good only if it is also
possible to affirm that life may not be extinguished before the accomplish¬
ment of that purpose. Men can live purposefully in the difficulties of this
life because they are confident that the purpose of God for their lives
reaches into eternity. An understanding of eternal life must begin with
the realization of a blessedness in this life which is able to overcome the
*There is very little of the element of crisis or judgment in
Oman's interpretation of the Kingdom of God, but he did at least acknow¬
ledge that there was this aspect in the Kingdom in a review of Rashdall's
The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology, when he said: "A king¬
dom which is a crisis, into which the publicans and harlots go before the
respectable religious people, does set something above moral progress,
some change of relation to God while we were yet sinners, of a transform¬
ing kind." Oman was here, however, more concerned to reject Rashdall's
moralistic theory of the atonement than he was in developing the positive
aspects of crisis and judgment in the kingdom of Christ in his own inter¬
pretation.
Oman's review of Rashdall's The Idea of the Atonement in Christian
Theology, loc . cit.
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fear of death and bring its own confirmation of eternal life. Religion,
therefore, should be primarily concerned, not to prove the existence of
an eternal life, but to offer a way whereby man may be reconciled to God
in this life. Oman warned, however, that our motivation for being recon¬
ciled to God in this life should not be the promise of an eternal life ., but that
we should be reconciled to God in this life because we have discovered a
pattern of meaning and purpose in this life which refuses to be confined to
this world.
We are reconciled to God by finding in our present life, and
not merely hoping for it in another, that God's real meaning is a
rule of love, by accepting which we discover an eternal purpose,
for the realisation of which every event is working. Being no
less than the infinite goal of holy love, it can give us nothing
less than the assurance of eternal approximation to itself; and
as that is the goal, of which every appointment for use of disci¬
pline and duty, being of God's love, gives us assurance, we have
a life blessed in a hope which is eternally fulfilling itself. Thus
we rightly and religiously believe in another life, because we
are serving the purpose of a love for which this life is too small. 1
^Grace and Personality, pp. 290-91.
Kant declared that the will of man cannot possibly correspond
completely with the moral law during the limitations of human existence;
however, the fact that man is obligated to seek the summum bonum as
directed by the moral law can have meaning
only in an endless progress to that complete fitness.
This infinite progress is possible, however, only under the
presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality
of the same rational being. . . . Thus the highest good is practi¬
cally possible only on the supposition of the immortality of the
soul.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason translated by Lewis
White Beck(Ghicago: University Press, 1949), Part I, Book II, Ch. 2,
paragraph 4, pp. 225-26.
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Oman summarized his interpretation of eternal life, and indeed the
major thesis of his doctrine of reconciliation, when he concluded that eter¬
nal life is not an isolated gift of God apart from our moral responsibility
because this would defeat morals in the interest of religion, nor can it be
the reward of human achievement because this would sacrifice religion to
morals; however, when eternal life is received by accepting God's grace
in a personal relationship there is provided "a right relation to ourselves,
to our neighbours, and to God, and, therefore, an adequate moral subject,
an adequate moral sphere, and an adequate moral order.





Oman's doctrine of the Church is an appropriate and consistent
amplification of his basic personalistic theology which insisted on the free¬
dom of the individual to accept God's will and then freely unite himself in
fellowship with others who have received the same Divine order of love.
In Oman's interpretation of the Church there is very little that is really
new or unique which he does not stress in some way in his interpretation
of freedom, authority, or grace; therefore, a discuss on of his doctrine
of the Church may serve as a summary presentation of the manner in which
the major emphases of his theology are related and applied specifically to an
understanding of the Church. Oman sought to be true to his own principle
of comprehensiveness or wholeness when he interpreted his doctrine of the
Church in the broad context of the social struggle of his day. He realized
that his suggestion that the Church was significant for the modern world
would be considered irrelevent by many in his generation, for to them the
basic social issue of the day was the conflict between a competitive indivi¬
dualism and a legalistic socialism. What difference could it make to them
about the nature of the Church and one's relation or lack of relation to it,
or, for that matter, whether the Church even exists or not? Oman answered
by affirming his conviction concerning the relevance of the Church to the
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problems of society because he believed that the freedom of the social order
must be based upon the willingness of men to submit their human forms of
power and organization to the direction and authority of the personal realm
of love. Unless this surrender is made, might will rule over all human life
and freedom, and social struggle will amount to little more than an occasional
difference in the manifestation of power. The kind of love and freedom which
is necessary as a foundation for a free society, whether individualistic or
collective, is best exemplified, according to Cman, by a prophetic remnant
in the Church.
In some order of love and freedom, that is in some kind of
Church, the historical struggle of mankind must be gathered
up, and, if it is not being served by the present Churches,
then a supreme effort should be made to recall them to their
true task. *
In spite of all the weaknesses of the Churches and their involvement in the
same aims and ambitions and methods as the world "they all contain ele¬
ments of self-sacrifice not to be found elsewhere; and except by self-
sacrifice no social salvation will ever be won."^ Oman's basic point of
departure for his doctrine of the Church surely has a poignant relevance
for the present situation for individualism and collectivism are probably
in sharper conflict today than Oman ever imagined possible. Even though
he did not very fully articulate the political and social implications of the
^Church and Divine Order, pp. vii.
2Ibid.
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doctrine of the Church, his basic emphasis on the Church as the greatest
practical source for freedom in society is as urgently needed today as it
was in Oman's day. The political, social, and economic realms remain,
and are destined to remain, incapable within themselves of producing a
society and providing a motivation for the fullest expression and realiza¬
tion of man's freedom.
Oman ventured to give his own approach to the doctrine of the
Church in his day, even though he realized that the matter had received
very careful and scholarly attention throughout many centuries, because
there was in his generation a renewed consideration of the differences and
affinities between the various denominations within Christianity. Oman set
forth a very sound Biblical principle when he stressed that his age needed to
realize "that no good can be accomplished till we recognize that our differ¬
ences do not concern the Church but the doctrines of God and of salvation
upon which our views of the Church rest."* There could be little value in
*Church and Divine Order, p. 3. It is clear in the phrases used
to describe the Church in the New Testament that the early Christians con¬
sidered their theology and their sotcriology as the basis for their understand¬
ing of ecclesiology. The ecclesia is called the Church "of the Lord " or
"of God," Acts 20:28, I Cor. 1:2, 10:32, 11:22, 15:9, Gal. 1:13,
I Tim. 3:5, 15; Church "of Christ," Gal. 1:22; "Churches of God in
Christ Jesus," Rom. 16:16, II Thess. 2:14. The doctrine of the Church
is derived not only from who God is but from what He has done for men in
salvation through Christ. For example, Paul writes: "To the Church of
God which is at Corinth, to those sanctified in Christ Jesus. . . " I Cor.
1:2.
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debating the comparative weaknesses or merits of individual Churches,
for the ultimate issue must be the theological question of the nature of
God and the salvation which He offers. Oman had no illusion that his gene¬
ration, any more than others before him, would be able to maintain a Church
according to the Divine order which would not become entangled in the legal¬
ism of the world. He was, nevertheless, convinced that the era in which he
lived offered an unparalleled opportunity and challenge for a reconstruction
of the doctrine of the Church which would conform more closely to Christ's
ideal. "Never was there an age which brought men so unavoidably to the
issue that the basis of the Church is freedom, not authority, individual faith,
not organised constraint, prophetic hope, not priestly tradition."*
Oman believed that the doctrine of the Church which was prevalent
in his day, and especially the actual historical and ecclesiastical context of
the Church,had been largely produced by the development of the concept of
freedom, primarily along two lines: rationalism and evangelicalism.
Rationalism took an axiom of the Christian religion—"that the religious
life is just the ordinary life properly lived" -—and related it so compre¬
hensively and convincingly to the realm of society and ethical responsibility
that men began to believe that the Church with all its failures and divisions
was not really relevant to their world. On the other hand, the evangelical
*Church and Divine Order, p. 290.
2Ibid. , p. 293.
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movement began with a genuine spirit of dedication and sacrifice, but,
according to Oman, it eventually degenerated into a wealthy organizational
movement which tended to lose its compassion and to interpret religion in
terms of a negative moralistic Pharisaism. Eventually rationalism and
evangelicalism began to have their effect on one another and their in¬
fluences gradually combined to show, for one thing, that there can be no
religious progress where religion is conceived as mere moral principles,
even though they may be universally accepted. Rationalism learned anew
that genuine religion cannot exist "where evei-ything is undenied and unden¬
iable, but in the vision of things unrealised and by human means unrealis-
able."* At the same time, evangelicalism learned the futility of a shallow
emotionalism and realized that it must find its proper perspective in his¬
torical continuity and a more universal concern and approach toward life.
Oman described the situation of the Church in his day in the following way:
The old Evangelical impulse is fading, and many are mainly
conscious that our emotions are dull, our aims divided, and
our spirits dwelling apart. That feeling was mainly respon¬
sible for the return of a large section of the Church of England
to the idea of the Church as one continuous external organisa¬
tion. The power of this revival lay in the need of a protest
against the conception of the Church as a congeries of rival
associations, of competitive religious clubs. It has forced
upon us the questions of the idea of the Church, its true unity,
its historic task."
^Church and Divine Order, p. 295.
2Ibid. , p. 296.
Consequently, these basic questions—(1) the idea of the Church, (2) its
true unity, and (3) its historic task—are the major divisions of emphasis
in Oman's discussion of the Church.
As it has already been pointed out, Oman believed that the doctrine
of the Church was basically a theological concept which was derived from
one's interpretation of God and the nature of salvation. He explained this
thesis by discussing at some length an illustration used by Vernon Staley
which interpreted the Church as a "covenanted sphere" of God's grace. *
Staley had suggested that if a wealthy man wanted to provide a continuing
grant of money to help those who were sick and suffering, there were essen¬
tially two methods open to him. He could either accept anyone who came to
his house and try to aid them, or he could endow a hospital to fulfill his pur¬
pose. If he chose the latter procedure, then everyone would understand that
to receive the benefits which were offered to them, they must go to the hos¬
pital which had been provided. This particular institution would thus become
the "covenanted sphere" of the rich man's benevolence and it would be un¬
reasonable and ungrateful for anyone to expect his generosity to be avail¬
able to him in the same fullness in any other place. Oman made his own
theological application of the analogy by insisting that the basic question is
really whether God deals with man according to the pattern of exclusiveness
which the rich man followed or whether God extends his grace more
^Oman's treatment of the illustration is given in Church and Divine
Order, p. 297f. The illustration is in Vernon Staley, Plain Words on the
Holy Catholic Church (1891), p. 3.
throughout all of His relations with man than the illustration allowed. God
has not limited his aid to any one institution, and he has not even demanded
that men first approach Him, but He has by every providential and gracious
means available to Him continually taken the initiative in seeking to recon¬
cile man to Himself; therefore, any interpretation of the Church along the
lines of institutional exclusiveness cannot do justice to a proper theological
understanding of God's nature. Every human interpretation of God will have
its imperfections because men are not capable of comprehending the full
depth of God's love and grace, and when it is realized that this is the
reason for many of the inadequacies of our knowledge about God it will then
be possible to understand that
the particular road by which His child returns will not matter
to Him, and that every Church by which the publican and the
harlot enter the kingdom of God will be a true Church, and that
it may exist wheresoever Christian faith and fellowship exist,
wheresoever two or three are gathered in the name of Christ.1
Oman continued to use Staley's illustration as a point of departure for his
own theological position when he developed the other aspect of his thesis
that the doctrine of the Church should not only conform to an adequate inter¬
pretation of God, but that it should also be compatible with a proper view of
the way God provides salvation. In an emphasis which was more fully devel¬
oped in his doctrine of grace, he observed that If the hospital is a true analogy
of the Church then it might be concluded that salvation could be administered
^Church and Divine Order, pp. 298-99.
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quite impersonally like medicine, and any intelligent person would know
to purchase his medicine only at an authorized place. Oman suggested
that it is often the "sensible person" who has perverted the concept of
salvation by failing to realize that salvation must involve the discovery of
true freedom by a total surrender to the will of God in every area of life
and not just in the realm of the understanding. True repentance requires
an absolute sincerity in all things and any attempt to relegate the working
or efficacy of God's grace to an exclusive institutional or sacramental
realm will not do justice to the breadth of the personal dimensions inherent
in salvation.
For that salvation the only adequate sacrament is the whole of
life. The Church's observances can only be the symbols and
seals and interpretations which show us that all things, if need
be the eating of husks, work together for good, when we have
found the key to life in loving God. *
Yet another example of Oman's conviction that much of the obscur-
ity concerning the doctrine of the Church arises from an inadequate concept
of grace may be seen in Grace and Personality, where he pointed out that
most Churches attempt to integrate conflicting interpretations of grace in
their teaching and practice. Some Churches profess to believe that an under¬
standing of the Bible can come only by means of spiritual perception, but they
also hold quite inconsistently that the Church exists on the basis of the very
tangible reality of historical priestly succession. In others, the theological
position may be accepted that salvation depends solely on God, but actually
^Church and Divine Order, p. 300.
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they appear to accept the overwhelming responsibility of creating it them¬
selves. It was Oman's belief that in some instances Churches which gave
every outward indication of being quite divergent from one another frequently
had in reality a basic affinity in their essential structure. For example,
"the extremest Catholicism and the extremest Evangelicalism"* are, in
spite of all their differences in externals, very closely related to one
another in their interpretation of grace as a mechanical work of infinite
force. Oman characterized both Catholicism and Evangelicalism in a rare
passage which lacked his usual warmth and charity in dealing with those who
held positions other than his own when he declared:
They are not simply societies of those who have understood
God's gracious mind towards all His children, and who have come
together for the express purpose of helping others to understand
that God has to them also the same mind, and of welcoming all
who understand to join them in their task, but they are organisa¬
tions of persons who, through special operations of omnipotence,
have a special relation to God , the possession of which by new¬
comers must be investigated.2
J. K. Mozley objected to this comparison of Catholicism and Evangelicalism
by reminding Oman that Catholicism's doctrine of grace is not based on the
arbitrary omnipotence of God, but upon the perfect moral nature of God;
and that Catholicism certainly desires to interpret grace in the light of
man's whole experience with the world about him; furthermore, he
explained:
*Grace and Personality, pp. 163, 164.
2Ibid. , p. 165.
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Whatever language be used, the Incarnation Is a special channel
of God's graciousness, and the religion sprung from belief in it
reflects that fact in ways which do not at all impair the truth
that all experience is usable for the knowledge of God and for
fellowship with Him. *
Mozley touches on a very sensitive point in Oman's theology, for Oman
did not adequately deal with the Christological distinctiveness of either
Christ or His Church as a special channel for God's grace; however, the
real emphasis which Oman is attempting to make docs not concern the Incar¬
nation but the impersonal way in which radical sacramentalism interprets
the means by which grace is available to men and Oman's emphasis in this
regard is justified.
The essential nature of the Church, according to Oman, is to be
understood primarily as a fellowship of Christian believers who are asso¬
ciated together under the authority of the Spirit of God. The Church should
not be conceived as a corporation or an institution for it is "the fellowship
of faith which is the pillar and ground of truth.The members of the
Church are bound to one another not by legal contracts and external eccle¬
siastical compulsion but by the unifying power of the Spirit of God in their
lives. Those who have known God's personal reconciliation have the respon¬
sibility to judge ail things for themselves and should never surrender to
^John Kenneth Mozley, "Grace and Freedom," in Essays, Catholic
and Critical, ed. Edward Gordon Selwyn (London: SPCK, 1929), p. 244.
^Concerning the Ministry, p. 14.
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another In matters of spiritual discernment. * To clarify this principle,
Oman compared Protestantism to Catholicism. He explained that there
could not be an oversimplified contrast between these Churches as though
Protestantism were only a fellowship and Catholicism were only an institu¬
tion. Although there are elements of fellowship and institution in both, it
is possible to make a vital distinction between them on the basis of their
controlling concept. In Catholicism the dominating interpretative and
functional motif lies in the priestly and institutional order of the Church,
whereas in Protestantism the essence may be found "in the fellowship, in
all that is involved in the two or three met in the name of Christ, in the
?
succession of believers, in the bond of love." Oman warned Protestant¬
ism, in an emphasis which he acknowledged he had received from Rudolf
Sohm, that it must continually be on guard that the concept of the Church
as a fellowship is not too easily conceded or taken for granted because
the natural man is always a Catholic, and that does not cease
to be true though he call himself a Protestant. He still likes
material guarantees, and would rather not trust anything to
God that can be managed by man. ... an institution with offi¬
cial rule seems a better security than a fellowship with Divine
gifts.3
^Church and Divine Order, p. 59.
"Ibid., p. 207.
"Church," Encylopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume III.
Ed. James Hastings. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913), p. 622. Cf.
Church and Divine Order, especially p. Ill, also pp. 88-98, p. 150.
(continued on page 206.)
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The fact that there is frequent reference to Rudolf Sohm in Oman's doctrine
of the Church, along with the noticeable kinship between their emphases,
makes it fairly safe to assume that he was indebted to Sohm for his distrust
of the external guarantees offered by Catholicism.
(Footnote 3 continued from page 205)
R. Sohm (Kirkenrecht i. 18, i. 455). Sohrr expressed his position
in the following passage which runs the gamut of many of Oman's convictions
concerning the dangers of an external authority, and which reveals the basic
affinity in the thought of the two men.
The natural man desires to remain under law. He strives against
the freedom of the Gospel, and he longs with all his strength for a
religion of law and statute. He longs for some legally appointed
service, in the performance of which he may exhaust his duty
towards God, and so for the rest of his time be free for the ser¬
vice of the world, free from that 'reasonable service,' the pre¬
senting of his whole life as a sacrifice to God. He longs for a
legally appointed Church, for a kingdom of Christ which may be
seen with the eyes of the natural man, for a temple of God, built
with earthly gold and precious stones, that shall take the heart
captive through outward sanctities, traditional ceremonies, gor¬
geous vestments, and a ritual that tunes the soul to the right pitch
of devotion. Before all, he longs for an impressive, authoritative
constitution, one that shall overpower the senses, and rule the
world, a wonderful constitution whose fabric shall rise upward
and reach outward far and wide. He desires, as the key-stone of
the whole, a fixed body of doctrine that shall give certain intelli¬
gence, concerning all divine mysteries, presented to him in a
literal form, giving an answer to every possible question. Christ
walked on the sea: man would do so likewise. Alas, he sinks! He
desires a rock which his eyes can see—the visible Church, the
visible Word of God. Everything must be made visible, so that he
may grasp it. From these impulses of the natural man, born at
once of his longing for the gospel and his despair of attaining to
it, Catholicism has arisen. Herein lies the secret of the enor¬
mous power it has had over the masses who are 'babes'; it satis¬
fies these cravings. The natural man is a born Catholic.
Rudolf Sohm, Outlines of Church History"^London: Macmillan &
Co., Ltd., 1931), p. 35.
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The concept of the Church as a spiritual fellowship of believers
was discussed by Oman along the lines of the distinction made by the Re¬
formers between a visible and an invisible Church. He was willing to con¬
sider the Church invisible if by that term it was meant that God is the only
one who can distinguish between those who really believe and the ones who
merely profess to believe. The fact that God alone can determine the true
believers relieves the Church of much of its embarrassment and responsi¬
bility concerning the presence of the hypocrite and the actual unbeliever in
its membership, for even though they surely do not contribute to the spiri¬
tual welfare of the fellowship, they do not really have the power to defeat its
purpose. Since it is impossible for the Church itself to succeed u; separat¬
ing the believer from the unbeliever, it must be content to embrace every
member of the visible Church in what Oman termed "the judgment of char¬
ity." Nevertheless, it is the spiritual minority whose fellowship truly
exists in Christ "who are in principle the Church, and who alone are rightly
described as the Catholic, the Universal Church."^ Oman believed that the
essence of the Church was a spiritual fellowship composed of "congregations
of faithful", where men believe, and where the Word of God is proclaimed
and the sacraments are administered. Even though men do not have the dis¬
cernment or the ability to restrict its membership to these who genuinely
believe, the Church is none the less in essence and strength composed only
^Church and Divine Order, p. 209.
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of those who have received God's forgiveness and reconciliation through
their personal Christian experience and who participate in a true fellow¬
ship of faith. *
Oman's interpretation of the Church as a fellowship of believers
also quite naturally involved the question of the nature of the Church's organ¬
ization. He maintained that when Jesus began the Church He did not deter¬
mine any organizational structure as essential for the Church. Oman held
this position because he believed that there was no reliable Biblical evi¬
dence that Christ proposed founding an organization; Christ's relationship
to Israel would also have made it inadvisable; and His eschatology was not
really compatible with the idea of an established institution. When Christ
established the Church He did not intend "the creation of an organization with
rulers and subjects", but the creating of a community which would not allow
any man to impose his will on another. ^ Men should live humbly with one
another and not call anyone Rabbi because this implies that a human authority
may come between man and God. The Church should be a company of believers
whose only instructor is God, and whose sole concern is to love the Heavenly
Father and thus truly discover and serve one's brother. The spirit of
*John Oman, "The Presbyterian Churches, " Evangelical Chris-
tianity, Its History and Witness, ed. W.B. Sel'bie (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1911), pp. 55-79,
^"Church," loc. clt. , p. 618.
3
"Presbyterian Churches," p. 76.
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brotherhood and love are "far more important than whether the rule is
a deacon, an elder, or a bishop."*
The Church as thus described by Oman is established on the founda¬
tion of the prophets and apostles, but this was not to be understood as an in¬
stitutional succession. He thought that the attempt to establish the apostoli-
city of the Church upon a tangible historical continuity of the ceremony of
laying on of hands was a dependence on the physical realm which was un¬
worthy of the spiritual nature of the Church. Neither did he believe that
apostolic succession could be adequately described by simply asserting
that the vision of God which the Apostles knew in a primary revelation is
received from them in a secondary capacity, nor did it mean that the
Church can interpret only what God's will was for them and neglect to
discover what His will may be for today. On the contrary, the concept
goes much deeper than that for it involves one's actually becoming a pro¬
phet and an apostle in the sense that he must know God's will for himself,
accept God's purpose for him as his own, and dedicate himself toward that
end in the Church and the world in his own generation.^ When the founda¬
tion of the Church upon the prophets and apostles is interpreted in this way,
it is then possible for the Church to understand more clearly its rootage in
history and its contemporary responsibility. The Church is a historical
congregation because it is founded upon a historical revelation of God in




which Jesus "is . . the fountain-head and . . . the abiding inspiration"
of an "ever-fuller manifestation of God's eternal order of love and freedom."1
The Church should therefore realize that it cannot ignore either the failures
or the accomplishments of its past but must relate itself properly to God's
unfolding revelation in history. It must not attempt to isolate itself from
the age in which it lives for it has come to its own particular period for a
special task, and that work may be approached in the confidence that God
will reveal His purpose in the midst of the present situation.
Since the Church has a historical heritage and a historical respon¬
sibility, it is necessary and useful that it have a historical organization. As
long as the Church is immersed in the historical order it will be impossible
for it to be entirely free from organizational structure, some kind of tradi¬
tional pattern of worship, and the influence of custom. Observing that Christ
attended the synagogue regularly, Oman felt that his own generation could be
strengthened spiritually if it would establish better habits of self-discipline
concerning spiritual matters. While he recognized the varying worth of
the different religious organizations, he believed that a vital relationship
with some religious body was absolutely essential if one expected to have
any meaningful development in the religious life. He went on to declare
that "Jesus created something far greater than the Church," for the basic
issue concerning the Church is "whether we regard the Church as in
^Oman, "Presbyterian Churches , " p. 78.
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itself an end or only a very imperfect and, for that reason, necessarily
changing means to a higher end."*
We have to recognize the significance of God's providential
dealing in once more breaking down the discipline of the Law
by division, criticism, and even unbelief. Out of this ferment
a new phase of the Church's life must surely issue, and a new
vision of the gospel, and then possibly a new and, we trust, a
more spiritual incarnation of it in outward form, one in which
there will be at once more freedom and more spiritual power. 2
Men must understand that the organizational form of the Church is like the
body of man, absolutely essential to him as long as he remains in the his¬
torical order, and that the Church, also like the body, should be under the
direction of the soul, and even be continually willing to die to itself that
there may be spiritual life.
Another major consideration which Oman developed in his doctrine
of the Church was the nature of its true unity, and it was in this area that he
did some of his most refreshing thought regarding the Church. Oman ex¬
plained that there were two basic types of unity: the unity of the quarry in
which there can be no change and where external conformity is preserved;
and the unity of the building where there is great change and patient struggle
and construction according to a master plan. It is futile for the Church to
think that it can maintain the unity of the quarry or put the stones back in
place again for there has already been too much change and development
*Honest Religion, p. 171.
2"Church," p. 623.
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for this to be possible. The Church must seek the unity of the building,
not thinking presumptuously that its own little sphere is the final manifesta¬
tion of God's plan, but looking in faith toward the future accomplishment of
God's purpose and unity. * The same thesis concerning the relation of free¬
dom to the Divine order of love in history which he followed in his treatment
of the spiritual nature of the Church as a fellowship is also made the control¬
ling principle in his interpretation of the unity of the Church. He contended
that the question of the unity of the Church must always be of paramount
theological importance because the Church is in essence a theological com¬
munity in relationship to God's rule of love which only God can inaugurate.
His penetrating analysis of this situation touched the very heart of the
problem when he said:
Sufficient pliability in accepting other people's convictions and
a habit of sitting so loosely to ties as not to be galled by other
people's fellowship, a spirit of dull mediocrity in ethics, and of
uncritical facility of belief, however they cohere in one society,
will help men little towards being "perfected into one," which is
the only promise of real unity ever given them.^
The criterion of unity must always be the degree of spiritual congruity which
the Church has to the order of God's love; consequently, the externals of the
Church, such as its organization, should continually be the servant of its
spiritual functions and relationships. Personal and constructive means
toward a deeper spiritual unity must always be sought rather than the mere
*
Vis ion and Authority, pp. 146ff.
^Church and Divine Order, p. 307.
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arrangement of organizational conformity or the attempt to form a union
"hammered together by ecclesiastical compromise. '*
Oman did not agree with those who saw only embarrassment and
failure in the fact that there were many divisions and denominational dis¬
tinctions within Christianity. He realized that the divisions prevented the
Church from having an effective organizational control such as a secular
authority might exert, but he felt that this should not disturb the Church
since an external authority could not really advance a spiritual kingdom.
Even the divisions within the secular r aim of the state have been allowed
by the providence of God in order that men might know more freedom from
the dominion of external authority; therefore, in the realm of the Church,
for one "to dismiss our divisions as mere quarrelsomeness and perversity
is to be blind to the meaning of history and to lack faith in a guiding hand
over human affairs."^ Since the Church is founded on the principle of
freedom, the risks of division adhere to its very nature in an unique and
integral way. Christianity began as a separation from Judaism, and obed¬
ience to Christ and to the realm of freedom which He introduced may demand
at times that our allegiance to Him be affirmed even by division. Oman spoke
very strongly against any attempt to establish unity on a superficial basis
when he declared:
1The War and Its Issues, p. 117.
^Church and Divine Order, p. 308.
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Few things, at least, keep us farther apart than the violent
demand for unity which turns narrowness into a virtue, which
makes acuteness in discovering our brother to be an alien an
evidence of religion, and which considers great stress laid on
outward things the highest exercise of piety. As long as these
merely external demands appropriate the name of Christ, much
outward division may be needed to keep men from entirely for¬
getting the true unity. *
He warned that there may be in God's providential wisdom even more divi¬
sion for the Church in the future in order that men might realize the futility
of putting their trust in the externals of the Church and turn again to dis¬
cover its true unity in love and spiritual fellowship. When this occurs an
external union may be possible, not only as an artificial prop for the unity
that is lacking, but a true manifestation of the unity which shall exist.
Regardless of how desirable and advantageous the union of the
Church may be, the way in which it is sought is even more significant
than the union which may result. An attitude of genuine respect for the
sincerity of others, and not just acquiescence in their differences, must
characterize any search for spiritual unity, for if this attitude does not
prevail there can only exist an indifferent tolerance toward other positions
which really contains less of the Christian spirit of love than an impassioned
abhorance of other opinions. "May not one divine purpose in our divisions
be just the production in us of a charity which believeth all things on some
more Christian ground than the instinct of the herd."^ The spirit of union
^Vision and Authority, p. 149.
^Church and Divine Order, p. 310.
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must begin in the broad realm of the Christian experience of sincerity and
humility where ideas and practices are less rigid and stereotyped and are
most vital and dynamic. Here in this realm it is easier to appreciate spiri¬
tual growth and to accept the contributions and the limitations of others in the
light of one's own absolute dependence on God. When union is approached in
this attitude, which Oman called the "soul of unity", then it is probable that
some of the separations in the Church may be healed because it would be
realized that the soul of the Church is the free association of men together
under God and in His spirit, and the external framework is its body. Men
would then cease to "expect from the body what is only possible for the soul."*
However, Oman did not speak entirely in a negative way concerning the unity
of the Church. He declared:
Every society should be expected to realise that the Church is
different from all other societies in this, that its ideal is its
essence. Each society must have an ideal of the Church, and
consider in what way it is serving that ideal in its separate
state, else it can only exist as a successful corporation with¬
out vision of the kingdom of God, When by that test it fails to
justify its existence of itself, when it no longer stands alone for
the aspect of freedom for which it came into being, it should
endeavour, if possible to bring its isolation to an end.2
The Churches therefore have the responsibility to seek every spiritual
means to keep from being divided on mere external inconsequentials and
to express and embody their unity in Christ.
*Church and Divine Order, p. 312.
2Ibid.
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Oman believed that many of the divisions in the Church could be
avoided if men were more conscious of the fact that though the Church is
involved in the limitations which are inescapable in a historical order,
there is nothing in all the world that can prevent God from fulfilling his
purpose. When this is realized, the temptation will not be nearly so great
to wait until every aspect of the Church has been purified before aligning
oneself with it and sharing in its responsibility. Since the Church is one
in fellowship and at the same time necessarily entangled in the affairs of
history, it is not possible to escape being identified with and involved in,
and in some measure responsible for, every historical manifestation of
the Church,regardless of how incongruous it may be to the ideal nature of
the Church. If there is no serious violation of conscience involved or pro¬
found impression to do otherwise, one owes his gratitude and his service to
that Church which was initially responsible for introducing him into the com¬
munity of Christian faith. Even so, one has the responsibility to remain sen¬
sitive to all the historical forms and practical expressions of the Christian
faith and to seek continually ways that the Christian communities may be
united. Oman concluded that if the Church is ever to be one, its unity
must be accomplished by faith in the power of God's spirit to overcome
the divisions which the legal temper has imposed, and there must be the
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ri.sk to Love men even as God has loved them in His Church. The Churches
must realize that the only kind of competition between them which is com-
patabie with their calling is that they "should be rivals only in preaching the
good news."' Once this spirit has been accepted it will mean that there will
be such a transformation of our theological and ecclesiastical pride that
"we shall either have outward union, or be so united in heart as to be able
to do without it."'*
The final emphasis to be considered in this exposition id Oman's
doctrine of the task of the Church, and this concluding division may serve
as a brief review and general statement of the main principles of interpre¬
tation which Oman used throughout his theology, and more particularly in
his doctrine of the Church, to stress the primacy of the Church as a spiri¬
tual fellowship with God in freedom. The primary responsibility of the
Church, according to Oman, is to provide a fellowship and an atmosphere
where the children of God will be encouraged and inspired to acknowledge
their ultimate allegiance to the authority and the love of God. The early
Church "held no such exclusive view as nulla salus extra ecclesiam, but
there was a glad sense of possessing in a special degree a salvation which
made it a joy to bring men into the fellowship of the Christian society.
'war and Its Issues, p. 123.
2''Church and Divine Order, p. 315 . Cf. Vision and Authority,
p. 149.
3
Church and Divine Order, p. 71.
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To accomplish this redemptive task today the Church must not depend on
its power to compel men to submit to creed, institution, or political
authority, but it must rely wholly upon the convicting and persuasive
power of the Spirit of God.
We are all labouring to make our churches outwardly impres¬
sive rather than inwardly persuasive. We imagine the two
aims are quite consistent, but . . . you can't lay stress, say,
on having your deacons prosperous and also on having them -
saints, you can't lay stress on nourishing well-to-do congre¬
gations and also in caring for the souls of men. *
The Church must seek to "kindle the soul's own light by bringing God's
own fire to it from the altar. Oman summarized the task of the Church
with an emphasis which well characterizes the basic concern of his whole
life and thought when he declared that the essence of our responsibility is
for us to live like saints of God in this world. We must be men who sur¬
render our freedom only to the Spirit of God, and then allow Him to create
in us what He wills, being confident that in the strength of His will we shall
be able to realize our own identity and fulfil our own destiny without frustra¬
tion and defeat. We shall no longer be overwhelmed by the forces of evil
nor will we desert to expediencies because we live in the assurance that
the Kingdom of God has already come because we have seen (he vision of
its triumph for ourselves.
dialogue With God, p. 158.
^Church and Divine Ordei", p. 324.
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Th. is temper has not failed. It has not been tried. Perhaps
now that so many external supports of Christianity have fallen
and we are back at the position before the days when the world
took to patronising Christianity, it may have a chance. It will,
if we do not say, "The bricks have fallen, but we will build
with hewn stones," and say instead, "not by might, nor by
power, but by My spirit, saith the Cord."*







In evaluating Oman's contribution to theology it will be necessary
to remember that while Oman was in the midst of his theological work, the
major trend of theology changed from an idealistic, anthropological and
immanental direction to a transcendental, revelational and eschatological
character largely as a result of the rise of neo-orthodoxy. It is possible
to compare Oman with the more recent theology and criticize him for his
failure to include many of the emphases found in neo-orthodoxy, and also
to appreciate his development of some emphases which neo-orthodoxy has
neglected; however, the main criterion in this critical evaluation must be
the inherent value and consistency of Oman's individual thought and his
relatively unique and significant contribution to theology. This evaluation
shall therefore be approached from this writer's own evangelical theologi¬
cal perspective, which seeks to be orientated around the pattern and content
of Biblical revelation.
The one single characteristic which best describes Oman's theology
is the quality of comprehensiveness or wholeness, which kept his theology
from becoming an isolationistic theologism concerned with only one com¬
partment of life, and enabled him to convey the existential relevance of
religion to every area of life. All of man's varied experiences do com¬
prise a unity and a wholeness in which religion is not an intruder but an
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integral aspect of man's life which has developed alongside his experience
in other areas as man has responded to his environment. Oman might have
made a greater contribution to theology if he had made a clearer distinction
between methodology and content but there is nevertheless an inherent in¬
tegrity in his thought which convinces one that it is not merely a theoreti¬
cal or "paper theology" but a practical and sincere attempt to interpret
the breath of experience. One example of this wholeness or comprehen¬
siveness may be found in the way he refused to allow the religious and
ethical components of man's religious experience to be separated as they
had been in Otto's interpretation of religion. Oman was continually aware
of the danger of the partial view or the compartmentalized interpretation
of religion. He realized that religion is often considered as merely an anti-
rational experience of fear or awe, or on the other hand, that it may degene¬
rate to a mere moralism. He recognized this threat in Otto's interpretation
of religion and his reinterpretation of the inseparable relationship between
the awesome and the ethical aspects of man's religious experience even in
its earliest germ is a very helpful corrective at this point. It is also in¬
teresting to note that the basic concern for wholeness in Oman's thought
was already firmly developed and expressed in Grace and Personality,
wherein he pointed out that the religious experience of grace must be con¬
sidered as at the same time ethical and religious, long before Otto had
addressed himself to this problem in The Idea of the Holy.
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The practical and experiential characteristics of Oman's inter¬
pretation of religion are also helpful where he insisted that the conviction
of the existence of the Supernatural is not something which is derived by a
logical or metaphysical extension from the experience of the holy and the
evaluation of the sacred. At least the progress of Oman'e thought from an
intuitive and experiential awareness of living in a Supernatural environment
to the cognitive conclusion that this environment exists and is to be under¬
stood as personal, makes the epistemological transition from experience to
existence as smoothly and adequately as it can be made by a logical or meta¬
physical method. The belief that the Supernatural exists may receive meta¬
physical support and clarification from rational sources, but Oman was right
when he refused to place the original question of the existence of the Super¬
natural at the disposal of the metaphysician, for it is best that the experien¬
tial nature of religion be understood from the very beginning of man's rela¬
tions with the Supernatural.
Although Oman does not rely expressly on the Biblical testimony
concerning the way God may be known in what has been called general reve¬
lation, he has adequately recognized that through the whole course of God's
sustaining man in his existence, and in the structure of the created world,
God has given witness to Himself. * Man doe3 have a fragmentary but true
knowledge of God which may come to him even as Oman described the
*Acts 14:17; Romans 1:19-20, 2:14-15.
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experience of the holy and the sacred as evidence of the reality of the
Supernatural. It is this knowledge, as well as that which comes from Christ
more fully, which comprises the grounds of man's responsibility before God.
While Oman would have agreed with Karl Earth's insistence that man has no
disposition toward the Word of God or capacity for revelation in and of him¬
self, for everything is given to him by God} he would have rejected Barth's
interpretation that the image of God has been annihilated.3 Oman was actually
A„
much nearer to Emil Brunner's position that man does retain an a'usprech-
barkeit, or an element of "addressability" in his nature due to the continual
sustaining relationship which man has with God.3 Oman might even have been
nearer to Kant than he was to Brunner on the question of the structure of
man's personality, for Oman frequently employed the form of freedom in
a Kantian way almost as if it were a category of "discoverability" which
man possessed in his capacity to interpret his environment. Be that as it
may, Oman did have confidence in man's capacity to perceive the existence
of the Supernatural through his relations with his environment, and as an
initial observation this confidence is justified. However, he did not follow
through carefully enough on his conviction that the crucial question in reli¬
gion is not man's knowledge of the existence of the Supernatural, but how
* Earth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I, Section 1, p. 221, and
Section 2, p. 235.
2
Ibid. , Volume I, Section 1, p. 273.
3Brunner, Man in Revolt, p. 98.
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the Supernatural and man are related to one another. In the actual rela¬
tion of man to the Supernatural as it is reflected in world religions, the
historical evidence reveals little encouragement for Oman's optimistic
exhortation that man's responsibility is "to discover the true Supernatural.
... to exercise the true sense of the holy and have the right judgment of
the sacred."* This very thing is what man is incapable of doing without
something of a divine strength or infinite succour which Oman does not
adequately discuss. Even though he recognized the danger of corrupting
the witness of reality with insincerity at the very point of man's encounter
with his environment, and even though he admitted that there can be bad
religion, he did not apply these themes very extensively to show the result
of man's insincerity in the manifestations of his religions. He almost
Speaks as though the problem of insincerity could be handled rather easily
if man were only to apply himself to the task. The New Testament speaks
in very drastic terms of the basic nature of the man who is unreconciled to
Christ when it describes him as one who is incomplete, or sick, darkened,
imprisoned, and even dead in sin^ consequently, man is not capable of
being reconciled to the world through a proper evaluation of the Natural
and Supernatural, until he is newly created by God in a way which even
transforms and empowers man's capacity to evaluate and respond.
*
Natural and Supernatural, p. 72.
^Mark 2:17; John 8:12; John 8:34; Romans 6:16; II Timothy 2:26;
II Peter 2:19; and Ephesians 2:1-5.
^11 Corinthians 5:17, Colossians 3:10.
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Oman did not emphasize that the remnants of man's relationship to God
which find expression in the religions of man are but broken and empty
shells which must be refashioned by God and filled with the content of His
revelation in Christ. *
Oman has given comprehensiveness to his approach to religion by
his willingness to study all the phenomena claiming to be religion; however,
his desire to show the common ground of all religions in their dealings with
the whole breadth of man's relations with the Natural and Supernatural has
caused him to overlook the distinctive character of Hebraic revelation.
Since Oman did not clearly relate prophetic religion either by comparison
or contrast to the other types of religion in his classification, one is left
with the impression that the basic affinity which all religions have in their
concern for redemption from the evanescent is more determinative than any
antithesis or essential difference which may be present in prophetic religion.
By allowing Rilschl's category of redemption from the evanescent to be the
dominating criterion of description for religion, and even for prophetic
religion, Oman has failed to distinguish clearly between a proper relation
with the world in its Natural and Supernatural aspects and the personalistic
and voluritaristic nature of prophetic revelation. Although Oman did say that
reconciliation in prophetic religion is wholly of God, he did not sufficiently
stress God's personal initiative and action i.n revealing Himself through the
*
Jeremiah 2:13 , Acts 17:22ff.
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the prophets to call man to responsible decision toward Him and to grant
man a reconciliation which is possible in no other way. He overlooked the
fact that while the evanescent is a legitimate concern for religion, the great¬
est problem with which prophetic religion is concerned is not the problem of
evanescence or finitude, but rather the problem of man's sin against God.
Evanescence is surely a fact of man's finite existence which provides many
occasions for his sin, but the most significant aspect of man's sin in its
Biblical description is that man sins against God by putting his own free
and responsible causality into the evanescent human situation. Oman's in¬
terpretation of religion would therefore have been much truer to the stress
which he placed on freedom and personality in his system if he had inter¬
preted religion in closer connection with the responsibility which man has
for his sin. Oman failed to acknowledge that the Hebrew prophets gave the
most severe condemnation of world religions ever given, and this includes
the sins of Israel's religion. If this had been stressed, Oman might have
recognized that eschatological note basic to the Hebrew prophets that God
not only reveals Himself and His purpose in the midst of the evanescent
situation, but that He also reveals Himself in judgment upon man for his
role in the moral and spiritual condition of his world. Oman's failure to
develop this essential aspect of the prophetic revelation is characteristic
of his weakness in eschatology throughout his system.
Even though Oman spoke of religion as giving significance to the
personal nature of man's environment, he did not interpret the personal
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nature of the Supernatural in his methodological approach to the study of
religion as fully or adequately as his more distinctive Christian personal-
ism demands. He spoke rather cautiously of the Supernatural as an envir¬
onment which best expresses itself in experience in terms of personal
relationship, but he would have been truer to his own methodological
principle of interpreting reality from the highest manifestation man can
know had he given greater attention, even in his prolegomena, to the
Christian religion, especially the doctrine of reconciliation in all its
personalistic manifestations, as the interpretative motif and evaluating
criterion for religion. If Oman's interpretation of Christian reconciliation
as God's personal gracious gift had been brought to bear on his interpreta¬
tion of religion—and it will be remembered that his interpretation of grace
was given much earlier than his discussion on religion—he could have
shown more clearly how God's grace in Christ is the only adequate answer
to man's strivings with his environment. He might also have recognized
that God's grace unveils the self-assertive and perverted attempts to mani¬
pulate God which are often present in man's religions. Oman's interpreta¬
tion of religion needed some of Barfch's insight that when human religion is
evaluated from the Christian perspective it may in some sense be considered
as "the realm of man's attempts to justify and to sanctify himself before a
capricious and arbitrary conception of God."* While man's religions are
*Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I, Section 2, p. 280.
often the expression of man's highest response to the Supernatural as
Oman explained, there is also present a complex human attempt to achieve
and control God's grace which the Christian doctrine of grace can only inter¬
pret In the light of God's judgment, and which Oman never really bro ght to
bear on his interpretation of religion.
The most fundamental weakness of Oman's interpretation of reli¬
gion lies in his failure to show how religion, even prophetic religion, is
related to the revelation of God in Christ. While recognizing that Oman
was primarily trying to give a methodology for the principles which should
be included in a proper approach to the study of religion, one is tempted to
ask if Oman went far enough in his interpretation of religion to make any
really distinct contribution to an understanding of the Christian religion.
The spiritual climate in Schleiermacher's day may have needed a defense
of religion, but what the twentieth century has needed is an interpretation
of the uniqueness of the Christian revelation. Although Oman did effectively
show how the Natural has the capacity for receiving God's revelation, he did
not discuss how the Christian religion has its similarities , affinities, and
weaknesses along with other religions, but is at the same time distinctive in
a way that is more than just difference in degree, for it uniquely embodies
the transcendental revelation of God in the Incarnation. Where Oman is
often satisfied to say that revelation is a proper relation to the Natural and
the Supernatural, a discernment of the divine order of love, or even life as
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Lnterpreted by Jesus Christ, neo-orthodoxy has been much nearer the
Biblical norm of revelation when it has emphasized revelation as an event
of God's self-giving which is Christ, for the revelation of God has been
accomplished once for all when the Son of God actually became man. *
With our greater emphasis on Biblical revelation today, it may now be
possible to appropriate and relate Oman's interpretation of the phenomena
of religion as an expression of man's relations with his environment to the
more distinctive and unique elements of the Christian religion, using Chris¬
tian revelation as the standard and norm of interpretation.
Oman should be commended for recognizing the importance of
freedom for theology, and for deliberately seeking to establish his system
on the principles of freedom. An understanding of freedom is as central
and necessary for theology as the concepts of reason, grace, or even reve¬
lation; yet it seldom receives as much careful attention and analysis as
these doctrines. Theology is continually needing the reminder that Oman
gave to his generation that one must see the importance of freedom if
religion is to be anything more than a result of mechanical processes
and determined responses. Religion has to do with men and history
and God can never be adeq uately interpreted abstractly and philoso¬
phically apart from man's real experience of freedom; therefore,
the broad outlines of Oman's emphasis on freedom will be needed as
long as men continue to obscure the reality of man's freedom with the
*Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I, Section 1, p. 134, and
Section 2, pp. 345-46!. Cf. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, pp. 8, 258.
-232-
concepts of process, determination or illusion.
Oman has shown quite adequately the impossibility of surrendering
the solution of the problem of freedom to either moral or mechanical neces¬
sity. Man does live at the same time in both the realm of moral conse¬
quences and the realm of calculable mechanical order, and he could not
be true to his experience if he ignored either realm or exalted either order
to cosmological proportions. Oman actually gave stronger treatment to
the problem of the mechanical concept of inertia than to the idea of the
equivalence of action and award in the moral realm. He pointed out very
effectively that freedom cannot exist in a world which is only mechanical
vibration, but he did not deal very extensively with the harder problem of
man's moral freedom producing real consequences. A part of Oman's
weakness here may be due to his failure to define or distinguish between that
freedom which is primarily related to things in cause and effect sequence,
and that freedom which is more closely related to man's moral response to
his Supernatural environment which is moral and personal in essence. The
failure to acknowledge the distinctive personal nature of man's environment,
which was pointed out in the discussion of Oman's interpretation of religion,
also weakened Oman's cosmoiogical treatment of freedom. Freedom was
interpreted in Oman's cosmoiogical discussion as if the only conflict were
between freedom and mechanical necessity, for at this point of his exposi¬
tion he even treated freedom in the moral realm as the freedom which is
contrasted to a mechanical equivalence of action and award. While it is
true, as he has pointed out, that many interpret the moral aspect of man's
freedom mechanically, Oman has not adequately dealt with the question of
the moral consequences of man's freedom by merely rejecting the mechani¬
cal solution which some have offered to that problem. He needed to go on
and relate more clearly man's moral freedom and its consequences to the
personal moral order of his environment. He should not have been satis¬
fied, even in this Introductory area, to dismiss the problem by saying that
the belief in the equivalence of action and award somehow witnesses to the
belief that the universe is basically just, for this is precisely where the
crucial problem of moral freedom begins. The question of how man's
free acts bear consequences which further limit or liberate man's future
actions never received adequate consideration in Oman's thought. The
nearest he came to facing the problem squarely was in his exposition of
grace, where he declared that sin brings consequences which can never be
dismissed as though the past had never happened, and that the consequences
of sin provide many of our present responsibilities. He did maintain that one
can be reconciled to God and transform the consequences of sin by God's help,
but he did not give an adequate treatment of the effect of sin on man's free¬
dom, either in the historical context of the effect of sin on the race, or its
personal effects on the individual.
The Biblical concept of freedom, which is contrasted primarily
to sin rather than to necessity as Oman has emphasized, never received
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adequafce attention in Oman's interpretation. Jesus taught that everyone who
commits sin is a slave to sin and Paul declared that "sin will have no domin¬
ion over you, since you are not under law but under grace," and speaks of
"having been set free from sin."1 Without taking away from Oman's inter¬
pretation of freedom in contrast to necessity, and without applying proof
texts of Scripture against him unfairly, it may be said that just as his in¬
terpretation of religion would have been stronger if he had not limited his
emphasis so much to the problem of evanescence and dealt more seriously
with the problem of sin, so his interpretation of freedom would have been
stronger if he had not placed the balance of his interpretation in rejecting
forms of determinism, and had given more serious and extended considera-
to the relation of freedom to sin. Christ does invite men to come to Him in
the freedom of their personal response, but it must also be said that Christ
came to set men free from the enslaving effect of their sin, and to bestow
upon men a Christian liberty which they did not and could not possess, even
in their freedom to respond or reject his invitation, unless they be liberated
2
by Christ and His truth. When Christ is freely received, there is a personal
spiritual endowment given in the relationship whereby man is liberated from
3
the "law of sin and death," enabling him to stand in the freedom of Christ.
*John 8:34; Romans 6:14; Romans 6:18.
^John 8:32, 36; Romans 6:18; II Cor. 3:17;
3
Romans 8:2, Galatians 5:1.
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In other words, the Christian man is freed from self-defeating bondage
to himself, and from a merely external obligation to God's law, and is
given the freedom and strength to perform that which he not only ought to
do, but that which he truly wants to do in service for Christ. While Oman
did not deny this, he tarried so long in emphasizing that truth must be
freely received that he had little occasion to interpret what the receiving
of Christ actually does by way of further liberating and empowering a man
in Christian experience.
One of the most valuable emphases in Oman's interpretation of
freedom is the way in which he insisted on the form of freedom as the struc¬
tural basis of moral personality. Although the Bible does not present this
emphasis in the philosophical and theological mould which Oman followed in
his discussion, it does affirm or imply in every event where God and man
are seen in relation that man is a free being who can and must make signifi¬
cant and responsible decisions. Karl Earth would probably consider Oman's
interpretation of freedom as one which attempted to achieve a Protestant
synthesis or "balance" between freedom and grace, between man and God,
which, according to Earth, would amount to a denial of the absolute depend¬
ence of faith on the sovereign grace and freedom of God. Barth believes that
the doctrine of election in Christ, rather than the doctrine of man's freedom,
is the proper perspective for interpreting God's relationship to man. * While
*Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume II, Section 2, p. 193. Cf.
Volume IV, Section 1, pp. 449-50.
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Oman's thought would have been stronger if he had captured more of the
revelational and elective initiative which Barth's interpretation possesses,
it is also true that Oman has recognised more effectively than Barth that
the grace which God offers in Christ cannot be understood apart from the
recognition that God lias made men in the very structure of their created
being, as persons who are free to respond or not to respond to the revela¬
tion given them, and that since they are capable of response, they are
therefore responsible for the way that they use their freedom, even if this
leads to an ultimate rejection of God's grace. An interpretation of the sig¬
nificance of freedom for Christian thought can and should go further than
Oman has gone in relating the structural form of freedom to the freedom
which Christ gives in Christian experience, but the interpretation must at
least begin by taking the form of man's freedom seriously as Oman has donn.
There is a fundamental omission in Oman's interpretation of free¬
dom which greatly weakens his contribution to theology and further illustrates
the vast difference between his theology and the contemporary emphasis of
neo-orthodoxy on revelation . Throughout his interpretation of freedom,
Oman stressed the freedom of man to respond to his environment. He
acknowledged that man's environment is essentially personal and that the
Kingdom of God is a divine order of gracious love, but there is scarcely a
reference which could be interpreted as an emphasis on the personal freedom
of God in his revelation to man. The freedom of God is the very essence of
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HLs nature and the ground of His authority, according to Karl Earth,^and
Paul Tillich has recognized that almost every word in the Bible witnesses to
2
the freedom of God in His dealings with. man. If Oman had developed this
theme alongside his concept of the freedom of moral personality, his whole
theology could have been given a sounder basis in Biblical authority, for it is
this absence of an emphasis on the sovereign freedom of God in revelation
which characterlsac the greatest single weakness in Oman's theology.
Oman made his greatest contribution to an understanding of reli¬
gious authority, not by constructing an elaborate theoretical interpretation,
nor by discovering or stressing anything new or unique, for there is really
nothing in his interpretation which Ritschl had not said before, father, his
greatest contribution lies in the way in which he stressed the priority of the
internal authority and its practical implications for every area of experience.
The comprehensiveness or wholeness which is so characteristic of Oman's
approach is not found so much in the breadth of his discussion of the structure
or the delineation of authority as such, for he really could have done much
better than he did in distinguishing various emphases in authority, but it is
found more in his application of the principle of internal authority to the
practical concern for the whole of life. Although Oman needed to relate his
*Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I, Section 1, p. 352.
2
Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I, p. 248.
-238-
interpretation of internal authority more clearly to that which he called
external authority, the principle of internal authority—-that nothing in any
realm can ever be a properly functioning authority in our lives until we see
it and respond to it appropriately for ourselves—is an emphasis which every
age must learn.
Oman had a reveiational, or perhaps more accurately described, a
supernatural concept of authority in the sense of realizing that everything of
worth for man has its ultimate origin in God and not in man himself, and in
recognizing that the only ultimate authority is the authority of the truth itself,
but he did not adequately describe the locus of authority in its distinctive
Christological and Biblical pattern. His greatest weakness in this area lies
in his failure to clarify the relationship between the external authority of the
truth as it is in itself, and the internal authority as it has been received in
experience. Indeed, where Oman is really weakest in this regard is in his
failure to acknowledge the limitations of such a distinction as internal and
external authority in the first place. Even though an interpreter surely has
the right to use the concepts of internal and external authority, for some sort
of distinction must be employed, he should make It abundantly clear, as Oman
often did not, that It is impossible to speak of internal and external authority
as if they are really two separate and isolated realities, for they can never
be experienced in such isolation. Our consciousness always includes ele¬
ments of both aspects in our experience, although we may choose at times
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to emphasise one more than the other in our interpretation.
Oman was so concerned to stress the acceptance of authority in
freedom as an insight of one's own mind that he failed to give proper atten¬
tion to the more objective qualities of Christian authority. He frequently
spoke as though the external aspects of the authority of Christ, the Church
or Scripture were exclusively mechanical or even despotic in character,
with little or no internal or spiritual authority involved. What this tendency
really amounts to, surprisingly enough, is that Oman, who was elsewhere
so concerned with the unity of experience, has failed in his own intention
toward wholeness by letting an artificial, or at least an ill-defined, anti¬
thesis remain in his interpretation of the internal and tho external authority
It should be admitted, however, that there are times when Oman appears to
have overcome, or at least to have acknowledged, the false contrast between
the internal authority and the external authority. When he spoke of the
authority of Christ, and more particularly of the Cross of Christ, which
one has seen for himself, he attempted to unite the internal and external
authority—but the burden c£ his emphasis fell on the internal authority
which has been recognized and there was little concern given to that which
may be called the external or objective authority of Christ's person and His
revelation. It is not enough to insist that there can be no merely external
authority in religion, for the fact remains that there is an authority in
Christ and Scripture and the Church which to some extent is external and
is authoritative as ontologicaliy independent even of man's individual insight
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and receptivencss. It is true as Oman has stressed that truth or authority
will not be an adequate functioning truth or authority unless one accepts it
for himself; however, it is also true, in a way that Oman never found oppor¬
tunity to stress, that a proper authority in religion possesses an intrinsic
authority in itself whether or not it has been accepted.
Oman has quite adequately emphasised a very essential element in
any understanding of the authority of Christ for the Christian religion when
he stresses that the method of Christ's approach to men is to speak to their
highest natures and call from them their free response. Christ does exer¬
cise His lordship over man in such a gracious manner that He does not
destroy man's self-respect or integrity as a person but enriches his life
by presenting him with an object worthy of his freedom. Oman has therefore
very appropriately described an integral aspect of Christ's means of dealing
with men, and this theme must ever be near the center of interpretation
where the authority of Christ is presented. However, in concentrating his
exposition so heavily in the area of Christ's method of dealing with men,
Oman has almost entirely neglected to consider the grounds or the basis of
Christ's authority-—and the means whereby authority is accepted must never
be confused with the basis of authority. Even though Oman is correct when
he speaks of the way Christ approaches men, he should not have failed to
stress what Christ Himself witnessed to, both in word and action, as the
grounds of his authority and the basis of His invitation to men. It is
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certainly true, as Oman has pointed out, that Christ did not present Himself
merely as an external authority; however, it is true in a way which Oman
did not emphasize that Christ presented His revelation as the Son of God,
and His commission to the Church as one to whom "ail authority in heaven
and on earth" had been given. A It almost seems that Oman, in his desire to
avoid presenting Christ as a tyrannical external authority, has withheld from
Him something of the essential authority of His person. This limitation in
Oman's thought is all the more significant in that in none of his writings does
he clearly describe his doctrine of the person of Christ. Furthermore,
while it may also be true, as Oman said, that Christ appealed directly to
man who is made in the image of God, the Biblical account of Christ's
ministry is far more concerned with what Christ declared cf God to man
than it is with the major emphasis of Oman on that which Christ appealed to
in man or drew from him.^ Oman has therefore overstated his position
when he said that Christ did not portray Himself as an authority, for there
is an inherent authority in Christ's person and work which cannot success¬
fully be avoided.
Oman's interpretation of the authority of Scripture suffers from the
same weakness pointed out earlier concerning the fallacy of the distinction
*
Matthew 28:18.
^Tohn 1:18; Mark l:14ff; Luke 10:21-24; Matthew 25:3f;
Ephesians 1:9.
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between internal and external authority. The very fact that Oman is content
to discuss his interpretation of the authority of Scripture under the heading
ot external authority is an indication lliat lie did not give proper attention to
the internal structure of the Scriptures themselves, that is, the witness
which they give to the inner aspects of the writer's experience, and the
basic concern of the Scriptures to precipitate an inner personal response
in man. Nor did Oman satisfactorily deal with the external or objective
aspects of the Scriptures for he was primarily concerned to say what kind
of authority they do not possess. He was satisfied to say that the authority
which Scripture has must be received in freedom rather than imposed on
man by the force of an infallible proclamation, and with this one may agree;
however, it is the lack of more positive construction in Oman's interpreta¬
tion of Scripture which prompts the criticism that he emphasized the form
of freedom to the neglect of its content. Oman's interpretation of authority
would have been much better if he could have realized that the authority of
God's Word in Scripture can be auto-pistic or self-validating and must be
received in freedom, but that at the same time there are appropriate histori-
cal and theological considerations which are legitimate guides to establishing
a criterion for helping one determine the reliability and trustworthiness of a
Scriptural authority. For example, if Oman had followed through on his con¬
cept of revelation buiug given to the race in history, he would surely have
emphasized more clearly than he did that the Scripture is revealing not 1
^Due to typographical error, page 244 immediately follows page 242.
The continuity of the text is uninterrupted.
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only an eternal Word of God to be received by individual men as an inter¬
nal authority, but also the coming of the eternal Son of God in flesh into the
very fabric of the events of history. He would therefore have been able to
emphasize how the historical proximity of the Biblical writers to the histori¬
cal revelation gives an indispensible significance to the content of that about
which they wrote and he would not have allowed the weight of his interpreta¬
tion to fall almost exclusively upon the theme of the internal authority of
Christ with which "no fellow mortal, were he even an Apostle, should inter-
,, 1vene."
Oman should have put more stress upon the value of Scripture as a
historical revelation which is an external authority, properly understood,
*
V
compatible with and conducive to the freedom of man and his internal spiri¬
tual insight, but nevertheless an authority historically and ontologically dis¬
tinguishable from man's existential response. There are, as Oman pointed
out, many difficulties concerning the authority of Scripture, and one has no
right to demand of him an exhaustive account of the inspiration and authority
of Scripture; however, it is necessary to conclude that his emphasis, as far
as it goes, is a valuable one, but it is regrettable that he treated such an
essential question as Scriptural authority so negatively.
It must be asked, finally in this connection, if Oman really gained
anything by substituting the principle of rationalism on the form of freedom
1Vision and Authority, p. 193.
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for the emphasis on the internal witness of the Eoly Spirit, which was
available to him in his own Reformed tradition. Oman's interpretation of
authority would have been greatly strengthened if he had given it a more
adequate Christological and Triniiarian structure by stressing the role of
the Holy Spirit as the agent who convinces and illumines inwardly the more
objective and external aspects of God's revelation. The Reformers had
acknowledged that man must receive God's truth for himself, and Calvin
especially sought to make it abundantly clear without mere negative warn¬
ings that God's truth comes through Christ as He is witnessed to by the
Scriptures as the instruments of God's revelation which are illumined by
the Holy Spirit. * In this emphasis there was already at hand a very effec¬
tive instrument of interpretation for uniting the internal and external authority
toward which Oman was striving in his interpretation, and for integrating
«.i»-
those converging aspects of the authority of Christ, Scripture, and the
Church into the cohesiveness and unity of Christian experience, which
could have helped Oman avoid many of the dangers of his more subjective
emphasis on the primacy of the internal authority.
«
Oman certainly succeeded in his intention to follow the course laid
down for theology by Schleiermacher and Ritschl when they attempted to
reject all impersonal elements in religion and sought to reorientate
Christian theology around a personal understanding of grace. Oman
made a significant contiubution to theology by the unrelenting way he pursued
^Calvin, Institutes, Book I, Section VII, p. 4-5.
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the personalistic approach in his interpretation of the doctrine of grace,
and by the way he stressed persuasive grace as over against irresistible
grace, and the non-personal juridical, penal theories of grace. Oman has
been an effective voice in insisting on the inadequacy of an impersonal
interpretation of God's grace which conceived grace as a mere supernatural
force which worked on man sub-personally by sacramental magic, legalistic
bookkeeping, or overriding will. It will never be possible nor indeed advis¬
able to purge theology completely of its non-personal or legalistic termino¬
logy, since many of these concepts are derived from Biblical language and
have certain aspects of the justice and holiness of God to represent; never¬
theless, it may be concluded that Oman has provided a helpful service to
theology by reminding interpreters that whatever else the grace of God may
involve, it must be considered as basically a gracious relationship which is
distinctively personal.
Although Oman shared a similar theme with neo-orthodoxy concern¬
ing the interrelatedness of revelation and reconciliation, there was quite a
difference between the two meanings and emphases. Oman tended to identify
reconciliation with forgiveness, therefore, when he discussed revelation and
reconciliation he was concerned primarily to stress the familiar refrain
of his theology: that revelation must be received and appropriated as recon¬
ciliation, i.e. , forgiveness, before it could be really understood as revelation.
On the other hand, Karl Barth seeks to establish the significance of the per¬
son and work of Chri£ in the accomplishment of reconciliation which makes
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forgiveness possible. R.evelation can only be meaningfully appropriated
when it has been received in an experience where the grace of God has
truly become personal and forgiving for the one who has received it, and
this experiential side of revelation as response must always be acknowledged
in order that the personal redemptive purpose of revelation shall not be lost.
Nevertheless, Oman's emphasis became unbalanced when he allowed his in¬
sistence on the necessity of receiving God's revelation in a relationship of
forgiveness to overshadow the essential noetic function of revelation as an
unveiling and offering of God Himself for response which could never have
taken place if God had not given Himself in the event of revelation. The
weakness of Oman's interpretation of the relationship between revelation
and reconciliation is never more clearly apparent than when he attempted
to show the significance of Christ as the revelation of God because He is
also the means of reconciliation. The description of Christ in such
phrases as one who has a "right relation to God," who is an "inspiration
of our insight, ' or even the "embodiment of a relation to the Father,"*
hardly seem adequate to describe the uniqueness of Christ's deity which
is necessary for the accomplishment of God's revelation and reconcilia¬
tion.
Even though Oman is weaker than Barth in acknowledging the
elements of intervention, giveness, and accomplishment in the event of
*Grace and Personality, p. 158.
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revelation and reconciliation through Christ, Oman is more effective
than Barth in describing the place of the Individual in the reception and
acknowledgement of that revelation and reconciliation which has been
accomplished. While Earth's doctrine of revelation as reconciliation
does convey the conviction that a divine event has indeed occurred for
man in Christ, Oman much more clearly acknowledged the graciousness
of that event as a personal gift for the individual in his freedom. The criti¬
cisms of both Oman and Barth on this theme are not so much on what each
has affirmed but on what has been neglected. Since the adequacy of the
doctrine of grace depends largely on the question of the relationship be¬
tween the emphases on what God has done, and what man in turn receives,
it may be that Oman's basic stress on grace as primarily God's being
personally gracious to man and man's receiving this grace personally,
can provide a necessary complement to the emphasis on the accomplish¬
ment of reconciliation through Christ which has been made by neo-
orthodoxy.
Oman's doctrine of grace suffers from a weakness which has
already been noted in the evaluation of his interpretation of religion. Just
as he had in his understanding of religion given the priority of concern to
the natural world in which one became conscious of the supernatural, so in
his treatment of grace he declared that any investigation of grace must begin
by investigating the nature of personality. As a result, the priority of con¬
cern is given to the nature of moral personality rather than to the nature of
God's grace. This is a valid principle of interpretation if it is allowed
to mean primarily that there can be no a priori doctrine of God's grace,
but that the grace of God must be approached by seeking to understand its
relationship to the freedom of moral personality, and Oman surely had
this emphasis uppermost in his mind. However, there are serious con¬
sequences involved, from which Oman did not altogether escape, when
God's revelational priority and initiative in unveiling to man his essential
nature is relinquished to the axioms of rationalism concerning the autonomy
of moral personality. Oman could have avoided falling into this difficulty if
he had been more consistent in following his own insight concerning the inte¬
gral relationship between revelation and reconciliation—that is, if he had
insisted more clearly that the nature of reconciliation can be understood
only when its dependence on revelation is acknowledged. Since he did not
develop this theme, it almost appears that Oman has attempted to construct
a Christian doctrine of grace upon a rationalistic and humanistic experien¬
tial foundation. To know first the nature of human personality, as Oman
desired, cannot really be possible because man is so involved in the sin
and contradiction of his own nature and circumstances that he does not
actually have an adequate standpoint from which to evaluate his personality.
The order of Barth's approach is much nearer to the Biblical perspective
than Oman's , for revelation and grace must come first, then the truer
and fuller understanding of personality. Oman had the prerogative to use
whatever insights and tools rationalism may provide for help in understanding
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the nature of man as a free and autonomous being, but it should have been
made abundantly clear which perspective is the dominating and controlling
directive for Christian thought.
Oman's interpretation of the atonement may be called the moral
influence theory in that it concentrates more upon Jesus as an example or
a symbol of God's love and willingness to be gracious than it does upon any
ontological distinctiveness of the person of Christ and his work. Many of
Oman's phrases explaining how faith is given by God through the "whole of
revelation", and the "whole of Christianity," convey a legitimate concern
for comprehensiveness but they leave much of the content of the Christian
faith rather nebulous and undefined. When Oman, like Ritschl, tends to
merge the characteristics of justification, forgiveness and reconciliation,
he really fails to do justice to the objectivity of the reality which these terms
represent. Oman's major emphasis on the gracious willingness of God to
forgive and the necessity for man to recognize this graciousness, usually
overshadows the objective accomplishment of Christ's reconciliation and
justification which makes forgiveness available. Atonement in the broad
sense which that word covers theologically in the New Testament is not
just a revelation of the love of the Father who is willing to receive the sin¬
ner home, although it involves that, but it is primarily the creation of a new
* Grace and Personality, p. 158.
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conditlon which is brought into full existence by the event of the life, death
and resurrection of Christ. The Scriptures speak of the believer's being
"reconciled to God by the death of His Son, ' and of God who was "in Christ
reconciling the world to himself." They declare that "Christ died for our
sins," that He "offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins."1 Oman
may have been justified in his rejection of the crude interpretation of the
legalistic elements in some theories of atonement, but he usually spoke as
though all objective or legalistic metaphors were impersonal and therefore
to be avoided, and he reinterpreted these analogies in such a way that the
distinctive character of their Biblical meaning was lost in the attempt to
make every description of grace essentially personal.
By failing to capture the crucial note of the apostolic kerygma that
"if Christ has not been raised your faith is futile and you are still in your
sins", Oman greatly neglected the significance of the resurrection for the
accomplishment of reconciliation and a demonstration of the power of God's
grace. ^ He probably assumed that this event and its consequences would be
understood to be included in all that he said concerning the cross; however,
such a cardinal issue should not have been almost totally ignored for it is just
at the point of historical concreteness that the Christian doctrine of Grace
offers its greatest distinctiveness and contribution in spiritual power to
Romans 5:10; II Cor. 5:19; I Cor. 15:3; Heb. 10:12.
2I Cor. 15:17.
sinful man.* The cross and resurrection must never be interpreted in
isolation from one another, but there is a sense in which the cross is the
sacrificial accomplishment of redemption which is empowered and made
vital to the individual through the resurrection of Christ and His living pre¬
sence with the believer in the Christian community. This truth is not the
magic or the mysticism which Oman abhored, but it makes possible the
intensely personal appropriation of the spiritual blessings of God's grace
which have been obtained through the death of Christ. It is regrettable that
Oman did not develop more adequately the New Testament theme that "if
when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son,
much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life."
Oman was true to his basic methodological principle of compre¬
hensiveness when he set the concept of sin in its broadest possible context
as enmity with reality. He rightly recognized that sin is not just a break¬
ing of a law, even though that law be a moral law, but that sin includes an
estrangement from all of life and only a right relation to the whole of one's
environment can satisfy man's essential unity as a moral person. However,
it must be asked if Oman has not blurred the personalistic focus of his in¬
terpretation of the Christian faith when he concluded somewhat impersonally
*The RSV brings out this emphasis very pointedly in its translation
of I Cor. 15:19f. "If in this life we who are in Christ have only hope, we are




that "to be at enmity against God is neither more nor less than to be in
bitter hostility to reality, with the sense that it is all against us," and that
reconciliation is essentially "reconciliation to the discipline He appoints and
the duty He demands."* Oman's interpretation is valid in stressing that
enmity with God and reconciliation certainly encompass the total context
of man's practical circumstances and situation in this life, and he may be
followed confidently when he affirmed that reconciliation surely includes
nothing less than the acceptance of these realities, but is this all? Is it
sufficient to say that reconciliation includes nothing more? To put it very
simply, Oman would have been closer to the center of his own personalistic
thesis as well as closer to the seriousness of the Biblical picture of sin if
he had portrayed sin as being more against God Himself than he did, more
as a personal affront to God where one cries "against thee, thee only, have
I sinned."^" While it may be true as Oman said that enmity with God is fre¬
quently interpreted so abstractly that one may wonder how he could offend
God, it may be that Oman's interpretation would leave one with the impres¬
sion that if he has erred primarily against 'duty1 and 'discipline' and 'appoint¬
ment' there can be very little of serious consequence involved. Throughout
Oman's theology his major emphasis fell upon sin as insincerity, spiritual
lack of vision, the unwillingness to see, sin as "resisting the truth in un¬
righteousness," which is essentially what the gospels call "hypocrisy,"
*Grace and Personality, pp. 116, 119.
^Psalm 51:4.
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and which he interpreted primarily as dishonesty. "Thus it is not an act
but a principle, which has as its natural outcome corrupt minds, degraded
consciences and unnatural vices."* The depth of man'G personal alienation
from God, which the New Testament describes in terms of man being an
2
enemy who is hostile in his mind toward God. is never fully recognized;
consequently, it seems that Oman has actually placed more weight of
emphasis on his doctrine of personal reconciliation than hie interpretation
of sin can bear.
Unfortunately, Oman's Ritschlian affinities caused him to miss an
essential depth of meaning in the doctrine of grace by avoiding the signifi-
cance of the wrath of God. The gulf that exists between man and God
because of sin is not only a subjective aspect of human experience, but
there is in man's sin and guilt an objective counterpart in the very nature
^Honest Religion, p. 115. Cf. Natural and Supernatural, pp. 327-
329; Vision and Authority, p. 65, p. 107; Grace and Personality, pp. 193,
197, 244, 266T26T!
2
Romans 5:10; Col. 1:21; Rom. 11:28.
Ritschl believed that the concept of the wrath of God was incom¬
patible with the being of God as Father and love and concluded that "From
the point of view of theology, therefore, no validity can be assigned to the
idea of the wrath of God and His curse upon sinners as yet unreconciled. . ."
Ritschl, op. cit. , p. 323.
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of God, whereby He mast act ally judge and reject man as long as he
remains unreconciled to Him. The wrath of God need not be interpreted
crudely or impersonally as t ough there were antipathies between God's holy
love and His wrath, nor does it have to be expounded ir. crude and impersonal
concepts as though God delighted in being antagonistic to man. Quite the con¬
trary, it is because His holiness and love and concern for man are so distinc¬
tively personal that the wrath of God cannot be overlooked. If God's holiness
or love were mere impersonal decree or force, it might be conceived how
God could deal with sin lightly or even condone it indifferently, but when it
is understood that God Himself in gracious personal love has offered Him¬
self to man for fellowship, then and only then can the profound seriousness
of man's rejection of that grace and the ensuing judgment of God be adequately
understood. Oman may again be contrasted to the representatives of neo-
orthodoxy for although Barth and Brunner do nut agree on the ultimate eocha-
tological manifestations of the wrath of God, they are both convinced that the
wrath of God must be interpreted in integral correlation with the grace of
God. Karl Barth emphasizes the necessity for a realistic interpretation
of the wrath of God when he explains that if the opposition of God to man's
rejection of Him is not taken seriously, then grace cannot really be grace.
Emil Brunner warns, in terms that might even have prophetic significance
for Oman's interpretation of grace, that whenever the wrath of God is
^Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume IV, Section I, p. 490.
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neglected there "is the beginning of the Pantheistic disintegration of the
Christian Idea of God.
Oman's insistence on the integral relation of the doctrine of God
and salvation to the doctrine of the Church was in keeping with his principle
of wholeness and also very near the New Testament emphasis on the theolo-
gical nature of the Church. Whether or not Oman's fuller exposition corre¬
sponds to the basic New Testament description, his doctrine of the Church
was at least begun on a solid Biblical methodological principle. One of the
places he employed this principle very effectively was where he explained
that frequently Churches, such as radical Catholicism and radical Evangeli¬
calism, which are quite dissimilar in their externals, possess a remarkable
correspondence in their true nature because of their mechanical interpreta¬
tion of grace. Although Oman rather overstated his case in his characteriza¬
tion of Catholicism and Evangelicalism, his basic thesis remains valid, that
the real essence of the doctrine of the Church is largely determined by the
doctrine of salvation, and wherever grace tends to be an impersonal sub¬
stance dispersed either by priest or evangelist, there can be no adequate
understanding of the Church and its personal significance for God and man.
Oman's interpretation of the Church as a fellowship of persons united
in the Divine order of love is an emphasis which is relevant for an understand¬
ing of the Church in any age. The natural man does tend to be "catholic" in
^Brunner, Mediator, p. 445.
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the sense of his continually being tempted to crystallize the fellowship of
the Church into a mere institution. While this emphasis may not be a unique
contribution of Oman's thought, for indeed many interpreters had said this
before him, it is noteworthy that he emphasized that element of koinonia
which plays such an important role in the New Testament Church. * It must
be noted again, however, that Oman has put his stress on the form of free¬
dom, which is the receiving of the Divine order of love voluntarily, and he
has not too clearly defined the Biblical content of the basis for Christian
koinonia . Oman was satisfied to speak in rather broad terms con¬
cerning the Church as a fellowship of believers associated with one another
under the authority of the Spirit of God in the bond of love, in order that he
might go on to emphasize the real burden of his message: that the Church
is not an institution. Even though Oman's generalities are valid and even
commendable in the interest of comprehensiveness, the New Testament is
much more emphatic concerning the definite Christological framework of
the koinonia . What one believes about who Christ is, what He has
accomplished for men and their redemption, and what His relation to the
Church is in the present, are questions which are inescapably related to
the personal relationship of "believing in Him", and involve tremendous
consequences concerning the nature of that fellowship of believers. Surely,
Oman did not ignore these questions altogether but they did not receive
1Acts 2:42; I Cor. 1:9; Phil 2:1; I John 1:3.
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adequate theological exposition in his interpretation. For example,
Oman gave almost no emphasis whatsoever in his doctrine of the Church
to the kerygmatic theme in the New Testament that it was the Christ of the
resurrection in whom the Church believed and who actually created the fel¬
lowship of believers into His koinonia . It was the revolutionary fact
that God raised up Christ that gave the Church both its assurance and confi¬
dence, and also its very existence at Pentecost, and made it possible for the
Church to continue in the apostles' teaching and koinonla . If it is
not made expressly clear, as Oman unfortunately did not make it, that Jesus
has actually risen from the dead, then the whole foundation of atonement
2
crumbles and there is no justification for a community of hope. ' The com¬
ing of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost can only be understood in the light of the
fact that the crucifixion, resurrection and ascension had already occurred,
and the Holy Spirit came to illumine what had happened and to empower the
Church in its witness of those events. The Church, therefore, has its ori¬
gin, its message and its future hope orientated around the reality of those
events. To fail to emphasize the significance of the actuality of these
events, as Oman did, is to run the risk of involving one's interpretation
of the Church in an unnecessary vagueness as though the Church were only
a moral unification of men around the principle of a Divine order of love
*Acts 2:24, 42.
2I Cor. 15:17, 19.
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exempiified in Christ.
Oman's Ritschlian distrust of mysticism was probably one factor in
his neglect of that genuine Biblical emphasis whic W describes the Christian's
relationship with his risen Lord in terms that are, to be sure, historical,
personal, and communal, but at the same time, unmistakably transcendental
and mystical in nature. Oman did speak occasionally of the two or three who
meet in the name of Christ, but it was usually mentioned in contrasting the
fellowship of believers with an institutional interpretation of the Church. He
spoke at length about following Chrises method in fulfilling His tasks, but he
hardly acknowledged that the ministry of the Church is carried on by those
believers who are strengthened and sustained by the risen Lord Himself.
The work of the Church In Oman's emphasis is carried on by the personal
freedom of those who discern God's mind and accept His will in their free¬
dom, and this is a wholesome emphasis, but there is very little dynamic
offered from the One who has promised His living and abiding presence in
their midst. *
Bound up inseparably with Oman's neglect of the resurrection of
Christ and His spiritual presence as the creating and renewing power of
the Church is Oman's failure to realize the significance of the Church as
the body of Christ. Perhaps his Ritschlian antimystical and antimetaphysi-




when Oman referred to the body of the Church he thought primarily in
negative docetic concepts of the body as the institutional or organizational
form of the Church which needed to die in order that the soul could live.
He used an effective illustration to portray the living reality of the Church
when he declared that its unity was not like the quarry which must remain
undisturbed, but that it was like the building which was fashioned even in
disturbance by a master plan. How much better he could have conveyed the
dynamic nature of the Church if he had seen fit to interpret the Church as a
living organism which is the body of Christ. There are several figures in
the New Testament to describe the manysidedness of the Church's nature,
and among them is the illustration of the Church as a building* which Oman
has modified in his image concerning the quarry and the building; however,
there can be little question that the expression of the Church as the body of
Christ is central, and should surely not be overlooked. ^ Paul uses the
phrase not only to vitalize the concept of the Church, but to historicize
and concretize its relation to Jesus, and to identify its ministry with His
presence and activity in the world. Although the Church is not a reincar¬
nation of Christ in a literal sense, it is a reality vivified by the actual
presence of Christ, which embodies the evangelical continuation of His
incarnational ministry of reconciliation. Oman impoverished his
*1 Peter 2:4ff.
2I Cor. 12:12b; Ephesians l:22f, 5:23; Col. 1:18, 24.
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ecclesiology by neglecting the Christological and evangelical emphases
which an acknowledgement of this theme could have introduced.
Oman has very thoroughly incorporated his interpretation of free¬
dom and the secondary importance of institutions, which he inherited from
Ritschl, into his theology. Oman is right when he charges that there has
been a tendency, whether in Romanism or in Protestantism, to overlook the
essence of the Church as a spiritual fellowship and to identify it with a parti¬
cular institution. His emphasis on the subordination of the institution to the
higher order of love and freedom is a valuable one, but Oman's basic thrust
is often almost wholly negative concerning the institutional aspects of the
Church. The burden of his message is that the Church may become an
external organization which is a continual threat to the freedom of the indi¬
vidual, and he had difficulty in speaking of the Church as a fellowship of
believers without appearing to disparage the visible manifestation of those
believers in a historical institution. In other words, at times Oman seemed
to present the reader with an either/or alternative—either the Church is a
spiritual fellowship or it is an institution exercising external authority
which commands submission and interprets grace mechanically. An illus¬
tration of this kind of contrast may be observed where he declared that
when Christ began the Church He did not propose "the creation of an
organization with rulers and subjects." * This is perfectly true, but
^man, "The Presbyterian Churches," p. 76.
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Oman's failure to interpret more positively how Christ's fellowship can
be related to its organizational framework leaves the impression that
organization per se is almost inescapably corrupt. In another place the
only option which Oman allowed was the contrast between "an institution
with official rule" or the security of "a fellowship with Divine gifts."*
Few would deny the dangers which he stressed, but it must be asked
whether or not Oman has given adequate attention to the contribution
which the historical Church, even with ail its institutional entanglements,
has made in its collective theological experience and organizational struc¬
ture to the preservation and guidance of the very internal authority and
individual freedom which he believed to be at the heart of the Christian
faith.
Even though Oman has done nothing really epoch making or unique
in his interpretation of the concept of Church unity, he did so thoroughly
saturate his doctrines of freedom, authority and the Church with the con¬
viction of the essential spiritual nature of Christian unity that the cumula¬
tive force of his emphasis is quite effective. Some of our divisions within
the Churches, as he pointed out, may truly be an indication not only of our
self-centeredness and involvement in the historical order, but also an evi¬
dence of God's providential dealing with men in their freedom and conscience
*Qman, "Church," p. 622.
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in such a way that they shall not be able to identify the Kingdom of God with
any particular institution. Oman has given very sound instruction when he
explained that the way in which unity is sought is even more important than
the unity which may be attained. The method of doctrinal obscurantism and
ecclesiastical compromise can never produce a true Christian unity for this
can come about only where there Is present the kind of sincerity and serious¬
ness which Oman prescribes concerning genuine theological differences, and
organizational matters which involve important doctrinal principles. Oman
possibly should have gone further than he did in outlining a more positive
and practical program for implementing his concept of unity, but he has laid
an excellent platform for at least the beginning principles of Christian unity.
Oman spoke occasionally of the task and privilege of bringing others
into the Christian fellowship of the Church, and of the fact that Churches
should be in competition only in proclaiming the Gospel; nevertheless,
the Church's responsibility in evangelism was never really central in his
theology. His quiet confidence in the triumph of the rule of God in the world
is comforting and strengthening to a restless, anxious age, and his criticism
of a competitive activism is needed, but Oman never adequately stressed the
missionary and evangelistic zeal which so characterized the early Church and
which is the evidence of a true Christian vitality in those who have known
Christ. The New Testament teaching on the Church not only emphasizes
the attitude of accepting the Divine order of love in freedom, but stresses
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that there are some things the Christian Church must do to fulfill its com¬
mission. There are, as Oman recognized, different manifestations and ex¬
pressions in the life of the Church whereby it accomplishes its ministry;
however, the priority of proclaiming the gospel should have been made
more central in Oman's theology. Throughout the New Testament the fact
that there are events of gospel to be proclaimed, and the fact that believers
have been commanded to give witness to that good news is the raison d'etre
of the Church. * Oman's emphasis on the Church as the koinonia
of individuals who have entered into the order of God's grace in a personal
relationship is a valid description of the status of the Christian community,
but this concept, if not balanced by an emphasis on the evangelistic task of
the Church, is far too static to portray the dynamic mission of the Church.
He was very reluctant to stress the fact that those who have received God's
grace are commissioned as heralds and ambassadors in a "ministry of recon-
2
ciliation" to thrust upon man the decisive invitation of the message of recon¬
ciliation, and his theology contained very little of the realization of the criti¬
cal importance of man's rejection of that message. It is unfortunate that
Oman, who had laid the personalistic foundation so well for an evangelical
theology, was never ever really able to feel the urgency of the apostolic
3
appeal that "now is the day of salvation," and that so far as God's time
*Mark3:14; Matt. 10:5-7, 20:14; Mark 13:10; Matt. 28:19;




for salvation is concerned there is only now, and this means in a real
sense that salvation is either now, or possibly never.
Throughout Oman's theology there is a failure to come to terms
with the Christological aspects of Biblical eschatology. For example, even
though Oman is to be commended for interpreting the significance of the
doctrine of eternal life for the responsibilities and purposes of this present
life, the Christian hope for life after death is unnecessarily weakened by
his failure to base its assurance upon the fact of the resurrection of Christ.
Oman's reasoning that men may be confident of immortality on the grounds
that they are serving a purpose for which this life is too limited sounds
more dependent on the rationalism of Kant than it does upon the witness
of the New Testament writers who were convinced that Jesus Christ had
"abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the
gospel."* Oman must not be condemned for attempting to integrate Kant's
argument into the Christian belief in immortality, for there is truth in
Kant's thesis that man cannot fulfill the demands of the moral law in this
span of life, even if that law be conceived in rationalistic terms of moral
maxims. The apostle Paul spoke concerning the insufficiency of even the
law of God to enable men to keep His commandments because it was
2




Kant nor Oman ever fully admitted that the only way for one to have the
power to overcome his moral impotency and his human evanescence is to
base his confidence and hope in the faith that "if the Spirit of him who
raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ Jesus from
the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit which
dwells in you. " *
Oman's limitations in eschatology may also be seen in the way
that he interpreted the Kingdom of God. as though it were essentially a cos-
mological and ethical realm of God which one only needed to adjust to mor¬
ally in order to know blessedness and peace. The ethical and moral struc¬
ture of man's environment is surely important as the arena for man's prac¬
tical moral struggle and responsibility; however, the basic thrust in the
New Testament concerning the Kingdom of God is not that men, even though
2
they be prophets, come to an "insight into the nature of reality," or that
one must "discover" the true nature of God's rule. It is rather that God
has ushered into history a unique and sovereign kingdom by Jesus Christ.^
Oman realized that the Kingdom of God is not a matter of man's
*Rom. 8:11.
2
Grace and Personality, p. 262.
3Ibid. , p. 263, 269, 275.
^Mark 1:15; Mark 3:20-30 (Matt. 12:25-37, Luke 11:17 - 2 3 );
Matt. 13:l6fi Luke 4:16-24; Luke 10:23f; Col. 1:13-14.
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accomplishment, and he even acknowledged that the future hope of the
kingdom lies in the Day of the Lord. He should not, then, have been con¬
tent to allow the major emphasis of his interpretation to remain on the level
of ethical axioms, insisting that the Kingdom of God was "a moral rule only
to be introduced by moral means"' when there were so many transforming
events of the kerygma to be proclaimed regarding the Kingdom of God.
Oman did realize very adequately that the Kingdom of God is not just a
remote and abstract speculation, but that it has practical relevance for
our blessedness and freedom in the present situation, His encouragement
for Christians to live in confidence as though the Kingdom of God had come
for the world as it had for themselves does contain a true insight into
realized eschatoiogy;^ however, Oman's theology would have had a better
eschatological balance if he had also emphasized that futuristic dimension
of the Kingdom of God which shall one day be manifested in glory and con-
3
summated in finality at the return of Christ.
*Grace and Personality, p. 272.
^Mark 1:15, 9:1; Matt. 3:2; Matt. 10:7, 12:23; Luke 11:20;
Luke 17:2 Of.
3Phil. 3:20-21; Titus 2:13; I John 3:2; Col. 3:4; I Thess. 4:17.
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From the foregoing discussions of exposition and evaluation, the
major thesis may be drawn in conclusion: Oman's basic contribution to
theology does not lie in the "content" or "exposition" area of thought but
rather in the field of theological methodology where freedom, personality,
sincerity, and comprehensiveness are indispensible attitudes and concepts
for the proper approach to theology. It should now be possible to go on
beyond Oman and make a more conscious attempt to interpret a theology
which is more thoroughly orientated around the kerygmatic event and con¬
tent of Biblical revelation. It will be helpful, however, to allow Oman to
stand guard over these efforts and insist that one maintain nothing in his




THE ROBERTSON SMITH CONTROVERSY
The Robertson Smith controversy within the Free Church of
Scotland arose in 1877 and ended in 1881, being dealt with in the Free
Church's Annual Assemblies each year within that period. The case
arose over articles contributed to the Encyclopaedia Brittanica's ninth
edition by William Robertson Smith, a twenty-four year old professor
of Hebrew in the Church's theological college in Aberdeen. The arti¬
cles, particularly one entitled "Bible" advanced the views of higher
criticism, and dealt freely with the dates, authorship and contents of
various books of Scripture. To deal in this way with the Bible was un¬
heard of within an orthodox and evangelical Church of that day. A full¬
blown heresy case soon developed and was dealt with under the elaborate
forms of a Presbyterian judicial process.
The General Assembly of 1877 set in motion, at Smith's own
demand, a "libel", making detailed charges of erroneous teaching. The
Assembly of 1878 declared the libel to be relevant, which meant that
Smith's views were found to be contradictory to the standards of the
Church. The Assembly of 1879 ordered immediate steps to be taken
for carrying out this finding and apparently the Church was heading
straight for a condemnation of Smith. At this stage, Principal Rainy
of New College, Edinburgh, who was Chairman of the Church's College
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Committee, changed his position. He had hitherto favored Smith, at
least to the extent of opposing the prosecution by libel. To avert the im¬
pending condemnation of Smith he made a compromise with the anti-Smith
forces. Under the agreement, they were to drop the libel and Rainy would
join them in removing Smith from his professorial position. This action
by Principal Rainy aroused intense adverse feeling. The controversy
rose to fever-heat at the Assembly of 1880. After prolonged and keen
debate, Smith was acquitted by a majority of seven. Apparently the case
was ended.
Within a few days, however, the fire was again ablaze. A new
volume of the Encyclopedia Brittanica appeared containing fresh articles
by Smith even more advanced in their critical position than the earlier
ones. The controversy reopened and by a very large majority the Assem¬
bly of 1881 declared that Smith's tenure as professor in the Theological
College was ended. 1
^Detailed information on the Robertson Smith Case is to be found
in the following works:
Robertson Smith Case, a bound volume of all the official papers
concerning the case, located in the library of Westminster College,
Cambridge.
J. S. Black and G.W. Chrystal, The Life of William Robertson
Smith (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1912J!
P. Carnegie Simpson, "The Robertson Smith Case Fifty Years
After," British Weekly (Vol. XC , May 28, 1931), pp. 161-62.
(continued on page 272)
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(Footnote 1 continued from page 271)
G. F. Barbour, The Life of Alexander Whyte, "The Robertson
Smith Case," (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1923), pp. 201-227.
P. Carnegie Simpson, The Life of Principal Rainy (2 volumes)
(London: 1909).
John Macpherson, A History of the Church of Scotland (London:
Alexander Gardner, 1901).
APPENDIX B
JOHN OMAN ON THE BOOK OF REVELATION
In The Book of Revelation, published in 1923, Oman treated the
book of Revelation in three parts: the text and its rearrangement; the text
and translation; and commentary. Concerning the book, Oman said a fit¬
ting dedication would be: "To the onlie begetter of the insuing book, Prof.
Burkitt's Seminar." He explained:
My presence at its deliberations on "Revelation" was not due
to any particular interest in the subject, but to a vague idea
that, to think about religion, without knowing a little about its
documents, is not much more use than to be a pundit on its
documents, w thout doing a little thinking about religion. *
Oman confessed that the study only stirred his antagonism to being baffled
by a problem. As he continued his study, three positive convictions
emerged concerning Revelation. The first was that the style and thought
alike guarantee unity of authorship. Secondly, he noted that the literary
sources were almost entirely the prophets, especially Daniel. The third
conclusion was that the visions were "transparencies of what are for us
abstractions, but were for the ancient world concrete, if ideal realities,
and not accounts of material supernatural happenings."^ He felt, then,
that there was through the whole of the book a view of the world which
*
John Oman, The Book of Revelation (Cambridge: University
Press, 1923), p. vii.
2
Ibid. , p. vii.
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might be reconstructed. Some parts Oman felt to be greatly clear,
others greatly confused; for this there must be some reason other than the
incapacity of the author. The most probable cause, he concluded, was dis¬
arrangement of the text. Some evidence of textual disarrangement was
apparent. Although pain and sorrow are described (xxi.4) as having
passed away forever, it is found in a subsequent passage (xxii.2) that
nations need healing. The Holy City is represented as coming (xxi.9),
but in an earlier passage (xx.4) the saints are described as sitting on
thrones. The prophetic call is not found immediately after the message to
the Churches, as it ought to be, but considerably later, in chapter ten.
When he began to transpose the sections in the order which commended
itself from an independent view of the contents of the book, he made the
extraordinary discovery that the sections, as he was induced to reshape
them, were of uniform length. He made the transpositions with the help
of Gebhardt's edition of the Greek New Testament, and found that the usual
length of the sections as reconstructed was thirty-three lines in Gebhardt's
text. This criterion of length was of service in enabling him to determine
a certain number of smaller glosses, which included practically all the
doublets, but it also served to indicate a variety of glosses which had a
"curious family likeness of dull comment.11'
iH. A. A. Kennedy, Review of The Book of Revelation, Tne
Expositor (Ninth Series, Vol. I, 1924), pp. 232f.
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In December, 1925, Dr. Oman wrote an article in The Exposi¬
tor on the "Apocalypse" in which he made one major change in his
theory of The Book of Revelation. He said that in his original theory
he had been dominated by the ordinary idea of a gloss, as an interjected
explanatory clause. But further study of the book had shown him that the
author gave many such explanations which were undoubtedly genuine.
Ke concluded that many of the glosses were genuine and were repetitious.
He also noted that the removal of all doublets which are not guaranteed
clearly by the text enabled him to divide the sections he prepared in the
earlier theory more naturally into the proper equal lengths. He
explained:
It may well be asked, why, especially as so large a part
of what I had excluded were doublets, I did not discover
this test at the time. But I suppose that I am not the first
person who, when working with a mass of detail, could
not see the wood for the trees. In some subconscious
way I must have noticed it, because, as soon as I dis¬
missed the subject from my conscious mind, and turned
to other studies, it occurred to me.^
^ohn Oman, "The Apocalypse," The Expositor (Ninth Series
Vol. IV, 1925), p. 443.
2
Book of B.evelation, p. 442.
-276-
These conclusions Oman used to form the basis for his The Text of
Revelation, A Revised Theory, published in 1928.
The essentials of the early theory are not changed in The Text
of Revelation; on the contrary, Oman felt the early theory to be confirmed
in the later work. The Text of Revelation is primarily a revision of the
attempt to rearrange the text in the light of the new clue he had found.
Oman was more convinced than before that the Apocalypse consisted of
a number of sections almost exactly equal in length. By removing ail
doublets—"repetitions by the original editor from his author,"—the
almost exactly equal length of the sections was demonstrable. *
According to his theory, Oman arrived at a book of twenty-seven
sections of exactly equal length. His final arrangement was as follows:
I "The Prophetic Call" Ch. i. 9 - ii. 3
II "Ephesis, Smyrna, Pergamum, Ch. ii. 3 - 19
Thyatira"
III "Thyatira, Sardis" Ch. ii. 19 - iii. 7
IV "Philadelphia, Laodicea" Ch. iii. 8 - 22
V "Second Prophetic Call" Ch. xxii.10-12, x. 1-11
VI "Summary to the Story of Ch. xi. 1-13
Prophecy" —
VIII "Fall of Satanic Powers" Ch. xii. 1-14
IX "Origin of the World-Kingdoms" Ch. xii. 14 - xiii. 11
X "The False Prophet and the Ch.xii. 11-18, xiv.6-12
True" — —
XI "The First Six Monarchies" Ch. xv.5-6, xvi.2-16 and
viii. 6-11
XII untitled Ch. xix. 11-15, xiv. 19-20,
xix. 16-21
XIII "The End of the World-Rule" Ch. xv i. 17 - xv ii. 9
XIV "Disruption and Anarchy" Ch.xvii.9 -xviii.6
XV "Desolation and Mourning" Ch. xviii. 19 - xix.9
XVI "The Old Order and the New" Ch. xvii.19 - xix.9
^ John Oman, The Text of Revelation: A Revised Theory (Cam¬
bridge : At the Universtt^Pre5ST^928), p. j.
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XVII "The New Prophetic Source"
XVIII "The Roll and the Lamb"
XIX "Summary of the Woes"
XX "The Sealing of the Saints"
XXI "The First Woe"
XXII "The Second Woe"
XXIII "The Third Woe"
XXIV "Ingathering of Good and
Destruction of Evil"
XXV "The Holy Jerusalem"
XXVI "The Holy Jerusalem
XXVII untitled
XXVIII "The Final State"
C h. i. 7, iv. 1 - v. 2
Ch. v.2 - vi.l





Ch. xi. 14-19, xiv.1-5,
13-14
Ch. xiv.14-19, xv.1, xv.6
xvi. 1, xv.2-4
Ch. xxi.9-24
Ch. xxi.24 - xxii.5, 6, 8,
xvi. 15, xxii. 14-17,20.
Ch. i. 3-6, xx. 1-10.
Ch. xx. 11 - xxi. 1, 3-8,
xxii. 18, 19, 21.
(It will be noted that VII is omitted because Oman felt an omission had
occurred in the text of Revelation.)
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